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CHAPTER I
RECONSTRUCTION: THE NEGRO AND THE SOUTH
It was December of I863 and the Confederacy was dying. During the 
summer months of that fateful year the gray-clad Southern armies, out­
numbered and poorly equipped, had seen their dream of a successful in­
vasion of the Northern heartland evaporate in the heat and smoke of the 
battle that was Gettysburg. They had also gone down to defeat in the war's 
western theater as Vicksburg finally succumbed to the long siege imposed 
by the Union forces under command of Ulysses S. Grant. The capitulation 
of this bastion severed the Confederacy by cutting off Arkansas, Louisi- 
■ana, and Texas from effective communication with their sister states. 
Southern arms had also failed, in this year of crisis, to contain the 
Federal forces operating in Tennessee. Confederate control of this key 
state was also lost in this fateful summer when the Northern troops 
emerged victorious in the bloody affrays at Lookout Mountain and Missionary 
Ridge. Defeat of the Southern soldiers in these "battles in the clouds" 
opened the way for the Northern host to launch a successful invasion of 
the heartland of the Confederacy. Over a year of death and destruction.
2heartache and horror, trial and tribulation remained to be endured, but 
for all practical purposes the month of December in the year I863 saw the 
death of the Confederate States of America.
In Washington, D. 0., during that month. President Abraham Lincoln 
was more and more turning his thoughts to the possibility of utilizing 
political experiments to assist the Union armies to bring a satisfactory 
and rapid conclusion to the rebellion. One such experiment had already 
resulted in eventual Confederate success being much less likely. This ex­
periment had been employed in I862 when Southern victories had made it 
appear probable that the nations of France and England would accord recog­
nition to the Confederate States of America. Such an act would have re­
moved the conflict from the category of a fratricidal dispute and bestowed 
upon it the aura of a war for independence on the part of the South.
After recognition was granted the European powers could offer arms, money, 
and other articles to the Confederacy without violating the rights of the 
United States under international law. Such an event would enhance the 
power of the Confederacy and increase the possibility that success would 
attend Southern efforts to loosen the shackles of union. Consequently, 
Lincoln, realizing that there existed among many of the English people a 
feeling of repugnance toward the institution of slavery, decided to bestow 
upon the \ra,r the character of a crusade to free the millions held in 
bondage. Such an act would require the English government, generally 
regarded as being sympathetic to the South, to take into consideration 
the attitude of its electorate and possibly withhold recognition. As 
England went so would go France, and if these nations did not recognize
3the South they -would be reluctant to violate international la-w by giving 
overt assistance to the Confederacy. With this in mind Lincoln issued a 
preliminary proclamation of emancipation on September 22, 1862, and followed 
it with a formal proclamation on New Year's Day, I663. The primary pro­
vision of the definitive statement was that in those areas still in re­
bellion all of the people held in bondage were free and the United States 
would recognize and seek to maintain their freedom.^ While no slaves were 
actually freed by the Emancipation Proclamation, it did fulfill the pur­
pose for which it was really intended— it contributed to the decision of
2
the government of England to refrain from recognizing the Confederacy.
The success attendant upon the issuance of the Emancipation 
Proclamation was undoubtedly one of the reasons for Lincoln's effort to 
take advantage of the fact that in some areas of the Confederacy there 
existed a non-vocal element which was essentially loyal to the Federal 
government. After Union troops overran portions of Louisiana, North Car­
olina, and Tennessee in 1662, the President appointed provisional gover­
nors for those states and charged them with the responsibility of en­
couraging the loyalists to assert themselves for the United States.
^Omitted from the effect of the Proclamation were Tennessee, the 
areas of Virginia and Louisiana then under Federal control, and the border 
slave states. For the text of the Emancipation Proclamation see Henry 
Steel Commager (ed.). Documents of American History (Two volumes in one, 
l-l-th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1$48), I, 420-21.
2
Southern leaders undoubtedly realized that this was the purpose 
of Lincoln's pronouncement, but they couched their opposition to it on a 
different plane. The Richmond VAiig, October 1, I862, said that it openly 
in-vlted the slaves to rise in insurrection. The Richmond Examiner echoed 
this sentiment and characterized the Proclamation as the "most startling 
political crime . . . yet known in American history." Jefferson Davis 
warned that it made restitution of the Union forever impossible. Quoted 
in James G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York; D. C.
Heath and Co., 1937); P* 498.
4Lincoln realized that the sowing of distrust and discord in these states 
would rust the armor of the Confederacy and would mean as much to the 
eventual success of the Union cause as would another victory in the field. 
In North Carolina the provisional governor did not find Union sentiment 
strong enough to subvert the Confederate cause, but some measure of 
success \fas achieved in Louisiana, Tennessee, and, after the fall of 
Vicksburg, in Arkansas.
To solidify the gains made in these states and to provide a more 
definite procedure for the establishment of loyal governments, Lincoln 
issued a proclamation on December 8, I863, which granted a pardon to all 
except a specified few of the residents of those states still in re­
bellion. This plan also looked forward to the calling of constitutional 
conventions and the establishment of loyal governments in the states which
4
had rebelled.
During the following year constitutional conventions were held 
and loyal governments were established under Lincoln's plan in Arkansas, 
Tennessee, and Louisiana. Establishment of new governments raised the 
question of whether the privilege of casting a ballot should be bestowed 
upon the freed Negroes. Before the convention was convened in Louisiana, 
the President wrote a letter to Michael Hahn congratulating him upon be­
coming the first free-state governor of that commonwealth. The President
^William A. Dunning, Reconstruction, Political and Economic, 
1865-1877, vol. XXII of The American Nation; A History, ed. A. B. Hart 
(28 vols.; New York: Harper and Bros., 19C4 -l8), p. l4.
^James D. Richardson (comp.), A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-I897 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing 
Office, 1896-99), VI, 214.
5noted in his letter that the forthcoming convention in Louisiana would 
probably define the franchise qualifications. He therefore suggested, 
for Hahn's "private consideration," that some of the colored men be 
granted the ballot--"as, for instance, the very intelligent, and es­
pecially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks.The Louisiana 
convention chose not to heed this suggestion and no Negroes were en­
franchised. Actually,there was little precedent for Lincoln's proposal 
because members of the colored race had only rarely been privileged to 
vote in any of the states prior to the Civil War.^
Establishment of new state governments continued the question 
that had faced the Louisiana convention— whether or not the recently 
freed colored man should be endowed with the franchise. Idiile Lincoln 
iiad deemed it necessary to suggest a limited amount of Negro suffrage in 
his letter to Hahn in lü6k, the idea had not been accepted and was more 
or less ignored when the war ended. Certainly in 1865 the belief that 
the colored man should be endowed with the ballot \ms not a part of the
L^etter of Abraham Lincoln to Michael Hahn, March I3, l864, in 
Roy P. Easier (ed.). The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, VII (New 
Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953); 132.
A^t the outset of the American Revolution only Georgia and South 
Carolina denied the ballot to the free Negro. After that conflict North 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia allowed all free men, regardless of 
color, to exercise the franchise if they possessed the requisite amount 
of property. By the 1830's, however, the constitutions of these states 
were changed so that even free Negroes were excluded. Maryland pro­
hibited voting by colored men in 181O, and no other Southern state per­
mitted persons of color to vote before the Civil War. The only states 
which apparently had no race restrictions in regard to voting were Maine, 
Nhssachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. For a complete 
discussion of this subject see Stephen B. Weeks, "The History of Negro 
Suffrage in the South," Political Science Quarterly, IX (December, l8$4),
674-81.
national policy of the Republican party. While some leaders of this party 
expounded the view that enfranchisement was necessary, for the most part 
they considered it to be an umd.se and perhaps even dangerous expedient. 
One such Republican leader, Oliver P. Morton, summed up the prevailing 
attitude in a speech at Richmond, Indiana, shortly after the end of the 
\jar. It was his contention that to say "men just emerged from slavery are 
qualified for the exercise of political power, is to make the strongest 
pro-slavery argument I ever heard. It is to pay the highest compliment
7
to the institution of slavery."
Morton's belief that the colored man at the moment of his freedom 
vras incapable of understanding the responsibilities attached to the exer­
cise of the franchise was not unanimously accepted by the party leader­
ship, but it vras the view apparently held by most party leaders in the 
last months of the war. There was not, for instance, any provision for 
Negro suffrage in the plan of Reconstruction promulgated by Lincoln on
December 8, 1863, nor did the Congressional answer to his program, the
8Wade-Davis bill, give consideration to the subject. The same situation 
prevailed when Lincoln was assassinated and was succeeded by the Southern 
Democrat, Andrew Johnson of Tennessee.
Lincoln's death at the hands of an assassin meant that Recon-
Quoted in ibid., 681.
o
The Wade-Davis bill provided for the enrollment of all white 
males in the seceded states, and, when a majority of those enrolled took 
an oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States, the election of 
delegates to a constitutional convention. Delegates were to be chosen 
by "the loyal white male citizens." No mention was made of Negro eli­
gibility to vote in the elections. Richardson (comp.). Messages and 
Papers, VI, 223-2 6.
7struction policy would be directed by a Southerner who had opposed se­
cession and who had long been hostile to the Southern aristocracy. Be­
cause Johnson had been an enemy of the Confederacy he was considered by 
the Radical Republicans as being attuned to their view that the South 
should be punished for its experiment in secession. The responsibilities 
of office, however, soon revealed Johnson in a new light, and it was not 
long before he adopted the essential elements of his predecessor's ideas.  ^
Much to the disgust of the Radicals, Johnson became fairly liberal, but, 
like Lincoln, he was never overly anxious to see the recently freed 
colored men enfranchised.^^
Under Johnson's plan of Reconstruction constitutional conventions 
were held throughout the South in the fall of l86$.^^ Conventions in
L^ike Lincoln,/Johnson soon adopted a liberal plan. He called 
for the provisional governors to provide for a constitutional convention. 
Delegates were to be chosen by those who had taken an oath of allegiance 
to the United States, but there was no requirement that a certain per­
centage of the electors, as in Lincoln's plan, must take the oath before 
a convention could be assembled. Such conventions were called upon to 
repudiate the Ordinance of Secession and the Confederate debt, and were 
to define qualifications to vote and eligibility to office. For pro­
visions of the various plans see Walter L. Fleming (ed.). Documentary 
History of Reconstruction; Political, Military, Social, Religious, and 
Industrial, 1865 to the Present Time (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, Co.,
1906-07), II, 118-70.
^^Johnson did suggest to Governor W. L. Sharkey of Mississippi that 
the convention in that state might extend the franchise to literate Negroes 
and to those who owned property in the amount of two hundred and fifty 
dollars. Johnson said that this would foil those Radicals who were wild 
on the subject of Negro suffrage in their efforts to prevent the Southern 
states from renewing their relations with the rest of the Union. Ibid., 
p. 177' Evidently the President's suggestion of even limited Negro 
suffrage was simply a matter of political expediency. His real attitude 
vras undoubtedly expressed on October 3I, I865, when he said that "it 
would not do to let the negro have universal suffrage now; it would breed 
a \far of races." Ibid., p. II7. It might be noted that before Johnson 
assumed the presidency loyal state governments had already been es­
tablished in Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Virginia.
8every state but Texas completed their work before the end of November.
All but South Carolina fulfilled the req_uirements laid down by Johnson; 
that state refused to repudiate the Confederate debt. The action taken 
by South Carolina, and the quibbling in some conventions as to whether 
their Ordinance of Secession should be "repealed" or declared "forever 
null and void" contributed to the increasing Northern suspicion that the 
South had not yet accepted the fact of her defeat.
An important factor in the development of this attitude on the 
part of many Northerners was that none of the Southern conventions seri­
ously considered granting the franchise to the Negro. A few months 
earlier even the Republican leadership did not believe that such an event 
■\'/as necessary, but the action of the conventions and Southern statements 
on the subject convinced many of the people at the North that the colored 
man would be unable to protect himself without the ballot. Some Southern 
leaders had given lip service to the idea of Negro suffrage, but even 
these had qualified their acceptance of the principle. In South Carolina, 
for example, some of the recognized leaders had stated that they were 
willing to see the colored man enfranchised, but that it must be in a 
limited manner. Northerners looked with suspicion upon such an attitude 
as that expressed by the brother of Wade Hampton. This individual in­
formed a visiting Northern reporter, Whitelaw Reid, before the convention 
was assembled in that state, that he and many other whites had no great 
objection to allowing the Negro to vote. Such a statement would have 
aroused no suspicion at the North as to Southern intentions toward the
^^In no instance were Negroes allowed to participate in choosing
members.
9colored man had not this prominent South Carolinian continued hy stating
that the South would not suffer from enfranchisement because the masters
12would cast the ballots of their former slaves as they did their own! 
Statements of this type certainly did nothing to mollify the increasing 
Northern suspicions as to the true attitude in the South toward the Negro. 
Neither did the fact that in all of the former Confederate states the con­
ventions refused to countenance even the enfranchisement of the more in­
telligent colored men. Thus, there was increasing dissatisfaction with 
Southern policy and the development of the thought that force must be 
applied to bring the principle of Negro suffrage to fruition.
Establishments of governments in the Southern states under the 
Johnson plan completed Presidential Reconstruction. It did not, however, 
mark an end to the question. Unfortunately for the future history of the 
South the state governments inaugurated under this plan and the Congressmen 
chosen in those states included among their numbers many former Confeder­
ates. This, coupled with the obvious reluctance of those states to .ratify 
the Thirteenth Amendment and the adoption of the so-called Black Codes, 
convinced some Republican leaders that a solidly Democratic South was 
emerging. They realized that the electoral vote of the Southern states, 
coupled with those of New York and New Jersey, would be sufficient to win 
a Presidential election for the opposition party. With this the dominance 
of the sectional Republican party in national politics would come to an 
abrupt end. But, if a strong Republican party could be developed in the 
Southern states such a situation might not develop for several years.
]_2Whitelaw Reid, After the War : A Southern Tour (Cincinnati, Low,
1866), p. 288.
10
Leaders of the party realized, however, that such success could not he 
attained without the Negro vote, and with the Democrats in power in these 
states this objective would be difficult to achieve. Consequently, the 
only hope that the Republicans had of ever being anything more than a 
sectional party was to bring an end to the white-dominated Democratic 
governments established under the Johnson plan.
In order to gain the time necessary to solidify opposition to 
the Johnson governments, the Radical Republicans blocked the seating of 
Congressmen from the Southern states in the session which began in De­
cember, 1865. Then the Radicals— those extremists in the Republican party 
who advocated a punitive policy toward the South— brought about the organ­
ization of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. This committee, under 
the chairmanship of Senator William Fessenden but dominated by the vitri­
olic Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, was charged with the responsibility of 
investigating conditions in the South. It was also to inform Congress 
when the former Confederate states were ready to be readmitted into the 
Union. The committee, composed of fifteen members, collected testimony 
from a seeming unending parade of witnesses on the conditions which pre­
vailed in the South. Such "evidence" as was elicited from these eager 
witnesses proved to the satisfaction of the Radicals that the Southern
states had been lax in providing protection for the loyalist element and
13
the colored people. Consequently, in the opinion of the committee these 
states could not be considered ready to fulfill their obligations as 
members of the Union. In addition, Congress was informed that since the
^^Francis B. Simkins, The South Old and New: A History, 182O-I9I7 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), P* I8I.
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former Confederate states were either unwilling or unable to regulate re­
lations between the whites and their former slaves, the Freedmen's Bureau 
and an army of occupation must be maintained in the South.
Testimony assembled by the Joint Committee convinced moderate as 
well as Radical Republicans that the former Confederates were unwilling 
to accept the fact of their defeat and that drastic measures were neces­
sary to protect the colored people. Supporting this contention were re­
ports from newspaper correspondents, occasional travelers, and official 
observers who visited these states in the years immediately after the war. 
f^liile not all of the reports, both formal and informal, were antagonistic 
toivard the former enemy enough of them fell into that category that Radi­
cal contentions as to Southern attitude could be supported. For instance, 
-the report of the highly respected Carl Shurtz, an official observer sent 
into the South by President■Johnson, maintained that a majority of the 
people in that region were not contrite and that they were only awaiting 
a favorable opportunity to reestablish slavery. This position was 
seemingly supported by reports of mistreatment of Negroes by the whites. 
Accounts of numerous Northerners, coupled with riots in Memphis and New 
Orleans in l366 during which many colored people lost their lives, con­
vinced many people at the North that steps must be taken to protect the 
freedman. Such action was forthcoming on February l6, 1866, when Congress 
passed legislation extending the life and expanding the scope of the 
Freedmen's Bureau. A short two months later, on April 9, 1866, Congress 
enacted into law the Civil Rights Act. This measure made the Negro a
^^ The Freedmen's Bureau, designed to protect the blacks in their 
relationship with the whites, ;ras created in March, I865, as a bureau in 
the War Department.
12
citizen and conferred upon him all civil rights enjoyed hy the whites.
It was hoped hy Republican leaders that such measures would not only af­
ford protection to the colored man, hut would also increase his loyalty 
to the Republican party.
In spite of the fact that these measures were widely acclaimed in 
the North, President Johnson did not feel he could accept them. Although 
not convinced that the Freedmen's Bureau was necessary for the protection 
of the colored man, the primary reason assigned to the President for his 
veto of the measure was that the Southern states had been denied repre­
sentation in Congress. In his veto message Johnson admitted that each 
branch of Congress was the judge of the qualifications of its members, 
hut, he continued, "that authority cannot he construed as including the 
right to shut out in time of peace any State from representation to which 
it is entitled hy the Constitution . Johnson's contention that
Congress was not legally constituted, and his subsequent veto of the Civil 
Rights Act resulted in increased antipathy toward the President on the 
part of members of that body and also among the rank and file of the Re­
publican party.
After the vetoes, verbal attacks upon Johnson came with ever- 
increasing frequency. The President answered the vituperation in kind 
and the nation ^ as treated to the unfortunate spectacle of the Chief Ex­
ecutive engaging in a name-calling affray with prominent Congressmen. The 
end result was a decline in the prestige of Johnson. Unable to longer 
command respect, he could not, as he attempted in 1866, influence the
^^The text of the veto message may be found in Commager (ed.). 
Documents of American History, II, 12-l4 .
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electorate to select a Congress which would support his program. Unfortu­
nately for the future of the South, the Radicals, augmented in numbers by 
newly elected members and by Moderates now disenchanted with Johnson, had 
little difficulty after the l866' election in overriding Presidential vetoes. 
Very quickly they began to work their will upon the South.
In the Congressional session of I867 the Radical Republicans were 
firmly in control, but there was some doubt as to how long this position 
could be maintained. Prior to the abolition of slavery only three-fifths 
of the Negroes were counted in determining Congressional representation.
The freeing of the slaves ended this arrangement and entitled the former 
Confederate states to increased representation in Congress and the 
Electoral College. That this posed a threat to the ascendancy of the 
Republicans was clearly recognized by the leaders of that party. Largely 
as a result of this, sentiment in the Radical-dominated Congress strongly 
favored making enfranchisement of the Negro a prerequisite for reorgan­
ization of governments in the Southern states. If the colored man could 
be made eligible to the ballot he could undoubtedly be influenced to cast 
his vote for the party responsible for his freedom. This might break the 
power of the Democratic party in the South and assure the continued as­
cendancy of the Republicans. That this was the ultimate purpose of that 
party can be seen in statements made by its leadership. Thaddeus Stevens, 
for example, said in I867 that "the Republican white men are in a minority 
in each of those States. With them the blacks would act in a body, form 
a majority, control the States and protect themselves. It would assure 
the ascendancy of the Union party.Charles Sumner, Radical counterpart
^^Quoted in Weeks, "The History of Negro Suffrage in the South," 
Political Science Quarterly, IX, 682.
Ik
of Stevens in the Senate, wanted to go even further and provide for Negro 
suffrage throughout the Union. On April 20, I867, he addressed the editor 
of a prominent journal, the Independent, on the subject of bestowing the 
franchise upon the colored man. Noting that the editor favored ac­
complishing this end through the medium of an amendment to the Consti­
tution, Sumner said that "we can not wait . . . this question must be 
settled forthwith; in other words, it must be settled before the presi­
dential election . . . The votes of the Negroes, he continued, "are 
needed at the North as well as at the South. There are Northern states 
where their votes can make the good cause safe beyond question."^?
That the colored vote was necessary for the continued success of 
the Republican party was increasingly recognized by its leaders, and 
their attitude toward the South was certain!'" not mollified by the action 
undertaken by the states of that section in relation to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This proposed change in the nation's fundamental law was 
passed by Congress even though the Civil Rights Act, guaranteeing to the 
Negro many of the same things incorporated in the Amendment, had been 
put into effect over Johnson's veto. The Radicals, however, realized 
that it would be simple for future Congresses to revise or abandon this 
legislation and, consequently, sought to guarantee the Negro's position 
by changing the basic law of the Ifaited States. Thus, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, submitted to the states in June, I866, not only defined citi­
zenship and made the Negro a citizen, but it also sought to protect the 
colored man in his civil rights. VJhile the Amendment did not directly
^^Quoted in ibid.
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enfranchise the Negro, it did seek to accomplish that end by penalizing 
those states denying him the vote by lessening their representation in 
Congress and the Electoral College.Reaction to this Amendment in the 
South vras what might have been expected. The legislature of every former. 
Confederate state but Tennessee refused to give ratification. In this 
action they were joined by enough other states that the necessary three- 
fourths vote could not be immediately secured, and for the time-being it 
appeared that the Amendment would be rejected.
Action of the Southern states on the proposed change in the 
Constitution resulted in the Radicals becoming even more convinced that 
restrictive legislation was necessary. Thus, when the "lame-duck" session 
of Congress was convened in December, I866, there -vras inaugurated what 
might be termed the "force policy" of Reconstruction.' Through the medium 
of legislation passed in this and the following session, the Southern 
governments established under the Lincoln and Johnson plans were over- 
tlxrown. In the so-called First Reconstruction Act, passed on March 2,
1867, it \78.s declared that "no legal State governments or adequate pro­
tection for life or property" existed in ten of the former Confederate 
states.In order that "peace and order" might be restored these ten 
states were divided into five districts--each of which was to be placed 
under the command of a military governor. This individual was to call a
18The amendment also forced repudiation of the Confederate debt, 
guaranteed that of the Federal government, and denied many former Con­
federates the privilege of holding office. This latter disability could 
be removed by a two-thirds vote of Congress. For the complete text see 
Commager (ed.). Documents of American History, II, $1 .
19Tennessee, already under a Radical government, was the exception.
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constitutional convention to which the members would be elected by
"the male citizens ... of whatever race, color or previous con- 
20dition . . . ." Each convention 'vras charged with the responsibility
of preparing a new instrument of government for its .state which would
include a provision establishing the same rule of suffrage. After the
constitution was approved by a majority of the qualified voters of the
state and by Congress, state officials might be elected. Congressmen
would be seated from the state, however, only after the legislature had
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and it had become a part of the 
21Constitution.
This act, and supplemental measures passed for the purposes of 
clarification, were not acceptable to President Johnson. Congress de­
sired to overthrow the already loyal governments, he maintained in his 
veto message, only in order that it could insist upon the granting of 
the franchise to the Negro. "Universal suffrage," he proclaimed, "is a
question which the Federal Constitution leaves exclusively to the States 
22themselves." Johnson's efforts in vetoing this and subsequent legis­
lation, however, was merely a "tilting at windmills." The Radical- 
dominated Congress had no intention of allowing the already discredited 
President to prevent the fulfillment of its plans for the Southern states. 
The vetoes were quickly over-ridden, and supplementary legislation,
2%he act excluded from voting those who were disfranchised for 
participating in the rebellion. Fleming (ed.). Documentary History of 
Re construction. I, 402.
^^ Ibid.
2 2
For the complete text of the veto message see Richardson (comp.). 
Messages and Papers, VI, 532-33
17
designed to prevent Johnson from thwarting the will of Congress, was en­
acted into law. On March 2, for example, Congress passed the Command of 
the Army Act. This measure placed the military, important to the Radicals 
as a tool through which their dictates could he enforced, under the 
virtual control of the Radical-dominated General of the Army, Ulysses S. 
Grant. At the same time there was enacted the Tenure of Office Act— a
measure which usurped control of the President's o\m cabinet by preventing
2Rthe dismissal of members friendly to the Radicals. That the Radicals 
were firmly in the saddle was now evident; they intended to ride until 
the Southern states were reconstituted to their own satisfaction.
Enactment of the Reconstruction measures left the South confused 
and disheartened. Benjamin H. Hill, later to represent Georgia in the 
Senate of the United States, declared that the legislation constituted a
breach of faith with the South because the obligations they imposed had
oh
not been made a condition of surrender. Provisions in the act moved 
another Georgian, a newspaperman, to write that while military rule might 
be forced upon the South "she will never confess a falsehood nor affix 
the brand of infamy on her own brow."^^ V/hite leaders in Arkansas
^^Johnson was later impeached for dismissing Secretary of War 
Edwin Stanton in violation of the terms of the Tenure of Office Act.
That he escaped conviction, on obviously trumped-up charges, by only 
one vote is indicative of the tenor of opinion in Congress.
2k
Benjamin H. Hill, Jr. (ed.). Senator Benjamin H. Hill of 
Georgia: His Life, Speeches, and Writings (Atlanta; T. H. P. Bloodworth,
1Ü93), P- 747.
^^Augusta Weekly Constitutionalist, February 27, I8Ô7, quoted in 
E. Merton Coulter, The South During Reconstruction, 1865-I877, Vol. VIII 
of A History of the South, eds. Wendall Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter 
(12 vols.; Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1$47--),
p. 121.
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declared that Reconstruction under the Congressional plan was an impossi­
bility; it would result in "the certain degradation, prostration and 
complete ruin of the State.Mississippi sought to prevent the imple­
mentation of the acts by requesting the Supreme Court of the United States 
to enjoin President Johnson from enforcing them. This request was denied, 
as was the petition of Georgia for an injunction prohibiting Secretary of 
War Edwin Stanton from enforcing the measure.No matter how much the 
South might complain, the refusal of the Supreme Court to take action 
made it clear that the Southern states could not look to that body for 
redress of grievances.
While much dissatisfaction was manifested in the South toward 
the Congressional plan, some Southerners believed from the outset that 
it would be better to accept the situation. Joseph E. Brown, war-Gover- 
nor of Georgia, warned his compatriots not to flatter themselves that 
they had the privilege of "choosing between the present proposition and 
continued military government." If the South rejected the Congressional
plan, he warned, the next action of the Radicals might be to turn the
?Rarea completely over to Negro rule. A Confederate hero from South
h2 3 -2h.
26Quoted in Fleming, Documentary History of Reconstruction, I,
^In the Mississippi case the Supreme Court ruled that the issue 
tvas a political matter in which the Court did not have jurisdiction, and 
also that the President might not be restrained in the performance „of his 
executive duties by the judiciary. Mississippi V. Johnson, 4 Wallace 
(U.S.), 475, 500-01, (1867). In the case of Georgia V. Stanton, the 
Court ruled that the Secretary of War was an agent of the President, and 
was consequently not subject to interference by the judicial branch. 
Georgia V. Stanton, 6 Wallace (U.S.), 50, 77 (I867, I868).
23Speech of Ex-Gov. Joseph E. Brown, of Georgia, Delivered in
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Carolina; Wade Hampton; advised Southerners to accept the situation; but 
to try and convince the colored man that his best friend vas the Southern 
white. Hampton professed to believe that the states of the South should 
establish impartial suffrage and recognize the political rights of the 
blacks. He cautioned all classes to cultivate harmony and exercise fore-
bearance; to remember the Negroes were not responsible for the existing
29state of affairs.
It actually mattered very little whether Southerners sought to 
"cultivate harmony" or whether they liked the Congressional plan--they 
were forced by circumstances to follow the procedure it outlined. Presi­
dent Johnson; although believing the legislation to be unconstitutional;
fulfilled his obligation under the act by appointing the military com­
manders. The generalS; required by the so-called Second Military Recon­
struction Act to enroll eligible voters before September 1; 186Y; also
quickly set about their task. According to the terms of the law no indi­
vidual was entitled to register if he had willingly participated in the 
rebellion; and as a result of this disfranchising clause much of the 
potential white electorate was not included on the completed registration 
lists. The ultimate effect was that more Negroes— the group from which
Milledgville; Ga.; June 6, 1867, on the Present Situation and Future 
Prospects of the Country; pp. 1-8; quoted in Coulter; The South During 
Reconstruction, p. 12].
^^Letter of Wade Hampton, August 7, 1867, included in Free Men I 
Free Ballots 11 Free Schools 111 The Pledges of Gen. Wade Hampton, Demo­
cratic Candidate for Governor, to the Colored People of South Carolina 
(n.p.; 1B76); pp. 1-2 . A copy of this campaign document may be foundat 
the University of North Carolina library. It might be noted that such 
other prominent Southerners as Albert Gallatin Brown of Mississippi and 
former generals Pierre G. T. Beauregard and James Longstreet also advised 
compliance with Congressional dictates.
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the Republican party was to draw its strength in the South--were enrolled 
than were native whites.
After registration ms completed in the various states, elections 
were held to determine if constitutional conventions should be called and 
if so, to choose delegates to them. lyfeny of those whites eligible to vote 
absented themselves from the polls in an effort to prevent a majority
of
vote in the state. Most of the whites who did vote cast their ballot 
for the convention. The same was true of the majority of the Negroes and
32
as a result the vote ms in favor of holding a convention.
Inactivity on the part of the whites plus the marshalling of the 
Negro vote in favor of the state constitutional convention resulted in 
the membership of those bodies being predominately Radical. In Louisiana 
and South Carolina a majority of the delegates were colored, and in all 
states, with the exception of North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, the 
combined vote of the Negro and white Radical delegates exceeded that of 
the Conservatives. A few.colored delegates were men of ability, but in 
most instances they were illiterate. ^3 Consequently, the white Radical
3*^ The registration totals included 627,00 whites and 703,000 
Negroes. The latter outnumbered the whites in Alabama, Florida, Loui­
siana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Simkins, The South Old and New,
p. 187.
^^ The Reconstruction Acts provided that no convention could be 
held unless a majority of the registered voters participated in the 
elections. Some leaders advised whites to abstain from voting and thus 
possibly prevent the necessary majority. Fleming (ed.). Documentary 
History of Reconstruction, I, k2 '^-2 k . In South Carolina and Florida 
only about one-tenth of the registered whites voted, and in no state did 
more than one-half participate. Coulter, The South During Reconstruction, 
P- 133.
S2Coulter, The South During Reconstruction, p. 133- 
^^ sitnkins. The South Old and New, p. I90.
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leaders, latent upon assuring the ascendancy of the Republican party, 
were able to dominate the proceedings.
The new instruments of government prepared by the conventions 
assembled under the Radical plan included some progressive innovations.
As a whole they all included the principle of equality of all men before 
the law, required the counting of the total population as the basis for 
representation, and provided for universal manhood suffrage without re­
strictions as to race, color or previous condition. Generally, too, they 
provided for free education of all children, and usually centralized power 
in the governor. Some states, however, included provisions which were 
too radical to be effective. The South Carolina convention, for example, 
adopted resolutions expunging forever from the vocabulary of the state 
the words "Negro," "nigger," and "Yankee.
By 1868 every convention but Virginia's and Texas' had completed 
its work and submitted a newly prepared constitution--each conferring the 
right to vote upon the Negro— to its electorate for acceptance or re­
jection. Republican leaders in the various states advised immediate 
adoption; most Conservative leaders voiced opposition. Despite all 
efforts of the latter to prevent it, all of the Southern states but three 
accepted their constitutions, inaugurated new state governments, and rati-
qh
For a compilation of these state constitutions see Francis N. 
Thorpe (comp, and ed.). The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial 
Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies 
Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America {k vols.; 
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, I909).
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of South Carolina, 
quoted in Fleming (ed.). Documentary History of Reconstruction, I, 4$0.
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fied the Fourteenth Amendment by July, l868.^^ Upon completion of this 
procedure they were readmitted to the Union and their representatives were 
seated in Congress.
The three remaining states— Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia— were 
not restored to their normal relationship until 187O. Prior to this date 
Mississippi voters had rejected the constitution submitted to them for 
ratification; Texas Republicans engaged in an intra-party battle and could 
not agree on a constitution; Virginia's new instrument of government so 
severely proscribed ex-Confederates that the district commander refused 
to submit it to the electorate. Consequently, when the Radical-dominated 
Ulysses S. Grant was elected President in I868, there were still three 
Southern states out of harmony with the rest of the Union. Shortly after 
Grant assumed office in March, I869, he was instructed by Congress to 
bring these states into their normal relationship with the rest of the 
Union as soon as was feasible. This was accomplished by allowing the 
electorate of Mississippi and Virginia to vote on their constitutions 
with or without the objectionable disfranchising clause. In both states 
that particular clause was rejected and the remainder of the constitution 
was accepted. As a result, Virginia, after ratifying the Fifteenth 
Amendment, v/as readmitted to the Union in January, I87O, and Mississippi 
the following month. By March of the same year the Texans had settled 
their differences and had been accepted back into the good graces of the
2°Enough voters remained aivay from the polls in Alabama that a 
majority of the registered voters did not participate as ivas required by 
the Second Reconstruction Act. Congress, therefore, enacted the Fourth 
Military Reconstruction Act. It provided that constitutions would become 
effective when approved by a majority of those participating in the 
election.
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37Iftiited States.
Readmittance of the Southern states did not result in an immediate 
end to their difficulties. In fact, the years included in the period from 
the summer of 1868 to the spring of l877--the time when the last Federal 
troops were withdrawn from-the South— saw so many changes and problems 
that the period is generally termed Black Reconstruction. These are the 
years when all of the Southern governments were, for varying lengths of 
time, under the domination of the Radical Republicans and their colored
o Q
cohorts. Actually, the Negroes, only recently freed from the stulti­
fying effects of slavery, were generally not competent from an educational 
standpoint to participate either in elections or governmental adminis­
tration. Since the colored men had no tradition of self-government it 
is not at all surprising that they ordinarily were meek in following the 
instructions of their white leaders. The latter fell into one of two 
categories— Carpetbagger or Scalai^ ag. Carpetbagger ivas an opprobrious 
term bestowed upon a few thousand adventurers who descended upon the 
Southern states from the North after the Civil War. Their primary purpose 
seemed to be that of organizing the blacks politically and then utilizing
37Georgia was another state not fully accepted until 187O. She 
had been readmitted in June, I868, but the first legislature convened 
under the new constitution expelled its Negro members on the grounds that 
the colored man was entitled to vote but not to hold office. The state 
\ia.s again placed under military Reconstruction with the proviso that the 
Negroes must be reseated, and that Georgia must join Mississippi, Texas, 
and Virginia in ratifying the Fifteenth Amendment. Upon fulfilling these 
provisions Georgia vra,s readmitted in I87O.
38Only Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina were dominated by 
the Radicals for the entire period. Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia 
attained "home rule" after a short period and the other states after four 
or five years.
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the Negro vote to win and control public office. This group was joined
in its activities by native white Southerners derisively termed Scalawags.
The motives guiding this group were varied. Some cooperated with the
Radicals because of a desire for office, some because they believed the
Negro must be uplifted; many because they had a heritage of a political
philosophy more akin to that of the Republican than of the Democratic
party.IVhatever reason they might have had for lending support to the
Radical Carpetbagger, they were usually considered traitors to the South.
One Southern journal, for example, characterized the Scalawag as the
"local leper . . .^ni^a mangy dog."^^ Another newspaper proclaimed
that it would prefer to see in office "the blackest man that can be found
to the whitest renegade of the South . . . ." These individuals, said
the editor, "have dishonored the dignity of the white blood and are
traitors alike to principle and race."^^
IVhile Southerners disliked the Scalawag as a matter of principle,
they were particularly concerned with the fact that the Radicals utilized
the Freedman's Bureau and an organization known as the Union League to
ho
bring the Negro into the Republican party. Although the Freedmen's 
qg
David Donald says that the assumption that after the war the 
Southern V/higs joined with the Democrats to fight Negro and Carpetbag 
rule ■v/as not always true. îfeny 1-fliigs joined with the Republicans. He 
estimates that from 25 to 30 per cent of the white voters in Mississippi 
had joined the Republican party by I873. David H. Donald, "The Scalawag 
in Mississippi Reconstruction," Journal of Southern History, X (November,
1944), 448.
^^ Land We Love, VI (1868-69), p. 87, quoted in Coulter, The South 
During Reconstruction, p. 12$.
^^Augusta Daily Constitutionalist, August 15, 1867, quoted in 
ibid., p. 126.
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Bureau was charged with such activity, it was undoubtedly the Union League 
which had the greatest success. The methods employed by this organi­
zation to achieve its ends were varied and complex. Well aware of the 
Negro's penchant for ceremony, an elaborate ritual and an impressive cate­
chism ^ fas evolved. Night meetings with their aura of mystery and gay 
parades and drills were used to appeal to the colored man's love of show. 
But if persuasion failed, fear and intimidation were also acceptable parts 
of the League's program to gain Negro support for the Republican party. ^3 
Most of the colored men willingly united with that party, but, unfortu­
nately for the Negro, the excesses of Black Reconstruction were charged 
to him while the spoils of office fell to his political mentors.
The period of Radical or Black Reconstruction is usually pictured 
as one of general corruption in the governments of the Southern states. 
Since this \ras not an era of morality in office--witness the activities 
of the Tweed Ring in New York and the scandals associated with the Grant 
administration--it is not too surprising to find the Radical Republicans 
in the South succumbing to the opportunities of gaining wealth from the 
public coffers. Most of the higher and potentially more lucrative offices
]i O
The Union League was founded in Northern cities in 1862 to rally 
support for the ifar effort after the reverses of that year. Agents of the 
League entered the South when the war ended. For awhile it was a white 
organization, but in l866 Negroes were admitted to membership. By I867 
its primary objective was the organization of Negro voters for the Re­
publican party. Fleming (ed.). Documentary History of Reconstruction,
II, 3-5.
4.3
North Carolina Negroes were told in l863 that if the Democratic 
candidate for President won the election the colored man would be returned 
to bondage. Ku Klux Report, North Carolina Testimony, pp. 3O9-I2, quoted 
in ibid., 22-23.
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were filled either hy white Carpetbaggers or ScalawagsYet, it was not 
the native white Southerner nor his Northern ^lly who evoked the most 
criticism, comment, and opposition from the mass of Southern whites. Real­
izing that this vras alien rule based upon the support of some 931,000 
registered Negro voters, the Southern white came to place most of the 
blame for the excesses of Reconstruction upon the head of the freedman.
That the whites of the South came to blame the colored race for 
most of their troubles is understandable but not entirely accurate. Al­
though the Southern governments were dominated by the Radical Republicans-- 
supported by the civil and military power of the Grant administration--the 
Negroes were recipients of little more than the crumbs of the spoils. For 
the most part the positions held by the colored men were confined to the 
local areas of government, constables, justices of the peace, county 
treasurers, and the like.^  ^ Some were appointed to Federal positions —  
postmasters, marshals, mail agents, and the like— and a few were elected 
to serve in Congress, Many Southerners viewed the latter situation with 
great glee. One Virginian wrote that "we want negroes to be so thick in 
Congress that a man standing on the wharf at Aguia Creek, with a favorable
^^Among the leading Carpetbaggers were David H. Chamberlain, a 
native of Massachusetts who served as Governor of South Carolina, Adele- 
bert Ames, who held the same position in Mississippi, and Henry C.
IJarmoth. who emerged a wealthy man from the governorship of Louisiana. 
Coulter, The South During Reconstruction, p. 1À0. In Virginia, North 
Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Texas it was the Scalawag who assumed 
the dominant position.
kg
T^here were, of course, exceptions. In Mississippi, a colored 
man, Alexander K. Davis, was elected Lieutenant-Governor; in South Caro­
lina a Negro Carpetbagger, Jonathan J. Wight, served on the State Su­
preme Court; in most of the states colored men were elected to the legis­
lature. For an account of Wright's service see Robert H. Woody, "Jonathan 
Jasper Wright, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, 
1870-1877," Journal of Negro History, XVIII (February, 1933); Ilk-136.
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wind; could smell them." We want, he said, "their wool to be knee-deep in
the halls of Congress, and we do not want any one there who is not five
times blacker than the ace of spades.IVhile men of color were not
elected to Congress in the numbers desired by this Virginian, seven
states— Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
and South Carolina--did send Negroes to the House of Representatives
during the Reconstruction period. Only two Negro Senators were elected
to serve during these years. These were Hiram R. Revels and Blanche K.
Bruce, both of Mississippi. Generally, the Negro members of Congress were
not noted for their statesmanship, but their presence in that body did
Lv
afford pride and satisfaction to their race. '
While some Negroes achieved prominent political positions, Republi­
can leaders in the South were little interested in advancing the Negro po­
litically except where it would aid them to control the Southern states. 
For several years the Radicals had overwhelming majorities in the legis­
latures of several former Confederate states. Despite this, little legis­
lation which would materially advance the colored race emerged from these 
legislatures. Instead, corruption and personal aggrandizement were the 
order of the day. In Louisiana, for instance, six hundred dollars would 
purchase the vote of a Senator, and in Florida the Negro members of the 
legislature, taking a cue from their white counterparts, organized a 
"smelling committee" to ferret out possibilities of graft.Included
^^Richmond Times quoted in Southern Cultivator XXIV (1866), 61, 
quoted in Coulter, The South During Reconstruction, p. l4h.
^^For an account of the Congressional service of the Negro see 
Samuel Denny Smith, The Negro in Congress (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1940).
^®Fleming (ed.). Documentary History of Reconstruction, II, 5^-55•-
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in the refreshments supplied to the legislators of South Carolina, at 
public expense, were wines and liquors, Westphalia hams, pineapple, Nor­
folk oysters, the finest cigars, and other delicacies too numerous to 
mention. State house "supplies" paid for by the public of South Carolina
included gilt mantle mirrors, the finest of furniture, jewelry, horses,
h-9
mules, carriages, buggies, and so on ad infinitum. It is small wonder 
that state expenses rose to astronomical heights during this period.
The saturnalia of corruption were not, however, limited to South 
Carolina. Tax rates were increased rapidly in all states; in some they 
became almost confiscatory.^^ Some states saw their credit mortgaged to 
provide aids for projects which were never brought to fruition. In Ala­
bama, for example, the Radical legislature was bribed to loan millions to 
the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad Company— money which \ias used to 
construct not a railroad, but a hotel and an opera house, and which ^ fas 
never repaid.State governments also floated large bond issues in 
order to provide additional funds to expend, and, as a result, there was 
a rapid increase in the indebtedness of these states. By 1872 the state 
debt of Alabama had risen from $7,000,000 to $32,000,000, while that of 
Louisiana had increased from $14,000,000 to $48,000,000.^  ^ In all of
^^Ibid., 59-68.
^^Tax rates in Mississippi were fourteen times as much in 1874 
as in 1669. Ibid., 71* Public expenditures were greatly increased 
throughout the South. In Alabama and Florida expenses of state govern­
ment increased 200 ,^ in Louisiana $00 ,^ and in Arkansas 1500%. The 
natural result was an increase in tax rates and a decline in property 
values. Simliins, The South Old and New, p. I96.
^^In North Carolina the Scalawag regime of William H. Holden 
made grants to railroad companies in excess of $27,000,000. Randall, 
Civil War and Reconstruction, p. 85I
^ S^imkins, The South Old and New, p. 186.
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these states the melon of spoils was sliced in a manner which benefited 
the men in office. It is little wonder that Radical rule produced a 
violent reaction on the part of the white people of the South.
Malfeasance in office was not the only reason that Radical govern­
ments were increasingly under attack. Radical Reconstruction iras also an 
attack upon white supremacy. While the excesses of the period were not 
usually the direct responsibility of the Negro, the average Southerner 
did not believe that these governments could exist without the support 
of the colored race. Corruption and extravagance increased the antipathy 
of the Southern whites toward the Republican governments. Yet, maintains 
one modern historian of the South, had these regimes been the model of 
rectitude, they would still have been suspect by the average Southerner 
as long as the Radical governments regarded the black man as the politi­
cal equal of the white.^^ To bring about an end to this alliance of 
Negroes and Radicals— and to return control of affairs to the native 
white— became the primary objective of many a Southerner. To accomplish 
this end they were willing to utilize any weapon at their command— be it 
social, economic, moral, or, if necessary, violent.
By 1870 indecision on the part of the whites :ras replaced with 
the firm intention to regain control of the Southern governments. To es­
cape the odium attached to the name Democrat, the Conservative party was 
organized in most of the states. This political organization, aided by 
dissentions among the Radicals and intimidation of Negroes by Ku Klux 
threats and outright violence, was soon able to control the governments
53Ibid., p. 199.
30
in Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee.The activities of the Ku 
Klux Klan, and similar terroristic organizations, elicited from the Radi­
cal-controlled Congress the third in a series of so-called "force" acts. 
This measure authorized the President to suspend the \rr it of habeas corpus 
in those states where he deemed it necessary. It also declared a long 
list of activities to be high crimes, and the perpetrators were made sub­
ject to fine and imprisonmentPresident Grant, acting under the au­
thority of this act, in October, I87I, designated nine counties in South 
Carolina as being in rebellion. The counties were placed under martial 
law, troops were rushed in to enforce the President's decree, investi­
gations were held, and the Federal Circuit Court handed down numerous 
sentences involving fine and imprisonment. Through this method the Klan 
was suppressed by Federal authorities, and the Conservatives deemed it 
necessary to turn to other methods to achieve the final overthrow of Radi­
cal governments in the remainder of the former Confederate states.
^^ The Klan was organized at Pulaski, Tennessee, in I865 as an in­
nocent lodge, but by I868 it had become an answer to the Union League and 
a means of intimidating the hated Negro militia units. Eventually, the 
better element among the whites became disenamoured with the violent 
tactics employed by the organization. To some it seemed that its "pri­
mary motive . . . was the desire of the lower class whites to remove the 
Negro as a competitor in labor and ... in the renting of land." Francis 
B. Simlcins and Robert H. Woody, South Carolina During Reconstruction 
(chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1$40), p. 462.
U.S., Statutes at Large, XXVII, pp. 13-15. The first of the 
so-called "force'' acts, passed on May 3I, I87O, vjas designed to enforce 
the Fifteenth Amendment. It provided penalties for anyone using force, 
bribery, or intimidation to prevent citizens from voting. The President 
was authorized to use the military to enforce decisions of the Federal 
courts which had jurisdiction in these cases. At the same time Con­
gressional elections were placed under Federal regulation. U.S.,
Statutes at Large, XVI, pp. l40-46.
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Despite the restrictive Federal legislation, or perhaps because 
of it, there was an increased determination on the part of the Southern 
leaders to rid their states of Radical control. Well a\fare that Radical 
domination rested upon the electoral support of the colored man, plans 
were laid to divorce the Negro from his white leaders. New organizations, 
reminiscent of the Klan but without its rituals and disguises, were formed 
in the early 1070's to accomplish that end.^^ Organizations of this type 
usually sought to convince the Negroes that the people of the South had 
the best interests of the colored race at heart and that the Conservatives 
were deserving of their political support. If persuasion failed, and it 
generally did, there was aluays recourse to intimidation and physical 
coercion. Armed men often invaded Republican meetings, heckled the 
speakers, and insisted upon equal time for Conservative orators. Moving 
through the crowd, they would hint to the awed colored me£ that a healthy 
course would be to cast their ballots for Conservative candidates. As 
a result of these tactics many Negroes, and even some white Republicans, 
either joined forces with the Conservatives during the twilight years of 
Reconstruction or ceased to participate in the elections.5?
Largely because of these activities the Conservatives were able 
to acquire control of all but three of the state governments before I876. 
Redemption occurred in Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia 
in 1870, and in 1S7A, despite open conflict, or maybe because, of it,
^^These associations were known as the White League in Louisiana, 
the White Line in Mississippi, the Vflaite IVfen's Party in Alabama, and the 
Red Shirts in South Carolina.
57Randall, Civil War and Reconstruction, p. 866.
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elections were carried by the Democrats in Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas.
In the following year Mississippi made her bid for freedom from Radical 
control. The situation in this state differed, however, from that in any 
of the other states which had so far been successful in achieving Re­
demption.^® Here, the Radical-controlled Negroes greatly outnumbered the 
whites, and the problem ivas how to effect control without bringing about 
Federal intervention.^^
The system which was evolved by the Mississippi white leaders was 
essentially very simple. At the outset of Reconstruction there was a 
relatively large number of whites in that state who were willing to ac­
cept the fact of defeat and to obey the dictates of the Radicals— even 
to the point of upholding the right of the Negro to the suffrage. This 
group of whites, composed mostly of old-line Whigs, desired order and 
harmony above all else. They, like many other Southerners, believed 
that it would be advantageous to convince the colored man that the best 
friend he had was the Southern white. If the Negro could be so convinced,
j-Û
Southern historians are increasingly institutionalizing the 
words "Redemption" and "Redeemer." Redemption is the term applied to 
the movement seeking to effect a return to native white political con­
trol of the Southern states. Redeemer is a term applied to those poli­
tical leaders who directed the movement to secure "home rule." These 
leaders generally remained politically prominent after 1877; but the 
"Redeemers" came to be termed "Bourbons."
59Because of the dislocation attendant upon the war and because 
of the ignorance of the Negro the Census of I87O, as it deals with the 
colored population, is inaccurate. The Census of I88O, however, is ac­
curate and, because it comes near the beginning of the period covered in 
this work, will be the one primarily utilized. This census showed the 
Negro population of Mississippi to be 650,291 and the white population 
to be 7^9;398. Percentagewise, 57*5/s of the population was Negro. The 
same ration probably prevailed in 1875. U.S., Bureau of the Census,
Negro Population in the United States, 1790-1915 (Washington; Government 
Printing Office, I9IÜ), chap. Ill, table I3, p. 4-4, and chap. IV, table
5, p. 51.
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it was believed, he would cast his vote for his "true" friend and home 
rule would be restored through the medium of the ballot box. Most Con­
servative leaders in Mississippi, however, did not accept this idea.
Almost from the outset they had believed that allowing the colored man 
to vote was a dangerous expedient and that it must be curtailed. As early 
as December, I869, for example, the editor of the Columbus Index wrote 
that "we have given the negro a fair trial. He has voted steadily against 
us, and we hoist, from this day, the white man's flag, and will never take 
it do\ra so long as we have a voice in the government of the S t a t e . T h e  
attitude expressed by this editor soon became that of a majority of the 
white people of the state, and by I87O a number of "Ifhite Men's Clubs" 
had been formed— the purpose of which was to restore white supremacy to 
Mississippi. These clubs, fearful of Federal intervention as in South 
Carolina, did not resort to much violence in the years prior to 1873- In 
the election of that year, however, there \æ.s an increase in Wegro office 
holders and the white supremacy movement gained new converts. Included 
among the new additions were many who had previously believed the Negro 
could be convinced that his best interests were those of the Southern 
whites
Radical Reconstruction came to an abrupt end in Mississippi in 
1875. In the state elections of that year the Democrats, determined to 
maintain home rule and white supremacy, gained control of the government. 
The methods employed to accomplish the restoration of home rule— later to
^ H^inds County Gazette, December 15, 1869, quoting the Columbus 
Index, quoted in Vernon L. lAiarton, The Negro in Mississippi, I869-I89O 
(chapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 194-7), p. iBl.
61
Ibid.
3^be given such titles as the Mississippi Plan, the Straightout Policy, and 
the Shotgun Policy--ranged from the stuffing of ballot boxes to the in­
timidation of whites and Negroes by threats and the occasional use of 
violence.By employing these means the Democrats were able to sweep 
the elections and Mississippi was redeemed.
As the presidential election year of I876 rolled onto the calendar 
only three Southern states--Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina— re­
mained under Radical control. In these states the large colored popu­
lation, destined to play a key roll in the election of that year, had 
been an important political factor from the time of the inauguration of 
Radical Reconstruction. Not only had the Republicans depended upon their 
votes, but many Negroes had also held local and state offices. Numerous 
attempts had been made by the Conservatives to wean the colored men away 
from the Republican bosses prior to 1876. In Louisiana, for example,
Negro and white leaders in New Orleans had evolved a plan in I873 which 
would end Radical control by unifying the two races into one gigantic 
political organization. This plan anticipated guaranteeing the Negro 
complete political, civil, and, if possible, economic equality.Although 
this so-called "Unification Movement" came to naught, continuing efforts 
were made in Louisiana to bring the Negro into the Democratic fold.
°^William A. Mabry, "Disfranchisement of the Negro in Mississippi," 
Journal of Southern History, IV (August, I938), 318-19. In this election 
there \ias a decrease in Negro votes. Democrats were chosen in 62 of 7  ^
counties and in the only race for state office, that of Treasurer, the 
Democratic candidate polled 96,596 votes to 66,155 for his Republican 
opponent. lAiarton, The Negro in Mississippi, pp. 18I-98.
Harry Williams, "The Louisiana Unification Movement of 1873, " 
Journal of Southern History, XI (August, 19^5), 3^9“50*
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In the election year of 1876 the New Orleans Daily Picayune, an 
organ of the Democratic party, launched a campaign designed not only to 
convince the Negro but also Northern leaders that the South was well aware 
of who had won the war and that the colored men possessed certain rights. 
On April 23 the newspaper editorialized that "the war is over. The 
negroes have been emancipated and enfranchised . . . .  They have a right 
to their own political opinions and to vote for whom they p l e a s e . O n  
May 12 the editor reiterated the recognition of the "enfranchised Afri­
can" as a fellow citizen. "We mean to go to the polls with him," he said, 
"and to count his vote as we would count our own, but we mean to control 
his vote, if we possibly can, by every fair m e a n s . O n  July 19 the 
Picayune professed to see a spread of conservatism among the colored men 
and said that undoubtedly they were beginning to sense the utter hopeless­
ness of their situation under Radical leadership.Editorials continued 
in this vein until after the election, but whether they had any success 
in disenchanting the mass of illiterate Negroes with the Republicans is 
problematical. Actually, the editors of this and other newspapers were 
more interested in convincing the people in the North that the intentions 
of the whites of Louisiana and the South were pure. Nevertheless, edi­
torials such as these obviously had an effect upon the white Republicans
because repeated warnings were issued to the colored men that the
—  ' ~ 
New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 23, 1876.
°^Ibid., May 12, I876.
^^Ibid., July 19, 1876. The Picayune pointed out that the colored 
men had assisted the Radicals in holding office for ten years and it had 
profited them nothing.
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Democratic party desired their votes only for its own selfish purpose.
The party press also began to characterize those Degrees who united with 
the Democrats as renegades, drunkards, and "deadbeats" who joined the 
enemy to "obtain food, clothing, and whiskey without working for them."^^ 
Obviously, Republican leaders in Louisiana feared their traditional hold 
on the colored man iras tenuous in 1876.
Another state in which the Democratic party actively sought the 
support of the Negro was South Carolina. In this state a number of Demo­
cratic clubs were formed in which the colored man was encouraged to be 
active. Also, the Democratic candidate for governor in 1876, VJade Hampton, 
made an appeal for their support. Hampton promised the Negroes that if 
chosen he would be "the Governor of the whole State," and would "render to 
the whole people of this State equal and impartial justice. H e  informed 
the Negroes that talk that the whites of the Democratic party desired to 
return them to slavery or even qualify their suffrage was foolish. In­
stead, he said, it iras the Republicans who wanted to limit colored suffrage. 
"We vrant your votes," he proclaimed, "we don't want you to be deprived of 
them . . . In spite of this show of interest in the political welfare
of the Negroes, however, the Democrats took no chance that their appeals 
would fall on barren ground. Consequently, in the election of that
^^ Donaldsonville Chief, October 7, I876, quoted in Philip D. Uzee, 
"Republican Politics in Louisiana, l877"1900" (unpublished Ph. D. dis­
sertation, Dept, of History, Louisiana State.University), p. I36.
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Donaldsonville Chief, September 9 and November 4, I876, quoted
in ibid.
^%ampton. Free Menl Free BallotsII Free SchoolsllI, pp. g-4 .
7°Ibid.
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year, the Red Shirts of South Carolina utilized the Mississippi Plan to
good advantage. Fraud, intimidation, and violence were employed during
the campaign and election to overawe the Republican Negroes.
In Florida, too, the Democratic organization :fas determined to
redeem the state in I876. Efforts were redoubled as the election ap-
71proached to curb the colored political organizations. During the cam­
paign and election, as in South Carolina, violence, threats, and economic 
coercion were utilized to limit the political effectiveness of the Negro. 
As the state did not provide a standard ballot it T-ms easy for employers 
to give special ballots to their Negro employees and to see that they were 
cast for Democratic candidates. The Radicals, divided among themselves, 
intimidated their colored cohorts in an effort to hold them firm for the
72party. Thus in Florida, as in the other states, the black man became 
only a pa\ra in the political chess game.
The confusing events of the Presidential election of I876 were 
of momentous consequence for the South and for the nation as a whole. In 
the states which had been redeemed a majority of the ballots cast were 
counted for the Democratic aspirant, Samuel J. Tilden of New York. The 
votes of these and other states provided Tilden with l84 electoral votes —  
only one less than the requisite majority. But in Florida, Louisiana, and 
South Carolina, a confused situation ga^ re hope to the Republicans that the
71H. D. Price, The Negro and Southern Politics : A Chapter in 
Florida History (New York: New York University Press, 1957); P* 11.
72The Radicals had reason to be concerned about the potential 
and actual abandonment of their party by the Negro for there were ^,000 
more whites than blacks in Florida. Coulter, The South During Re­
construction, p. 370.
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presidency might still he salvaged for their candidate, Rutherford B.
Hayes of Ohio. Apparently, the Democrats had won in the three Southern 
states still occupied hy Federal forces, and,if they had heen successful 
in only one, the Republican domination of the executive branch of the 
national government was at an end. In each of these states, however, 
voting irregularities were claimed hy the Republicans, and Radical re­
turning hoards fearlessly— with the army still in occupation— threw out 
enough Democratic votes to give Hayes the victory. The Democrats, however, 
were able to compile their votes and send the returns to Washington to he 
counted for Tilden. With two sets of returns from the three Southern 
states to he considered, the question arose as to who would decide which 
set would he accepted. After much recrimination. Congress established an 
Electoral Commission of fifteen members to determine which set of returns 
■vra.s valid. Shortly before the new President was to he inaugurated the 
Commission handed down its decision. By a strictly party vote of eight 
to seven the Commission ruled that Hayes was the victor in each of the 
disputed states and would he the next occupant of the lAaite H o u s e . 8^
The decision of the Electoral Commission resulted in some belli­
cose talk among the Democrats, especially those in the North. But the 
Southern members of the party would not accept the idea that perhaps the 
presidency should he seized hy force. Southerners had seen enough of 
civil conflict and, besides, what they desired most of all was the resto­
ration of home rule. That this could he accomplished under the adminis­
tration of Hayes iras entirely possible for he had promised, in his letter
73There iras also a dispute over one of the electoral votes of 
Oregon. This question was settled on its merits and the vote was airarded 
to Hayes.
39
accepting the nomination, that the Federal government would no longer
ihmeddle in the affairs of the South. ‘ If he abided by his promise, the 
South would be satisfied.
Hayes lived up to his promise. Upon assuming the presidency he 
called to Washington the governors of the rival administrations which had 
been established in South Carolina, Wade Hampton and Daniel Chamberlain. 
Over the latter's protest he informed them that Federal troops would be 
withdraw from the state. Chamberlain's Radical government rested upon 
the support of these forces, and as a result of their withdrawal his ad­
ministration collapsed. Thus, South Carolina was returned to the control 
of the native whites.
In Florida control by the whites was regained without a contest, 
but in Louisiana, like South Carolina, rival governments competed for 
domination. In this state, too, Hayes withdrew Federal support from the
Radical contestant, Stephen B. Packard, and the Democrat, Francis T.
75
Hicholls, gained the state house.
Thus, in 1877; home rule was restored to the last of the former 
Confederate states. Carpetbaggers and. Scalawags were no longer in the 
political saddle; the Negro r^as henceforth at the political mercy of the 
Southern whites. No longer would the Federal bayonet clear for him a path 
to the voting booth. In the future the colored man would have to trust 
the Southern white to observe constitutional and legal limitations upon
7hSome of Hayes' supporters promised Southern leaders, in a con­
ference at a Washington hotel, that this promise would be fulfilled. C. 
Vann Woodv/ard, Reunion and Reaction; The Compromise of 1877 and the End 
of Reconstruction (Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1951); PP» 212-14.
75Coulter, The South During Reconstruction, p. 370*
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enfranchisement. He would have to convince the people of the South that 
his participation in politics posed no threat to their traditional way of 
l i f e . I f  the colored man was successful in impressing upon his former 
masters that Negro suffrage did not constitute a danger, then perhaps he 
could continue freely to enjoy the advantages of citizenship conferred 
upon him during the last decade. If he was not successful, however, the 
future could only hold a relegation to some political limbo for the 
majority of the colored race.
^°It should be pointed out that not all Negroes supported the 
Radicals during Reconstruction. By I877 they were voting with the Demo­
crats, whether out of fear or conviction it is impossible to say, in in­
creasing numbers. A large majority, however, continued to support the 
Republican party, and without their assistance the Radicals could not 
have maintained themselves in power.
CHAPTER II 
THE PROBLEM OF THE NEGRO VOTER
In the lexicon of American politics the term "Solid South" is 
often employed to indicate that political solidarity prevailed among 
Southern whites after home rule iras accomplished. Use of the term im­
plies that the loyalty to one party which had been achieved when the 
whites were struggling to free their states from an alien domination based 
on the Negro vote iras a continuing thing; that the Southern whites were of 
one political mind both during and after Redemption. That the political 
diversity which had existed in the ante-bellum South iras largely sub­
ordinated during the period of Reconstruction is an accepted fact. Had 
not the Black Belt gentry and the hillbilly commoner cooperated during 
that time, success of the Redemption movement would have been problem­
atical. Despite such cooperation, however, there was no real feeling of 
trust or affinity between the two groups and when home rule was achieved 
this vaunted solidarity began at once to erode. Occupying a position in 
the middle of the disputants were some five million colored citizens of 
the Southern states.^ V/hether or not they would be allowed to continue
^In l830 the colored population for all Southern states, including 
those not a part of the Confederacy, was 5,953,903" U.S., Bureau of the
Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 17 9^-19^5: A Supple­
ment to the Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington; Govern­
ment Printing Office, 19 9^), P* 27*
h i
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to enjoy the rights bestowed upon them after emancipation depended to a 
great extent upon a satisfactory solution to the differences between the 
Southern whites.
The dominating force in the politics of the former Confederate 
states during the period between 1877 and 189O were those individuals who 
had provided the effective leadership in the campaign for Redemption.
These Redeemers, usually owning the proud and politically advantageous 
record of a Confederate office or statesman, were identified through their 
family names and manners with the ante-bellum South. There, however, the 
resemblance ended and the directing influence provided by these indivi­
duals did not in any wise constitute a "restoration." Essentially 
oriented in an economic sense toward the middle class, industrial, and 
capitalistic philosophy, the Redeemers, or Bourbons, actually had little 
in common with the pre-war agrarian regime. Like the high priest of the 
Bourbons, Henry Grady, editor of the Atlanta Constitution, the political 
leaders made it a practice continually to denounce the evils of slavery 
and of the single-crop system of agriculture. Proclaiming that "it is 
the white man of the South and not the Negro who has been freed by the 
Civil War,the Bourbons, destined to remain in political control until 
the agrarian revolt, utilized every opportunity to propagandize as to the 
advantages which would accrue to the South as a result of crop diversifi­
cation and industrialization. Everyifhere, on the huskings, on and off 
the floor of Congress, through the medium of newspapers and journals, they 
preached upon the text that the South, though it might justifiably glorify
2
Quoted in Francis B. Simlcins, The South Old and New; A History, 
1820-1947 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), P- 23I.
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the "Lost Cause," must emulate the North in its habits of thrift and 
industry. Only by so doing, they insisted, would the South be able to 
rise phoenix-like from the ashes and become something more than an 
economic satellite of the North.
The economic philosophy advocated by the Bourbons ifas one which 
was destined to result in a major problem for this class. These individu­
als were convinced that the South could not compete with the rest of the 
nation unless it abandoned its traditional agrarian orientation and sought 
to diversify its economy. Such a program would be difficult to achieve, 
however, unless investment capital could be attracted to the South from 
other sections. To facilitate this the new governments sought to lessen 
the burden of oppressive taxes and huge debts which were a legacy of Re­
construction. In nearly every state a program of "retrenchment," of 
spending nothing unless it i^ as absolutely necessary, was begun. Salaries 
of state officials were slashed and such vital public services as chari­
table institutions and education were provided with insufficient funds.b 
Economy became the watchword of the day.
The majority of Southerners could have undoubtedly accepted this 
program had it not been for the fact that at the same time the Bourbons 
were preaching the necessity for economy they initiated policies which 
worked to the advantage of the merchants, bankers, and industrialists of
In nearly every Southern state public education suffered a severe 
cut-back under the policy of retrenchment. The average length of the 
school-term, already low by Northern standards, fell by 20% after Re­
demption. Not until 1900 did the 100 day term become common. Expendi­
tures per pupil were also drastically reduced. Figures cited in C. Vann 
Woodward, Origins of the New South, l877-19l4. Vol. IX of A History of 
the South, eds. Wendall Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (12 vols,; Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1947--); PP* 6l-2 .
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the North and South. Few individuals belonging to the agrarian class, as
most Southerners did, could see any justification in granting railroads,
public utilities, and comparable' institutions franchises that were either
4
untaxed or assessed far below their actual value. Such a policy placed 
an unequal and unfair tax burden upon the holders of real estate. This, 
coupled with lower prices for their products and the fact that such in­
vestment capital as iras available to the farmer was subject to inflated 
interest rates, resulted in increased dissatisfaction with Bourbon poli­
cies by the agrarian element in the l880's.
IVhile Bourbon economic policies were destined eventually to result 
in the rise of Independent parties to contest for control of the Southern 
states, there was a more immediate problem facing these governments— that 
of the Negro and his place in the political framework. One factor in the 
Negro problem was the new policy of the Federal government. As a result 
of the Compromise of 1877, the colored man was largely abandoned by his 
political mentor, the National Republican party. President Hayes, hoping 
to conciliate the South by allowing Bourbon leaders a free hand in state 
politics in exchange for Southern support in Congress, informed the 
colored man in that year that their "rights and interests" could be better 
protected by the Southern white than by the Federal government.^ This 
attitude, coupled with the fact that little real effort was made by the
administration to maintain the Republican organization in the Southern
-  -
Some Southern legislatures, as is the case with a few states at 
the present, granted a tax holiday to new manufactures entering the state.
5
Hayes toured some of the Southern states a few months after his 
inauguration. He made this statement in Atlanta.
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states, was considered a grievous error by some of the leading members of 
the party. Opposition to abandonment of the policy inaugurated by Thaddeus 
Stephens and Charles Sumner \ras pronounced during the four years of the 
Hayes' administration. Nevertheless, when his most persistent critics 
assumed control during the administrations of Garfield and Arthur, they, 
too, considered it politically expedient to abandon the colored man. The 
reason for this reversal is apparent in a communication from William E. 
Chandler, Arthur's secretary of the navy and chief patronage dispenser, to 
one who had been a violent critic of Hayes policy. Senator James G. Blaine 
of Nfeine. "If we lose the next House," Chandler informed Blaine on 
October 2, 1882, "we can hardly hope to carry the next presidential 
election and we shall need more than 20 southern votes instead of the 10 
we had to give us organization of the House . . . .  Our straight Republi­
can, carpet-bag, Negro governments . . . have been destroyed and cannot 
be revived ... ; do not be narrowminded, or hesitating but place your­
self unmistakably on the side of progress at the South.
The side of progress, as conceived by National Republican leaders 
during most of the l880's, was to give support in state elections to any 
faction opposing the Bourbons. Thus, during this decade, although Negro 
politicians were sometimes given Federal positions in an effort to main­
tain their loyalty to the Republican party and the colored masses were 
encouraged to support candidates of that party in elections of national 
import, the Republican party often became moribund organization in state 
politics. Such an event made it potentially more difficult for the 
Bourbons to maintain white loyalty to the Democratic party.
6
Quoted in Woodmrd, Origins of the New South, pp. 101-102.
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The attitude of the mass of Southern whites toward the Negro, and 
especially his right to vote,' tos also a problem to the Bourbon govern­
ments. To most of the whites of the South abandonment of the Negroes by 
their Northern champions was a satisfactory culmination of a long and in­
tense struggle to free their states from Republican and Negro domination.
To some of the whites it undoubtedly meant that the Negro, the bête noire 
of Reconstruction, would be immediately disfranchised; others hoped to re­
place the Carpetbagger as the director of a political symphony of colored 
voters.
Falling into the first category were the whites of the upcountry, 
the small farmer class which was the traditional enemy of the colored man. 
During the ante-bellum period this group, most of whom aspired to but 
could never hope to achieve the status of a planter, had favored a con­
tinuance of the slave system because of a fear of being economically and 
socially leveled with a mass of liberated black men. During Reconstruction, 
when the Republican party had utilized the colored vote for their own pur­
poses in the Southern states, their worst fears had been realized. Conse­
quently, the rural white had cooperated with the gentry, whom they 
jealously disliked, in an attempt to combat the menace of permanent 
social, political, and economic leveling. Enfranchisement and civil 
rights legislation had moved the colored man up the social and political 
ladder until he was almost on an even plane with the poor white. If the 
wishes of this class were respected the Negro would be disfranchised and 
his civil rights subordinated, legally if possible; illegally if necessary.
Fortunately for the immediate political future of the Negro, it
1^-7
was not to this group, but to the Bourbons that the responsibility for 
developing a Southern policy toward the colored men fell after the Compro­
mise of 1877» Two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
delivered in the session of 1876, had opened the •\ra.y for the Bourbons to 
discriminate in suffrage matters if they chose. In the case of United 
States.vs. Reese, the Court had ruled that the Fifteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution did not confer the right of suffrage on anyone. Instead, it 
merely prevented "the States or the United States . . . from giving prefer­
ence ... to one citizen over another on account of 'race, color or pre-
7
vious condition of servitude.'" In another decision, United States vs. 
Cruikshank, the Court postulated that "the right to vote comes from the 
State, but the right of exemption from the prohibited discrimination 
comes from the United States . . . .
These decisions, defining the scope of the so-called enfranchising 
amendment, meant that the various states could legitimately establish the 
rules and regulations for their electorate. Thus, individual states, by 
imposing strict educational, property, or other requirements, could 
legally limit Negro suffrage— but only if the regulations did not openly 
discriminate in favor of one race over another. It would be possible, 
however, to so enforce the voting regulations that the whites could freely 
exercise the ballot while a majority of the colored men would be ef­
fectively disfranchised. Such a policy would have been more than ac­
ceptable to the small farmer class, but at the outset of the period of
^United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 212 (1876).
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 988 (I876).
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home rule the complete disfranchisement of the Negro was not a part of 
the Bourbon program.
It was upon the shoals of the Negro question, an issue upon which 
it is generally believed the Southern whites were of one mind, that white 
solidarity was destined to be battered. The Bourbons, heirs of the old 
aristocracy, had a paternalistic feeling toivard the colored men. Even 
before the Negro was deserted by the Republican leaders, it had been the 
policy of the Southern whites to convince the colored men that their best 
interests would be served by lending political support to their old 
masters. After Redemption \fas accomplished the tempo of this campaign 
was increased. Bourbon leaders used every means at their disposal to 
marshal the Negro vote. Governor Wade Hampton of South Carolina, for 
example, informed the colored electorate that "the best friends of the 
colored man are the old slaveholders . . . .  They will defend your right 
to vote because it gives to the South infinitely more power than we ever 
had before."^ This was a typical expression which was to be echoed by 
other leaders, in other states, at other times. In I879 the legislature 
of North Carolina adopted a resolution which proclaimed to all who were 
interested in Negro suffrage that "we are disposed and determined to 
carry out in good faith ..." the amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States which conferred suffrage and citizenship upon the colored 
race.^^ Another example of this attitude may be seen in an event which
^Charleston News and Courier, September 20, 1878, quoted in 
Woodward, Origins of the New South, p. 79*
^^Quoted in Guion G. Johnson, "The Ideology of #ite Supremacy, 
1876-1910," Essays in Southern History, ed. Fletcher M. Green ("James 
Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science," Vol. XXXI; Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 203.
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occured in Florida during the election of l884. In that year a Demo­
cratic candidate for Presidential elector, R. C. Long, made a vitriolic 
anti-Negro speech. He was forced to resign as a candidate by the Chairman 
of the State Executive Committee, Samuel Pasco, who stated that the Con­
servative Democratic Party of Florida had and would maintain the consti­
tutional rights of the colored man.
The foregoing statements are examples of only a few of the pleas
which were made by the Bourbons to the colored electorate in the period
before I89O. Such protestations of the purity of the intentions of the
Southern governments toward the Negro were often backed by the practice
of allowing colored leaders to hold minor offices. But, where cajolery
and the bestowing of favors did not have the desired effect, the Bourbons
12utilized other devices to accomplish their purposes.
A favorite method employed by the Bourbons to convince the Negro 
electorate that their interests could best be served by lending support 
to the party of white supremacy iras economic pressure. I4any, if not most, 
of the former slaves depended upon their old masters for employment. This 
convinced one planter that "a little moral suasion on the part of our
^^Tallahassee I^nd of Flowers, September 24, l884, quoted in 
Edward C. Williamson, "The Era of the Democratic County Leader; Florida 
Politics, 1877-1893" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation. Dept, of History, 
University of Pennslyvania), p. 203.
12
The practice of allowing Negroes to hold minor offices f^as wide­
spread in South Carolina while Wade Hampton was in office. The Charleston 
News and Courier said, on April l4, I877, that Hampton had appointed 
colored men to office because they were "equally capable with white ap­
plicants of filling . . , the office in question . . . ." Naturally, 
added the editor, "the endeavor is made to avoid putting colored persons 
in positions where,they would, or could, be peculiarly offensive."
Quoted in George B. Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, 1877-I900 (Columbia; 
University of South Carolina Press, 1952), p. 22.
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planters and others engaged in the employment and control of laborers has 
the effect of providing a potent influence upon the minds of the latter in 
election matters." He theorized "they naturally receive with deference 
the expression of opinion by their employers on all subjects . . . ."
The statement of this planter was symptomatic of the prevailing attitude 
in the South. But, not only ^ ra.s economic and moral pressure applied by 
the Bourbons and their supporters to win electoral support from the 
colored men, but when necessary legal and extra-legal devices were also 
utilized either to control or limit voting by members of that race.
Legal devices for limiting and controlling the Hegro vote varied 
1^from state to state. Generally they took the form of intricate regis­
tration and election laws which could be used not only against the re­
calcitrant colored man, but also against the poor and ignorant white.
Thus, the Bourbon-enacted registration laws, which required the potential 
elector to register several months in advance of an election and to pos­
sess the certificate on the polling day, struck at the lower economic 
strata of both white and black who had a propensity for not keeping papers
s. Sims and E. H. Pugh to W. P. Miles, October 30, I885, 
quoted in Philip D. Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana, 1877-I9OO," 
(unpublished Ph. D. dissertation. Dept, of History, Louisiana State Uni­
versity), p. 132. Republicans also pressured Negroes to support their 
candidates. One Louisiana planter informed Benjamin Harrison that "I 
vote the Republican ticket, and I have 125 colored voters on my plan­
tation, and they all vote as I do. I force them to do it." W. P. Pierce 
Benjamin Harrison, December 29, l838, quoted in ibid., p. I33.
From 1876 to l88S Virginia required the payment of a poll tax as 
a prerequisite for voting. Georgia, by her constitution prepared in 1877, 
demanded the payment of all taxes, including a poll tax. As in Virginia, 
however, such requirements applied equally to black and white. Frank B. 
Williams, Jr., "The Poll Tax as a Suffrage Requirement in the South, 187O- 
1900" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation. Dept, of History, Vanderbilt Uni­
versity), p. 19. Widely copied was the Virginia law which added petty 
larcency to the list of disqualifications because of its effect upon the 
colored vote.
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of any kind. Residence requirements also had the effect of disfranchising
numerous whites and Negroes. Ordinarily, it was required that a man
seeking to register must have been a resident of the state, county, and
precinct for a specified period. Because many Negroes and whites were
itinerants, they could not fulfill this obligation. Another device, in
South Carolina, which effected much disfranchisement was the eight box
law. This measure, passed by the legislature in l882, required the voter
to place his ballot in the correct box or have it invalidated. Election
managers, usually Democrats, were permitted to read box titles on request,
but many of the illiterate whites and blacks were too proud to ask for
assistance. This, coupled with a periodic shifting of the order of the
boxes, confounded many of them and resulted in their placing of ballots
15in the correct box a happy accident.
Nhen and where the colored man insisted on supporting candidates 
in opposition to the Bourbons— as they generally did in national or state 
elections when a Republican was in the field— and where legal limitations 
did not assure a Bourbon victory, extra-legal devices of fraud and chi­
canery were employed to achieve the desired end. Stuffing of boxes with 
tissue ballots, the use of boxes with false bottoms, repeating of votes, 
manipulation of returns, bribery, intimidation, and outright violence 
toward the Negro were all employed to assure a victory by candidates of 
the party of white supremacy.
^^Stephen B. Weeks, "The History of Negro Suffrage in the South," 
Political Science Quarterly,,IX (December, l8$4), 69O-703.
^ I^t would perhaps be possible to list several pages of methods 
which were used to curtail the colored vote in the various states, but 
the above account gives some clue as to the devices and practices which 
were most favored.
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The net result of Bourhon policy toward the Negro as a voter was 
that in some of the Southern states these political leaders were able to 
employ the submissive or intimidated colored men in the factional dis­
putes which beset the white man's party in the decades of the seventies 
and eighties. Since the Bourbons and their adherents were potentially in 
a minority in all of the former Confederate states, any internecine dispute 
within the white party ims a threat to their continued control. In order 
to lessen the possibility of the upland whites gaining control of the 
party machinery and replacing the Boiurbons as the political directors in 
the Southern states, the heirs of the old aristocracy resorted to "fusion" 
arrangements with the colored leaders. This was a device whereby the 
Negroes were allotted certain minor local and state offices in exchange 
for giving electoral support to Bourbon candidates. Where the fusion 
principle was adopted, it contributed to the ability of the Bourbons to 
maintain control of the party machinery and thus to resist encroachments 
upon their power by elements dissatisfied with their policy. In Alabama, 
for example, a convention nominated the candidates of the Democratic- 
Conservative party. Delegates to the convention were selected in each 
county on the basis of the number of votes cast within the county for the 
party's gubernatorial candidate in the previous election. Thus, Dallas 
county in the Black Belt, where Negroes outnumbered the whites by 4^,372 
to 9,285, \'/as apportioned thirty delegates to the convention of 189O 
because there had been a heavy black vote for the white supremacy party
in 1888. At the same time, Cherokee county, with a population of l8,080
17whites and only 3,618 Negroes, was allotted only ten seats. Such a 
7^pigTjres cited in V/ood'vra.rd, Origins of the New South, p. 79«
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situation naturally amplified Bourdon power in the Alabama convention and 
made it more difficult for the upland whites to achieve control of the 
party machinery. But, this situation was not confined to Alabama. In 
nearly all of the former Confederate states there was increasing dis­
pleasure with the policies of the leadership class during the decade of 
the eighties. Especially were there protests at the Bourbon's attitude 
toward the Negro. Leaders of the upland whites complained vehemently at 
the lowlanders policy of "fusion" with the Negro; of the Bourbon's 
truckling to the colored vote ; of Negroes filling public positions which 
"belonged" to white men. This dissatisfaction with the racial attitude 
of the Bourbons, coupled with agrarian discontent at the economic and
governmental policies of that class, threatened to divide the whites of
lô
the South. Maintaining Bourbon supremacy thus came to depend upon the 
ability of those politicians to enforce party discipline. Any issue that 
made permanent division probable \fas attacked by the Bourbon's as a 
danger to the white man's -vray of life. It portended, they insisted, a 
revival of Republican-Negro rule and a return to the excesses of Re­
construction.
^^Independent movements were local in nature at the outset, but 
the tendency for them to unite ifas marked. Because the Bourbons had pre­
empted the Democratic title for their party and because,the name Republi­
can carried with it a distasteful connotation, the Independents usually 
supported candidates seeking election as Grangers or Greenbackers. The 
economic issues which were destined to divide the Alliance from the Demo­
cratic Conservatives in the l8$0 's were present at an earlier date, but 
Southern Independents did not develop the class consciousness which was 
so marked in the Alliance movement. One reason for this \ras the inability 
of a majority of the agrarian class to subordinate their fear of a revival 
of the Republican-Negro combination. When they failed in their efforts 
to capture the white man's party they sullenly supported Bourbon candi­
dates .
5^
Despite all Bourbon efforts to prevent it, Independent political 
groups did arise to contest for control in the various states. While such 
movements varied in time, place, and intensity within the different states, 
it was deemed necessary by the men responsible for Redemption and their 
newspaper mouthpieces continually to exhort the white man of the South to 
remain solid for the party of white supremacy. "The negro vote is con­
solidated and wielded . . .  in the South today," warned a Georgia editor 
in 1885, "with more disastrous effects upon Southern ideas. Southern pro­
gress, Southern virtues, intelligence, and property interests than at any 
period since the negro was endowed with the b a l l o t . N o t  quite so 
blatant in his warning of the danger inherent in the Negro vote was the 
editor of the primary Democratic journal in Mississippi. "In other States
it may be different," he admitted. "In this State for some time to come
20there is but one issue. All know what it is." Not so coy, however, was 
the editor of the Raleigh News and Observer. lÆien an Independent movement 
threatened to split the party responsible for Redemption in North Caro­
lina, he attempted to identify what should be considered the overriding 
issue. "The issue is white supremacy, with all that exalts and enobles
humanity," he said, "in opposition to a base amalgamation, seeking re-
21spectability under the guise of coalition." For any individual or group 
that might oppose the white man’s party the same newspaper, at a later
19Southern Star (Atlanta, n.d.), quoted in Texas Baptist and 
Herald (Dallas), August 3, 1885.
20
Jackson Weekly Clarion, August 23, 1882, quoted in Woodward, 
Origins of the New South, p. $1 .
21
Raleigh News and Observer, June 29, l884.
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date, had a word of warning. Speaking for the benefit of the opposition 
in North Carolina, but propagandizing in a method that would be ac­
ceptable to the Bourbons in most of the Southern states, the editor pro­
claimed that "we are primarily organized to maintain Anglo-Saxon supremacy
in North Carolina and in every part of it. We wish to dwell on this fact;
22
we wish to make it plain."
Bourbon leaders and the party press did dwell on this fact during 
most of the period under discussion. From the Rio Grande to the Potomac; 
from the Tennessee to the Atlantic Ocean, the Bourbons continually ex­
horted the Southern white to remain solid for the party responsible for 
Redemption. Incessantly, the whites of the South were informed that a ■ 
political bolter or an Independent was lower than a Radical and an out­
right traitor to his race. The whites, insisted the Bourbons, must con­
tinue to present a united front or their traditional \ra.y of life would 
be in jeopardy. Republican whites and their black cohorts, it was \ra,rned, 
were impatiently awaiting the time when the Democratic party divided over
2Q
unimportant issues. If such division occurred, preached the Bourbons, 
^^Ibid., December l8, I887.
^%egro leaders such as Blanche K. Bruce and John Lynch of Missis­
sippi, Henry Demas and Pinckney Pinchbeck of Louisiana, Joseph Walls of 
Florida, Joseph Rainey and Robert Smalls of South Carolina, and others in 
the various states continued as'Republicans during the entire period. 
Bourbon leaders often concluded agreements with the Negro leaders whereby 
the colored men gave support to the whites in state elections, and the 
whites did not attempt to prevent them from receiving Federal patronage.
By maintaining Negroes and Carpetbaggers in control of Republican organi­
zations in the South, the Bourbons were more able to identify that party 
with the colored race and thus to solidify the Democratic party by the 
cry of danger to white supremacy. One of the more able white Republicans 
informed the dispenser of party patronage, William Chandler, that the ' 
Negro leader Bruce cooperated with the Bourbons of Mississippi to " . . . 
humbug the different Republican administrations and keep up negro rule
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the corpse of the white man's party would be shredded like carrion by a 
flock of vultures and there would be a dusky occupant of the governor's 
mansion.
Success was largely attendant upon efforts by the Bourbons to pre­
vent a successful political revolt by the agrarian element until the Al­
liance revolution of the l8$0 's. Success was also achieved in the efforts 
of this class to prevent a renewal of Federal legislation which would pro­
tect the colored men in their right freely to exercise the ballot. The 
methods they employed in an attempt to convince the North that such legis­
lation \7S.s unnecessary reveals another of the Janus-faces of the Bourbon's 
attitude toward Negro participation in politics.
Bourbon attitude toward Negro voting, as expressed for the bene­
fit of the residents of the Northern states, may be seen in a series of 
articles which comprised part of a symposium conducted by the North Ameri­
can Review in 1879* Posed by this leading Northern journal were two 
questions: Should the Negro be disfranchised, and conversely, should he
have been enfranchised? Bourbon answers to these questions were of vital 
interest to the politicians of the Republican party. Their answers were 
of even greater interest to those individuals and groups in the North who 
thought that it was the responsibility of the Federal government to pro­
tect the colored man in the full and free enjoyment of all the rights with 
which he had been bestowed.
One of the participants in this symposium v;as a leading Redeemer,
in the Rep. party in order that fear of negro rule in the State may keep 
white men in the Dem. party." George C. McKee to Chandler, July 6, 1882, 
quoted in Willie D. HaIsell (ed.), "Republican Factionalism in Missis­
sippi, 1882-1884,""Journal of Southern History, VII (February, 19^1), 93*
57
the Governor of South Carolina, Wade Hampton. In I876, when this former
Confederate general was campaigning for the office he now occupied,
Hampton had actively sought the electoral support of the colored man.
During the campaign he had bragged of being one of the first Southerners
to advocate suffrage for the Negro, and, as a part of his platform, he
had promised the colored man that if elected he would "know no party, nor
2k
race, in the administration of the law . . . ." Now, two years after 
becoming governor, Hampton was requested to state whether he believed 
enfranchising this race \ras a mistake which should be rectified.
In answering the questions which were posed, Hampton, always the 
practical politician, replied that they could only be of speculative in­
terest because disfranchisement had been rendered impossible by action of 
both the national and state governments. Considering the questions in an 
academic sense, however, the Governor was of the opinion that the franchise 
should not have been bestowed upon the colored man because his ignorance 
and general incompetence made him incapable of understanding the high 
moral responsibility attached to the privilege of exercising the ballot. 
Nevertheless, according to this Bourbon leader, enfranchisement vtss ir­
revocable, and the South was satisfied with the situation because the
Negro contributed immeasurably to the wealth and political power of that 
25section. Hampton informed the people of the North that this would be a
oh
Wade Hampton, Free Pginl Free Ballots 11 Free Schools!II The Pledge 
of General Wade Hampton, Democratic Candidate for Governor, to the Colored 
People of South Carolina (n.p. IÜ76), p. 6. After his election Hampton 
claimed that 17,000 Negro votes had been responsible for his victory.
The Charleston News and Courier, April 28, 1877, said that the purpose 
of Hampton's party would be "so to legislate, and so to administer public 
affairs, as to win over tens of thousands of colored voters." Quoted in 
Woodvrard, Origins of the New South, p. 80.
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continuing thing because "as the negro becomes more intelligent he natu­
rally allies himself with the more conservative of the whites for his
observation and experience both show him that his interests are identi-
pfified with the white race."
Participating along with Hampton in this written discussion were 
two other prominent Southerners who were regarded by the people of the 
North as being among the foremost spokesmen of their section— Senator 
Lucius Q,. C. Lamar of Mississippi and the former Vice-President of the 
Confederacy, Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia. They were in accord with 
Hampton's views as to the impossibility and actual undesirability of dis­
franchising the Negro. Lamar contended that he knew of no Southern man 
of importance or influence who believed disfranchisement to be feasible. 
Furthermore, he maintained that the South as a whole was willing to accept 
the situation. Noting that the people of Mississippi had voted in favor 
of the enfranchising amendment in I896, Lamar proclaimed that they "would 
vote for negro suffrage in the light of experience with more confidence
April of l877 Hampton spoke at a celebration in Charleston. 
During the course of his address he revealed that several high Republican 
officials in Washington had asked him how the Negro vote could best be re­
stricted. Hampton said that he informed them that the South did not want 
it curtailed because it entitled that section to thirty more Congressional 
seats. Yorkville Enquirer, April 26, 1877, quoted in Tindall, South Caro­
lina Negroes, p. 20. In I878 a touring member of the English Parliament 
was informed by Hampton that the better class of whites wanted to conserve 
the Negro, but that the lower class was less favorable. This bitterness 
extended, the governor said, only to political questions and did not ex­
tend into those involving labor. George Campbell, Black and White; the 
Outcome of a Visit to the United States (New York: R. Worthington, 1Ü79),
p. 318*
?6James G. Blaine, et al., "Ought the Negro to be Disfranchised? 
Ought He to have been Enfranchised?" North American Review, CCLXVII 
(March I879), 293.
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than they voted for it in the light of an experiment."
To Stephens' way of thinking there was no reason for continued 
agitation of the question. He vehemently denied the contention of another 
participant in the symposium, a bitter opponent of Hayes' Southern policy. 
Senator James G. Blaine of jyfeine, that the Southern states had in the past 
and were now illegally depriving the Negro of his vote. Stephens, then a 
member of the Georgia delegation in the United States House of Repre­
sentatives, admitted that individuals in his state had been guilty of 
offenses against the colored man. He insisted, however, that such an 
occurrence was the exception rather than the rule. When such isolated 
events happened, he maintained, they were the responsibility of indi­
viduals and certainly did not constitute official or even semi-official 
party policy. Should it not be, asked Stephens, the object of all citi­
zens, of all parties, of all races, to give Negro suffrage a fair trial?
If individuals were unwilling to do this the remedy must be provided by 
the courts and not, he hinted, by any legislative body.^®
The solicitude for the colored man in his right to the franchise
and the denial that Southerners were illegally depriving him of that right
which \7as expressed by these Bourbon leaders was a continuing argument in
the period of the l880's. Journalists, businessmen, politicians, and
Southerners in general took every opportunity to answer Northern criti-
29cisms of their attitude toward the colored man. Republican leaders,
^^Ibid., 231-34. . ^^Ibid., 239-
29Editorials continually appeared in Southern newspapers claiming 
that Negro -vjas intimidating Negro during various elections. For example, 
the Atlanta Journal, July 29, I89O, said that "we have said repeatedly 
that the only interference in this state with the negroes in their right 
to vote was by Republican negroes intimidating those of their color who 
were disposed to vote the Democratic ticket."
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they insisted, had been and were interested in the Negro only for the 
political advantage which would accrue from his support. They had in the 
past and would in the future utilize the colored men for their own base 
purposes. When Republicans had directed political affairs in the Southern 
states they had made little effort and had little real desire to advance 
the Negro socially, morally, educationally, or economically. They had 
falsely and frauduently inflamed the passions of the impressionable 
colored men until it had become necessary for the whites to unite for 
the preservation of their way of life.3*^ But, when the Southern white 
man regained control of his own affairs, propagandized the Bourbons, the 
situation was reversed and the Negro had started his slow climb of the 
ladder of civilization. They would continue to progress up^ fard, however, 
only so long as they did not become an issue between the sectionsj they 
would continue their ascent only so long as the whites of the South, 
those who knew the Negro best and had his interests truly at heart, were 
free to direct his future--a future which the Bourbons insisted included 
the right to the unencumbered exercise of the b a l l o t .3^
3 H^ilary A. Herbert, et al., VÆy the Solid South? Or Recon­
struction and Its Results (Baltimore; R. Woodward and Co. 1Ü$0 ), p. 6].
^^ Among prominent Southerners who pled that the Negro not be made 
an issue was Henry Watterson, editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal.
In an article written for a Northern journal in I879, Watterson said that 
the colored man was "placable and kindly--the fortunate possessor of a 
sweet, loving and generous nature." But, he maintained, when the Negro 
uas employed for party service he became "a devil incarnate; a barbarian, 
useful to the basest purposes; the easy prey of the vilest. No true 
friend of his but would take him out of politics as a factor or leading 
issue." Henry Watterson, "The Solid South," North American Review, CXXVII 
(January, 1079), 5 .^ See also the attitude expressed by the chief Justice 
H. H. Chalmers of the Mississippi Supreme Court. H. H. Chalmers, "The 
Effect of Negro Suffrage," North American Review, CXXXII (March 1881),
242.
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Throughout the entire period under discussion the attitude of 
Southerners toward Negro participation in politics took various turns.
As previously noted, the mass of Southern whites, especially the agrarian 
element, would have preferred disfranchisement if a method could be evolved 
which would effect only the colored race. On the other hand, the Bourbons, 
in an actual numerical minority as far as the white population of the South 
was concerned, hoped to be able to exploit the Negro politically as well 
as economically. In order that this feat might be accomplished it was 
necessary to convince the colored men, especially those in the areas where 
they were numerically superior, that their best interests would be served 
by lending electoral support to the party of white supremacy. At the same 
time, as noted above, the Bourbons had to convince Northern doubters that 
such support was a result of choice and not intimidation. Yet, because 
a second party in the South would pose a distinct threat to their pro­
gram, it was also necessary to convince the mass of Southern whites that 
Negro participation in politics endangered the supremacy of the white man. 
To satisfy the opinions of these three divirgent groups would require the 
sagacity of a Solomon. Nevertheless, continued Bourbon ascendancy depended 
upon the ability of this conservative element succèssfuly to accomplish 
that end.
CHAPTER III
THE NEGRO VOTE IN ALABAMA,
ARKANSAS, AND FLORIDA
In every former Confederate state throughout the entire Bourbon 
period arguments were heard as to why the Negro should or should not vote 
and as to what the electoral privilege in the hands of that race meant to 
the South. Despite this fact, however, the intensity and success of the 
several arguments varied in time and place. Had the Negro population 
been evenly divided among all of the Southern states a common philosophy 
toward participation by the colored men in politics might have been 
evolved. Such, however, was not entirely the case. The political situ­
ation in Mississippi, for instance, differed greatly from that of Tennes­
see, and the Bourbons of Virginia were forced to emphasize a completely 
different attitude from that of their counterparts in Texas. Nevertheless, 
certain facets of the Southern attitude toward Negro voting were common 
to every state, and it is only by examining the political situation in the 
individual states that the reasons for diversity and for identity can be 
understood.
At the outset it should be realized that colored men did continue 
to exercise the franchise, especially in elections of national import, in 
the period between 1876 and 189O. It is difficult to determine the actual 
number of Negro electors, however, because no exact count of the vote by
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races was maintained. Conseg.uently, only by examining the election re- 
txirns and relating them to the racial composition of the population of a 
state can some approximation of colored participation he made. Even the 
figures arrived at in this manner must be used with extreme caution. Con­
tinued Republican and Independent charges that the Democrats stuffed the 
ballot boxes for their candidates are to be found during the entire period. 
If this did occur, and it undoubtedly did, although how often it is im­
possible to determine, an inflated picture of the Democratic vote must be 
considered. Neither would it be correct to state that the Democratic vote 
consisted entirely of ballots cast by the whites and the Republican vote 
of those cast by the colored men. Ifeny Negroes supported the Bourbon 
ticket, especially in state elections, and this, of course, adds to the 
total of colored men who were voting. It is not the purpose of this work, 
however, to prove that a specific number of Negroes participated in any 
one election. That would patently be an impossibility. Nevertheless, by 
examining individual states it can be demonstrated that there was a con­
tinuing participation by the colored electorate in Southern elections— a 
fact which effected the attitude of the average white man toward his 
colored neighbor.
The state of Alabama, noted as the birthplace of the Confederate 
States of America, was under the domination of Radical Republicans until 
187^ . Prior to that year Negroes voted in large numbers, were elected to 
Congress and to other offices, and were protected by a clause in the state 
constitution which required every person seeking to register as an elector 
to take an oath that he would "... accept the civil and political 
equality of all men; and would agree not to attempt to deprive any
6k
person . . of any civil right, privilege or immunity, enjoyed by any
other class of men . . . In 187^ , however, the Democratic party, still
going by the name Conservative, took advantage of the fact that two years
of Radical turmoil had alienated most of the people of the state. In a
campaign based almost exclusively upon the race issue and accompanied by
2
violence and fraud, the Democrats won political control.
The Democratic party in Alabama, which moved the next year to con­
solidate its position by adopting a new constitution for the state, was 
one of diverse leadership and policies.  ^ An Alabama editor explained the
F^rancis N. Thorpe (comp, and ed.). The Federal and State Consti­
tutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Terri­
tories, and Colonies Mow or Heretofore Forming the United States of 
America (4 vols.; Washington: Goverruaent Printing Office, I909), I , l44- 
ÏÏ5"! Three different colored men served in Congress from Alabama.
Benjamin Turner served from 187I to 1873; James Rapier and Jeremiah 
Haralson from 1873 to I875. Monroe N. Work (comp.), "Some Negro Members 
of Reconstruction Conventions and Legislatures and of Congress," Journal 
of Negro History, V (January, 1920), 67.
2
Because the Democratic party v/as often characterized as the party 
of secession. Southerners found it advantageous to disassociate themselves 
from the odium attached to its name and to designate their party as Con­
servative, Democratic-Conservative, or something else. Before long, how­
ever, these names were dropped throughout the South and the party of white 
supremacy reassumed the Democratic label. For an account of the campaign 
of 1874 in Alabama see E. Merton Coulter, The South During Reconstruction, 
1865-1877, Vol. VIII of A History of the South, eds. Wendall Stephenson 
and E. Merton Coulter (12 vols.; Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University 
Press, 1947— ), pp. 350-51. More detail on this election is included in 
Allen J. Going, Bourbon Democracy in Alabama, 1874-I890 (University, Ala.; 
University of Alabama Press, 195J), PP* 26-36I
The instrument of government adopted in 1875 provided more 
stringent residence requirements for anyone seeking to register as an
elector. Also, the General Assembly was authorized to prescribe a shorter
or longer residence period in any incorporated city or town having a popu­
lation of five thousand. Not permitted to register, vote, or hold office
were persons convicted of treason, embezzlement of public funds, mal­
feasance in office, larcency, bribery, or other crime punishable by im­
prisonment in the state penitentiary. The stringent residence requirements 
were disadvantageous to Negroes and poorer whites who were often
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situation in I877 when he inrote that "the Democratic party . . .  is com­
posed of men of all shades of opinion upon what to us are non-essential 
questions . . . ." This heterogeneous crowd joined the party in 1868, he 
said, not because they were in agreement on a particular philosophy, "but 
because we agreed upon the one great essential question, the preservation 
of State government here in Alabama in the hands of the white race."^
Sentiments expressed by this editor in 1877 had been current in 
the state ever since home rule :fas achieved in I87U. After that date the 
Democrats generally based their campaign appeals upon the argument that 
it was of absolute necessity that political control be retained by the 
native whites. Any individual disagreeing with this philosophy or en­
deavoring to weaken the party by diverting its strength for any office 
was considered by its members to be an enemy of the state. Thus, "the 
downfall of Democracy," propagandized the party's primary newspaper to 
those whites who were dissatisfied with Bourbon policies, "means the 
restoration of negro rule."  ^ Yet, despite such statements, there was 
little sentiment in Alabama before 189O for disfranchising the colored 
men. Newspapers in the Black Belt, where the Negro was a potential ally 
of the Bourbons, continued to proclaim that it was necessary to permit 
the colored man to exercise the franchise in order that he might be di­
vorced from his traditional Republican alliance. Whether or not the
transients, and the larceny provisions also had its effect largely on 
this group. For the full provisions see Thorpe (comp, and ed.). Federal 
and State Constitutions, I, 17^-75-
\lobile Register, February 5, I887, quoted in Going, Bourbon 
Democracy in Alabama, p. 27.
^Montgomery Advertiser, August 2, 1882, quoted in ibid., p. 3I.
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Bourbons believed that this would be the final result of their policy, so
long as they dominated the Democratic party in Alabama they emphasized the
necessity of maintaining white supremacy, but took no legal steps to limit 
6
Negro suffrage.
What did all of this mean to the colored citizens of Alabama?
With a population nearly equal to that of the whites it might be expected 
that the Negro would play an important role in the political affairs of
7
the state. Election statistics and reports indicate that such indeed was 
the case. Not al’irays, however, ifas the role they played of benefit to the 
Republican party.
The Republican party of Alabama, traditional political home of 
the state's colored population, declined as an effective political force 
after l8y4 . In the period between 1876 and 1888 the party continued to 
hold state conventions, but only in I876 did they choose to nominate a 
state ticket.^ In I88O and again in I882 it was deemed wise by the Re­
publicans officially to endorse the Independent-Greenback ticket in the
Q
state election.^
C^ontrol in the Black Belt and often the state depended upon com­
manding or eliminating the Negro vote. The Democrats emphasized white 
supremacy in counties where the colored population \7as small, but in the 
Black Belt, where they hoped to win Negro support, the race issue tos 
subordinated. Ibid., p. 33"
•J
According to the Census of I88O there were 600,103 Negroes and 
662,185 whites in Alabama. U.S., Bureau of the Census, Negro Population 
in the United States, I79O-I915 (Washington; Government Printing Office, 
1918,), chap. Ill, table I3, p. kk.
g
The Republican Convention of 1878, largely composed of Negroes, 
cited as its reason for not putting forth a slate their belief that the 
votes would not be honestly counted. Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia and 
Register of Important Events (New York: D . Appleton and Co., I876— ),
Vol. Ill, 8-9.
6?
The decision of the Republican leaders to abandon the field to the 
Democrats in state contests and to attempt to defeat them through cooper­
ation with Independent parties left the colored man at loose ends. His 
primary antagonist, the poor white, ordinarily supported the Independent 
candidates. Since the party of Lincoln was actually endorsing candidates 
who were opposed to the colored vote, it became increasingly easy for the 
Bourbons to win Negro support. Newspapers throughout the South noted the 
frequency with which the colored men in Alabama were voting for candidates 
of the Democratic party.What the journals did not emphasize, however, 
v/as that such support was generally only available in state contests. In 
elections of national import the majority of the Negroes continued to vote 
for the ticket of the party responsible for their freedom.
While the Republican party rarely put forth a slate of candidates 
in state and local elections, there was always a member of that organi­
zation seeking election in a campaign with national overtones. In every 
Congressional campaign of the period, for example, a Republican stood for 
election in one or more of the districtsNone was elected from Alabama
^In 1882 Negroes were active in the Republican convention which 
endorsed the Greenbackers. Ibid., Vol. VII, 6.
*^^ In 1880 the Pittsburgh Post commented on the fact that there 
were many Negro Democrats in Alabama. Cited in Galveston Daily News, 
September 2h, 188O. In 1882 Southern newspapers commented that many 
colored men were voting Democratic. The Republicans were not organized 
for this election. See Raleigh News and Observer, August 10, l882, and 
Galveston Daily News, July 27 and August 11, 1882. It should be noted 
that Alabama, as did many of the other Southern states, held her state 
election at an earlier date than the national election. This lessened 
the possibility of Federal interference in such elections.
^^or a list of the candidates and the vote polled by each see 
The Tribune Almanac and Political Register (New York; The Tribune As- 
so'ciation. Yearly) for the years between I876 and 1891.
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after 18?4, "but they always polled a considerable number of votes. This 
was especially true of the two colored men who ran for Congress from the 
Fourth District in 1876.^  ^ One, Jeremiah Haralson, received 8,675 votes 
while the other, James T. Rapier, polled a total of 7,236. With two Negro 
candidates in the field, however, the vote of the members of their race 
was split and both received less than did their white Democratic opponent. 
The lack of success in this election did not deter Haralson from again 
seeking a seat in Congress. In 1878 he again campaigned, but this time 
he polled only 6,5^5 votes to 8,514 for his Democratic opponent, Charles 
M. Shelly. In l384 he did even worse— being able to command the support 
of only 683 electors.Defeats suffered by the Negro candidates foretold 
the fate of their white Republican counterparts, and the party of white 
supremacy was able to maintain a stranglehold on Alabama Congressional 
seats during the entire period.
Just as the Republican party had no success in its competition 
for Congressional positions, so did any hope they might have had of win­
ning the electoral vote of Alabama for their presidential aspirant assume 
the nature of an opium dream. Nevertheless, in every election they did 
poll thousands of votes for their nominee. For example, in 1876 Hayes 
received 63,230 votes to 102,002 for Tilden; in 188O Garfield polled
l^ The counties comprising this district were all located in the 
Black Belt. Ibid., I876.
^3por the vote polled by these candidates in the various campaigns 
see ibid., for the years I877, I879, and I885. In 1882 a Negro Republican 
by the name of Stevens polled 1,693 votes in a losing cause. Ibid., I883. 
White Republicans fared no better than did the Negroes, but they did poll 
thousands of votes. This indicates that colored electors were giving them 
support.
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$6,221 to 91,181 for Hancock; in l884 Blaine managed to attract the support 
of $9,^ ^^  electors, but, like the others, he was s^ famped by his Democratic 
opponent, Cleveland, who won Alabama's electoral votes by polling 92,973
llj.
popular ballots. These figures mean nothing unless it is remembered that 
the colored and white population of the state was almost equal, and that a 
majority of the members of the Republican party were Negroes. Obviously, 
then, many thousands of the colored men were allowed to exercise their 
franchise in Federal elections.
The fact that the Republican party had little success in its 
efforts to win in national contests and in its attempts to divide the 
party of white supremacy by endorsing Independent candidates in state 
elections may be largely charged off to the fact that Bourbon leaders 
were able to utilize the Negro vote in the Black Belt.^^ A contributing 
factor, also, was that the Republicans were never able to escape the odium 
of being the Negro party. Since this hindered their efforts again to be­
come influential in state politics, it was deemed necessary by Republican 
leaders to disassociate themselves from the colored man.
In 1889 Thomas H. Watts, an old-line Whig, was approached with the 
idea of forming a Republican party which would ignore the Negro and would 
concentrate on a platform expounding the necessity for a protective tariff. 
Watts could see no hope for such an organization because, as he said, "it 
is perfect nonsense to talk of splitting the democratic party of the South
^^Ibid., for the year 1S77, 188I, and l88$.
15In exchange for their aid a small number of colored men were 
permitted to hold legislative and local offices during the period. Never 
to the extent, however, that they could possibily pose a threat to the 
Bourbon program.
TO
so long as we are confronted by the threat and danger of negro rule." He 
believed, however, that "if the negro could be placed in the background 
and kept there, the white people might divide, but to thinly of a split now 
is idle dreaming.Only a few days after Watts made this statement, 
however, a convention of white Republicans was assembled in Birmingham 
for the purpose of organizing a party which would exclude the colored man. 
Organization of this group, the White Republican Tariff League, drew im­
mediate fire from the Negroes. Most of their leaders, including the very 
influential clergymen, denounced it from lecture platforms and from the 
pulpit. In the regular Republican convention, called to order soon after 
the other adjourned, the temporary chairman, a Negro by the name of 
Stevens, denounced all Federal office-holders in the state during the 
terms of Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur. He castigated them as "political 
rascals, acting with the Democrats in the State to keep the negro out of 
his political rights.
The split within the Republican party in Alabama was greeted 
gleefully by Southern Democratic journals. One such newspaper, the 
Atlanta Constitution, predicted that the movement would be abortive be­
cause the colored man constituted ninety per cent of the Republican party 
in Alabama. This journal did note, however, that the Negroes of the state 
had been alienated by the action of the white Republicans and offered the 
idea that many colored men would find their way into the ranlvs of the
l^Quoted in Raleigh News and observer, March 3O, 1889.
^^Quoted in ibid.. May 16, l88g. This convention of some 3OO 
delegates, four-fifths of whom were colored, nominated a full slate of 
candidates, but the Democrats swamped them again.
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Democratic party.While the same suggestion was made by some of the 
Negro preachers, it was too late for the colored man effectively to switch 
his allegiance. Just around the proverbial corner was the Populist re- 
volt--a struggle between the agrarian uplander and the.Bourbon. #en the 
smoke and fire of this contest between the whites was doused by the 
agrarian storm, the Negro of Alabama, never after 1876 as potent a poli­
tical force in the state as his numbers would indicate he should have been, 
would find that his political future was at the mercy of his traditional 
enemy, "the boys from the forks of the creek."
In Arkansas the situation in regard to Negro voting was somewhat 
different from that in Alabama because of the state's racial composition.
19Unlike in Alabama, the Negro was in a distinct minority in Arkansas.
In spite of this, however, the colored man \ras a factor to be considered
in the politics of the state. During the period under discussion no legal
20restriction was placed upon his exercise of the franchise. Usually the 
Negroes cooperated with their Republican mentors, but instances are to be
^^See the Atlanta Constitution for April 10, 11, 12, and 20, 1889.
~%here were only 26.3 per cent as many Negroes as whites in the 
population. The figures given by the Census of 188O show 591;531 whites 
and 210,666 Negroes. Of the latter, 107,331 were males. Age differ- 
entation is not given. Bureau of the Census, Negro Population, chap. Ill,
table 13, p. 1^ .
POThe constitution in effect in Arkansas during this period tos 
prepared in 1874. It entitled every male citizen or one who had declared 
his intention of becoming one, at least twenty-one years of age, and who 
had resided in the state for one year and the county for six months to 
vote. Thorpe (corap. and ed.). Federal and State Constitutions, II, 336-3?. 
Nevertheless, at a Negro convention held at Little Rock in l8?8 the 
suggestion was made that since the rights of the colored men were not 
respected in Arkansas, they should consider emigration to a state where 
they could exercise the franchise unmolested. Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, 
Vol. Ill, 23.
72
found where the opposition party endeavored to attract their support. For 
example, the Democratic State Convention of I878 included a plank in its 
platform which noted that "it is the sense of this convention that the 
colored population . . . are identified in interest with the great Demo­
cratic party of the State . . . Since this was true the Convention 
"fully realizing the importance of more harmonious feeling between them,
embrace this opportunity of inviting them— the colored people of the State--
21to an active cooperation with us in furthering our common interests."
It is impossible to determine the success of this and subsequent 
and comparable pleas that the interests of the Negro were those of the 
Democratic party. Nevertheless, leaders of that organization continuously 
bragged that the colored man was being converted and was placing his poli­
tical future willingly in the hands of the Democrats. Even a Northern 
journal reported in I88O that it had found evidence that indicated the 
Democratic party in Arkansas had made gains among the colored men. This 
\ras borne out to some extent by the fact that Negroes had been placed on
22
the party ticket as candidates for minor offices in a number of counties. 
Also bearing out Democratic contentions was an article carried in a Negro 
newspaper, published at Little Rock, in iS S k . The editor took cognizance 
of a statement in a Northern journal which maintained that the colored 
people of the South were gravitating toward the party of white supremacy.
He took exception to this statement to the extent of wondering if the 
Negroes were gravitating toward the Democrats or if that party was moving 
toward the colored man? He did admit, however, that there were numerous
21
Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, Vol. Ill, 23.
^%ation, LI (September 11, 188O), 201-02,
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instances throughout the South where, through a compromise arrangement, the
go
Negro '^/as permitted to share the political spoils with the white man.
IVhether the colored electorate of Arkansas was gravitating toward
the Democratic party or not, the primary Negro support which that party
24
ms able to command came in state and local elections. In elections of 
national import the colored men of the state continued to give their main 
support to the Republican party. This was true during the time of Recon­
struction when the Carpetbagger, Powell Clayton, m s  elected governor with 
the aid of the Negro vote. It remained the case down until the late l880's 
when a "lily-white" movement began and the same Powell Clayton informed 
the colored men that they were no longer welcome in the Republican party.
During the period between I876 and I888 the Republicans did not 
always find it feasible to nominate candidates for state offices in Arkan­
sas. In 1878 they did not bother to select a gubernatorial nominee, and
^3"Tiie greatest danger that threatens democratic supremacy in the 
south," said the editor, "is that the 'out faction' always gravitates 
toward the negro and secures his aid to route^sicJ7 the 'ins.' In nearly 
every southern state scores of colored men hold office . . . . Weekly 
Mansion (Little Rock), July 21, I883.
\^?he editor of the Weekly Ivfension, August 11, I883, complained 
tliat for twenty years the Democrats had opposed the wishes and interests 
of the Negro. Bourbon policies, he insisted, were forcing the colored men 
to remain Republican. On September 8, I883, the same Negro editor ap­
plauded a statement appearing in the Free South to the effect that if the 
Republicans wanted to remain a power in national politics they must give 
the colored man more office. The editor of the Arkansas journal claimed 
that four-fifths of the members of that party in his state were Negroes, 
and yet they were allowed to hold only the offices undesired by the 
whites— constable and coroner.
25poting Clayton's change of attitude, the Atlanta Constitution, 
May 15; 1888, said it was a sign of progress. The editor of this Bourbon 
newspaper maintained that the colored men would find that their true in­
terests were those of their white friends, the Democrats.
Jk
in 1880 they followed the same course but tried to split the party of
26white supremacy by supporting the Greenback candidate. Little success 
was achieved in this effort and in 1882 the Republicans again nominated a 
candidate for governor. A lack of success in this and succeeding 
elections, coupled with the fact that the Negroes were demanding more and 
better offices, led to disillusionment on the part of the white leaders.
Not since the period of Reconstruction had the Republicans, even with 
Negro support, been able to pose a threat to Democratic hegemony in either 
state or national elections.Not since the period of Reconstruction had
they elected a governor, controlled either house of the state legislature,
28or chosen a member of the United States Congress. The ultimate effect 
of this state of affairs was an increasing belief on the part of the white 
Republicans that their party would never gain respectability as long as it 
depended to such a great extent upon the colored vote. Bearing this out 
is a statement made by a party leader to the Lincoln Club of Arkansas in 
1888. He informed his audience tliat the Republican party must attract
26Colored electoral support was primarily given to the Democrats 
in state and local elections where the Republicans did not nominate a 
slate of candidates, but endorsed Independents.
27'According to Democratic editors, one reason for this was that 
more Negroes were voting for the party of white supremacy. For example, 
the editor of the Fort Smith Weekly Elevator, November 26, 1886, wrote 
that Northern impressions that Negroes were intimidated at the South was 
a fallacy. Democratic electoral majorities were increased, he said, be­
cause more colored men were supporting that party.
28For a compilation of the Arkansas vote in the various elections 
see the Tribune Almanac for the years 1877-I891. It is interesting to 
note that there was a continual increase in Republican totals during this 
period. For instance, the Republican presidential aspirant received 38,669 
votes in 1876 and 58,752 in I888. There was a corresponding increase in 
Democratic totals.
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"persons -who have heretofore acted with the Democratic party." He also
announced that he was trying to discover "a way by which they could act
29
with the Republican party without being dominated by the Negro." This 
was a backhand acknowledgment that the Republicans had in the past catered 
to and depended upon the colored vote. At the same time it was an an­
nouncement that the party of Lincoln in Arkansas intended to divorce 
itself from what had become an embarrassing alliance.
Despite the fact that at least one Democratic newspaper answered 
the Republican orator with the proclamation that the ranks of its party 
was open to the Negro, it is apparent that the influence of the colored 
man on the politics of Arkansas declined after 1888.^^ That year was 
marked by increased violence between white and black and the exodus of 
some Negro politicians from the state. One such individual, J. W. Ramsay, 
deputy-clerk of Crittenden County, arrived in St. Louis with eighteen other 
refugees. Ramsay informed a reporter for the Associated Press that he 
would not return to Arkansas because it was an unhealthy place for him.
He also took cognizance of reported violence from his section of the state 
by declaring that "the cause of these troubles there is that the whites 
did not want the negroes to hold officeV/hether or not the con­
tentions of Ramsay were true, reports of violence in Arkansas continued
^^ Little Rock Daily Gazette, July 22, l888, quoted in C. Vann 
Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-191 ,^ Vol. X of A History of the 
South, eds. V/endall Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (Baton Rouge; Louisi­
ana State University Press, 19I+7— ), p. 219»
^^Weekly Elevator, July 27, 1888, informed the colored men that 
they were welcome in the Democratic party.
31Quoted in Raleigh News and Observer, July 3I, 1888.
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to circulate. In 1889 the Atlanta Constitution, commenting on the situ­
ation in that state, contended that the root of the trouble was that 
Negroes were voting the Democratic ticket. , "Negroes who admit that they 
have voted the democratic ticket," claimed the editor, "are unmercifully 
beaten, and Arkansas is just now passing through a phase of the race 
problem that most of the other southern states have experienced long 
ago.
Charges and countercharges were the order of the day. Neverthe­
less, to use an old cliche, "where there's smoke there's fire." Un­
doubtedly the colored man -vreis an active participant in the political life 
of Arkansas; undoubtedly, too, there -VTas increasing concern on the part of 
some whites because of this activity. The agrarian element, opposing the 
Bourbons as Independent or Greenback candidates, found their chances for 
victory dimmed when the Bourbons utilized the pliant Negro vote. The 
Republican, on the other hand, found the colored man willing to vote for 
him, but he also found himself associated in the minds of the whites as 
the champion of the Negro— a fact which virtually assured his defeat. By 
the year I889, therefore, the Republican party in Arkansas, as in Alabama, 
decided to present a bill of divorcement to their colored colleagues. 
Apparently the divorce was concluded. At least the Republican Convention 
of Pulaski County in 189O was composed primarily of Negroes. This con­
vention nominated five colored men and two white Democrats for county 
office; the Democrats refused to accept this fusion arrangement and the 
white Republicans refused to support the colored nominee.This iras
^^Atlanta Constitution, July 26, 1889. 
^^Atlanta Journal, August I8, 189O.
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symptomatic of what was increasingly to he the political fate of the Negro 
in Arkansas. Slowly but surely he was deserted by both parties. Slowly 
but surely the colored men, once a factor to be considered in Arkansas 
politics, declined in influence until eventually they were almost totally 
disfranchised.
As was true in the states of Alabama and Arkansas, the attitude
toward Negro participation in politics varied in time and intensity among
the white population of Florida. During the period of Reconstruction the
Negroes, who, according to the Census of 188O, numbered some 126,690 and
3)4.
comprised forty-seven per cent of the population, were tutored in the
\rays of the Republican party. Despite all efforts of their former
masters, both during and for some years after the end of Reconstruction,
to sever them from this alliance the colored men tended to remain loyal
35
to the party of emancipation. Nevertheless, although the loyalty of 
the mass of Negroes could be counted upon by the leaders of the Republican 
party in Florida, it >/as not enough to maintain that organization in 
control. By 1876 white opposition was so intense to the Republicans that 
the Democrats were successful in their efforts to place George F. Drew 
in the governor's chair. The membership of the party responsible for 
the defeat of the Radicals and the ending of Reconstruction represented
35.
Bureau of the Census, Negro Population, chap. Ill, table I3, 
p. 4-4 .
During the period of Reconstruction the Negro not only voted in 
Florida, but many of them held office. For example, there were nineteen 
colored men among the seventy-six members elected to the state legislature 
in 1868. H. D. Price, The Negro and Southern Politics ; A Chapter of 
Florida History (New York: New York University Press, 1957), p. 11. A 
Florida Negro, Joseph T. Walls, served in Congress from 187I to I875.
A. A. Taylor, "Negro Congressmen a Generation After," Journal of Negro 
History, VII (April, 1922), 127.
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a conglomeration of economic interests and political philosophies, hut 
upon one point they could agree— the necessity of controlling the Negro 
and preventing a revival of the combination which had dominated and ex­
ploited the state for so long.
Agreement among the whites as to the necessity for control of the 
colored man left unsolved the method whereby it might be effected. The 
yeoman element of the party of white supremacy, Democrats before the Civil 
War, had a strong anti-Negro bias and would have been elated to see the 
colored men disfranchised. They especially distrusted the ability of the 
Black Belt planters, often members of the Whig party and now Democrats by 
necessity rather than conviction, to control the Negroes' vote as they had 
a short time previously regulated their very lives.But it was the 
planter element, the Bourbon, and not the agrarian class which dominated 
the Democratic party of Florida at the outset of Redemption. Because of 
this dominance it was the Bourbons who for most of the period formulated 
Democratic party policy in regard to the colored man.
IThen the Redeemer George F. Drew was inaugurated as Governor of 
Florida on January 2, 18TT, one era ended and another began. In his 
inaugural address the governor promised his colored constitutents that 
all rights, including those dealing with the franchise, which had been 
bestowed upon them by the Constitution prepared during the period of 
Reconstruction would be maintained by his administration. 87 such a 
promise was undoubtedly pleasing to the Negroes, but not greeted with so
36
Edward C. Williamson, "The Era of the Democratic County Leader; 
Florida Politics, l877“l893" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation. Dept, of 
History, University of Pennsylvania), p. 25.
'^^ Ibid., p. 30.
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much acclaim ivas a message which the governor delivered to the legislature 
on January 10, 1877. In this message Drew proposed that the Democrat- 
controlled legislature effect a reform of the election laws of the state. 
It was suggested that Florida counties be divided into election districts, 
and that each elector be required to cast his ballot in the district where 
he was registered. Undoubtedly the governor realized that such a law 
would work a hardship on many of the colored men. A large number of this 
race were itinerant laborers and it would often be difficult for them to 
return to their district on election day. That this would in effect dis­
franchise many Negroes and might be the beginning of complete disfranchis­
ing legislation was recognized by the small number of colored men in the 
legislature. Consequently, they fought the governor's proposal with every 
means at their disposal. Their battle was fruitless, however, and the 
suggestion of Drew iras enacted into law by a compliant legislature.^^
The election law of I877, while it did result in some transient 
colored men being unable to cast ballots, did not appreciably lessen the 
number of Negroes eligible to vote. Eligibility, however, does not 
necessarily mean that the colored citizen of Florida was freely allowed 
to exercise the franchise. It early became apparent that whenever the 
colored men opposed the Bourbon's program their right to vote would be 
encumbered. In 1878, for example, some Negroes who had earlier been en­
ticed into the Democratic party but who were now dissatisfied with the 
"retrenchment" policy of Governor Drew, joined with the Republican members 
of their race to oppose the Bourbons in the Congressional elections.
S^ ibid., pp. 39-51.
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The revolt of the colored man was of little success in 1878 be­
cause the party of white supremacy was able to elect their full slate of 
candidates to Congress.This accomplishment of the Bourbons was ap­
parently tinged with fraud and resulted in demands by the Republicans that 
a Federal election law be enacted to protect the colored man in his right 
to cast a ballot and have it counted.^^  Such a prospect was anathema to 
the Democratic party of the state. The Florida legislature almost im­
mediately passed a resolution which directed the Congressional delegation 
of the state to use all of its influence to prevent a recurrence of the
emplojmient of Federal officials as supervisors of elections held under the 
h2laws of the state.
3 9Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, Vol. Ill, 333“35* Negroes domi­
nated some of the Republican conventions in which the party's Con­
gressional candidates were chosen. The Democratic party also chose its 
candidates in convention. Shortly after the convention adjourned, Negro 
Democrats of Leon County held a mass meeting and passed resolutions con­
demning the cutting of the length of the school term, discrimination 
against the colored race in the drawing of juries, and the increase in 
county taxes. They warned that they would vote Republican until the 
abuses were removed. Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, July 30, 1878, cited 
in Williamson, "Era of the Democratic County Leader," p. 75-
*^^ One Republican candidate, Horatio Bisbee, contested his defeat 
on the grounds of fraud and intimidation, after an investigation, Bisbee 
-iras seated. U.S. Congress, House, Bisbee v. Hull, 46th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1878, House I4isc. Doc. I87, p. 3 9 1 BÏsbëë~wâs a perennial candidate 
from the Second District. He was elected in I876, I878, and l882. See 
the Tribune Almanac for the years 1877-85. In the other Congressional 
districts a Democrat was elected during these years, but the vote polled 
by the Republicans indicates that a large number of colored electors re­
mained loyal to that party in national elections. This is also borne out 
by the vote polled by Republican presidential aspirants. For example, 
Garfield received 23,686 votes to 27,92  ^for Hancock; in l38h Blaine 
polled 28,031 and Cleveland 31,766; in I888 Harrison received 26,657 and 
Cleveland 39,561. Tribune Almanac for the years 188I-I889.
^^ See the Tallahassee Weekly Floridian, December 18, I878, quoted 
in Williamson, "Era of the Democratic County Leader," p. 85.
k-2Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, Vol. IV, 371.
8l
No Federal election law existed in 188O— a year marked by another 
Democratic victory in Florida. The Republicans nominated ex-Senator 
Simon Bolivar Conover as their candidate for governor, and the Democrats, 
pledging to all men the fullest protection of their civil and political 
rights, countered with William D. Bloxham.^^ As in I878, this election 
year saw intimidation and fraud being practiced freely by both sides. 
Armed Democrats roamed the countryside intimidating prospective colored 
Republican voters. Not certain, however, that this would be sufficient 
to ensure the election of their candidate, the Democrats also stuffed the 
ballot boxes with tissue ballots. IVhile the Republicans protested 
bitterly at such actions, neither were they pure in their methods of cam­
paigning. In some instances members of the Negro community intimidated
some of their neighbors in an effort to keep the colored vote solidly in
A5
the Republican column.
Generally, the theme of Florida politics after I88O was that the 
Bourbons continued to appeal for the Negro vote and were able to command 
some such support in local and state elections. In contests of national 
scope during the period, however, the colored man generally retained his
^^Ibid., Vol. V, 273.
1,1,
'Ibid. In 1880 the Republicans nominated a colorful Negro 
orator, George W. Witherspoon, as their Congressional candidate from the 
First District. Williamson, "Rra of the Democratic County Leader," 
p. 113. Witherspoon polled 11,082 votes, but his Democratic opponent, 
Robert H- M. Davidson, received 15,078. Witherspoon contested his de­
feat, but the case was dismissed by Congress. Chester H. Rowell (ed.),
A Historical and Legal Digest of all the Contested Election Cases in the 
House of Representatives of the United States from the First to the 
Fifty-Sixth Congress, 1789-I9OI (Washington; Government Printing Office,
1901), p. 368.
45
Williamson, "Era of the Democratic County Leader," p. II3.
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allegiance to the Republican party. Random samplings of some campaign 
and election reports will provide the best indication of conditions in 
the state. In 1882, for example, the major news coming from the Florida 
election was that it passed off quietly except for the assualt on a 
colored voter by a Negro bystander because he voted the Democratic 
ticket.The most noteworthy event of the following year was the sug­
gestion by a Republican newspaper, the Key West News, that all elements
k-7
opposed to the Bourbon Democracy cooperate with each other. Some efforts 
at fusion were made. In l88k the Republicans endorsed an Independent 
candidate for governor, but to no avail, the Democrats were again vic­
torious .
That the Bourbons were successful in winning some colored support 
in this and succeeding elections can not be actually proved, but that it 
did occur may be drawn from inference. Had not the Bourbons been seeking 
to placate the Negro then it is doubtful if an event of the election of 
l884 would have come to pass. In that year a Democratic candidate for 
Presidential elector, R. C. Long, made an anit-Negro speech. He was im­
mediately forced to resign as a candidate by the Chairman of the Demo­
cratic State Executive Committee, Samuel Pasco, who informed the colored 
man that it had been in the past and would in the future be the purpose 
of the Democratic party to maintain "the constitutional rights of the
^^Raleigh News and Observer, November 8, 1882, and Galveston 
Daily News, November 8, l8ü2.
h-7'Key West News, n.d., cited in the Lancet, September 22, 1883.
The Lancet, a Negro newspaper published in Petersburg, Virginia, noted 
that the News claimed that the Republican party of Florida \ras composed of 
ninety percent colored men.
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colored man . . . The editor of the Key West Hews answered Pasco
by saying that "the studied and polished hypocrisy which the Bourbon 
leaders have displayed toward the colored people since the war has been 
and is remarkable only for its transparency.such a statement makes 
it evident that the Republican party was concerned about Bourbon efforts 
to attract Negro support. Additional evidence comes from the fact that 
the Bourbons permitted colored men to hold some county positions and 
seats in the state legislature, and that steps were not immediately taken 
to effect the disfranchisement of the colored race.^^
The possibility of curtailing Negro participation in politics 
certainly occurred to some citizens of Florida. By 1885 agitation by 
the yeoman farmer, the small merchant, and other members of their eco­
nomic strata resulted in consideration being given to the idea of dis­
franchisement. In that year, amidst dire predictions by the Republicans 
that it foreshadowed terrible political woes for the colored man, a 
constitutional convention was convened for the purpose of considering 
changes in the instrument of government prepared during Radical Re­
construction. Republican fears for the Negro, however, were not borne
^^allahasse Land of Flowers, September 27, 1894-, quoted in 
Williamson, "Era of the Democratic County Leader," p. 203.
^^Quoted in ibid., p. 204. Reports from Jacksonville said that 
the election was quiet and that the Negroes were voting more solidly 
than ever. Raleigh News and Observer, November 5, l884.
the period of the l880's, as a result of fusion agreements, 
at least nine different Negroes were elected to the state senate. Also, 
during this decade there were several colored Republicans elected to the 
lower house of the legislature. In addition, a Negro was elected marshal 
of Jacksonville, and, in 1889, a colored man was elected County Judge of 
Monroe County. He \fas impeached and removed from office because he issued 
a marriage license to a colored Cuban man and a white Cuban woman. Work 
(comp.), "Some Negro Members of Reconstruction Conventions and Legis­
latures and of Congress," Journal of Negro History, V (January, 1920), 
69-70. ---------------------
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out in the new fundamental law prepared by the Bourbon-dominated body. 
Liberal franchise requirements were adopted and the restoration of 
county self-government was provided. Of more immediate danger to the 
colored man, and, for that matter, to the agrarian opponents of the 
Bourbons, was the provision authorizing the governor to appoint county 
commissioners. Because these individuals controlled election machinery 
on the county level, the new provision of the Constitution enhanced the 
position of the party in power. Naturally the governor would appoint 
commissioners friendly to his party and, since they controlled election 
machinery, it would henceforth be easier to count out the party's op­
ponents.^  ^ Despite this new device, however, at the outset no overt 
action was taken to limit the franchise of the colored man under the 
provisions of the new Constitution.
The situation in Florida politics changed rapidly in IB89.
Negroes had continued their practice of voting for Republican candidates 
in national elections and seeking to conclude an arrangement in state 
and local politics whereby, in exchange for their electoral support, a 
number of offices would be allotted to members of their race. Generally, 
this support was available to the Bourbons, but by 1869 there was a 
possibility that the colored men would join forces with the agrarian 
element to overthrow the conservatives. To lessen the possibility that 
this combination would achieve success, the Bourbon-dominated legislature 
enacted into law a measure changing franchise requirements. This new
^^ The legislature was also empowered to enace a poll tax. For 
voting provisions of the new constitution see Thorpe (comp, and ed.). 
Federal and State Constitutions, II, 7^7“^ 8 .
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election law provided for the inauguration of a poll tax and also for a 
multiple ballot-box system similar to that of South Carolina. While 
these provisions did not overtly violate the Fifteenth Amendment— they 
applied equally to white and black— they did strike the Negro and the 
Republican party at the most vulnerable points, mny colored men would 
be reluctant to spend their hard-earned cash for the privilege of exer­
cising the franchise, a privilege that was less and less associated in 
their minds as a method of demonstrating their freedom. Even those who 
did pay the tax, or had it paid for them, often found that it was to no 
avail because of the confusing ballot-box system. According to the 
Florida law a ballot had to be correctly deposited in one of eight boxes, 
each of which was for a different office. It was an easy matter for the 
Bourbon-directed election officials periodically to shift the location 
of the ballot boxes. This had the effect of preventing a literate member 
of the opposition from memorizing the location of the boxes and in­
structing the illiterate Negroes and whites as to the one in which each 
ballot should be deposited.^ Consequently, a majority of those colored 
men who had met the poll tax obligation found that their lack of edu­
cation often resulted in disfranchisement. These machinations by the 
Bourbons had the desired effect for after the enactment of this legis- 
lation the Republican vote in Florida rapidly declined. Thus after
^^ Price, The Negro and Southern Politics, p. 13- It was a simple 
matter for Democratic election managers to inform their illiterate sup­
porters as to the box in which their ballots should be deposited.
^^ The combined effect of the poll tax and ballot-box laws on the 
opposition vote can be seen in the total vote for governor in the 
elections immediately preceding and following their adoption. In l884 
the Democratic gubernatorial total v?as 32,057 and the opposition polled
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1890 the colored man, while still a factor, largely ceased to he a 
force in Florida politics.
Even though the percentage of colored men in the population dif­
fered greatly in Alabama, Arkansas, and Florida, the political fate of 
the Negro in these states was somewhat comparable. In all of these 
states the colored men generally remained loyal to the Republican party, 
but when that organization chose to abandon the political arena in state 
politics and support Independents, the Negro often cast his vote for 
Bourbon candidates. In payment for such assistance to the Bourbons the 
Negro leaders were often allowed to hold a small percentage of the minor 
offices and seats in the state legislature. Inability of the Republicans 
to win elections, however, convinced the leaders of that party that the 
colored vote, so valuable during Reconstruction, was a liability rather 
than an asset. Consequently, before the end of the iBBO's a movement 
\jas under way in these states to disassociate the Republican party from 
its traditional alliance with the colored race. Thus, by 1889 the Negro 
was being abandoned by his political mentors in these states of the lower 
South. This situation was not, however, unique for it also prevailed in 
most of the other states which had formerly constituted the Confederacy.
27,351. Thus, out of a total vote of 59,938 the Democrats received 
53*5/^* la 1886 the Democrats garnered 40,259 oat of a total of 66,740 
for a percentage of 6O.3. By 1892, however, the Democrats percentage 
vra.s 78*7, but in 1B96 it dropped to 66.7. In 19OO the percentage of 
votes polled by the Democrats had climbed to an astounding Bl^ . It is 
instructive to note that the total vote polled by Democrats declined 
while their percentage increased after I89O. Obviously, many Democrats 
concluded their vote was not needed for a party victory. For a chart of 
these and additional figures see ibid., pp. 13-14.
CHAPTER IV
THE NEGRO AND SOUTHERN POLITICS: GEORGIA,
LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI, AND TEXAS
The attitude in regard to Negro suffrage which prevailed in 
Florida \<ras repeated to some extent in the neighboring state of Georgia. 
VIhite men of this state, wrecked and torn by the Civil War, faced the 
prospect of Negro voting with trepidation after that conflict. As was 
true of a majority of the people of the South, the citizens of Georgia 
had no desire to see the colored men enfranchised. Alexander Stephens 
more or less reflected the attitude of his compatriots when, in testimony 
before a Congressional Committee considering what eventually became the 
Fourteenth Amendment, he said that the "general opinion of the State is 
very much adverse to Negro suffrage . . . ." Citizens of Georgia, he 
stated, "... look upon the question of suffrage as one belonging ex­
clusively to the States . . . ."^  That this point of view did not im­
press either the committee or the Radical-dominated Congress is not at 
all surprising. The question of state's rights had, temporarily at 
least, been settled by the recent conflict, and the fact that the white
^Quoted in Southern Watchman, I#y 2, I866, cited in Ralph 
Wardlaw, Negro Suffrage in Georgia, 1867-193O ("pjielps-Stokes Fellowship 
Studies," No. 11, Athens, Ga.; University of Georgia Press, 1932), p. 18. 
General John B. Gordon said he did not favor disfranchisement of the 
colored men as a class, but he thought some restriction should be placed 
on their voting. Ibid., p. 2 k.
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citizens of Georgia were opposed to the enfranchisement of the colored
men made it even more certain that Congress would look favorable upon the
question of bestowing the vote upon that race. Eventually, of course,
this did occur, and when the Negro was enfranchised the Southern Watchman
gave the following advice to Georgia's colored citizens: Vote for the
best qualified candidates, and, above all else, "avoid saying or doing
2
anything which can get up any bad feelings between the two races."
The advice given to the Negro by this journal was well taken 
because strenuous opposition vras early manifested by some white citizens 
toi/ard participation by members of that race in the political affairs of 
the state. As a rule, such prominent Georgians as John B. Gordon, 
Alexander Stephens, Alfred Colquitt, Benjamin Hill, and ex-Governor 
Joseph Brown, while opposed to the indiscriminate enfranchisement of the 
colored men, acquiessed to the situation and attempted to make the most 
of it. Violent opposition, however, came from the poorer class of whites 
with whom the Negro \fas in economic competition. Nevertheless, in spite
of bitter protestations the colored men, backed by Federal bayonets,
freely participated in the Georgia political arena while that state was 
in the throes of Radical Reconstruction.
^Southern Watchman, May 27, I867, quoted in ibid., p. 23.
^In elections held on April 20, 1868, twenty-eight Negroes were
elected to the Georgia legislature. On September 3 the House expelled 
all but three. This action drew fire from Congress which retaliated by 
refusing to seat the Georgia delegation. Eventually the state iras re­
quired to seat the Negroes and to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment before 
her statehood was restored. After this date one colored man, Jefferson 
F. Long, served part of one term in Congress. Four Negroes sought 
election to Congress in I87O, but none were successful in their campaign. 
Samuel D. Smith, The Negro in Congress, 187O-I9QI (Chapel Hill: Uni­
versity of North Carolina Pre s's, iq40 ), pp. 5, '135.
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Redemption was accomplished earlier in Georgia than in some of 
the other former Confederate states— an event which placed the political 
future of the Negro in the hands of potentially antagonistic whites. The 
actual beginning of a return to native white control ■vra.s.,in 1872 when the 
Democrats were successful in electing their gubernatorial candidate. The 
following year the Georgia legislature sought to consolidate the position 
of this party by changing the electoral section of the state constitution. 
Since the Republican party of Georgia, as in other Southern states, ivas 
largely dependent upon the political support of the colored race, the 
change in the fundamental law sought to make it more difficult for a 
Negro to register as an elector. Capitalizing upon the propensity of 
the colored men to move periodically, an amendment \ras adopted which 
stipulated that to be eligible to cast a ballot an individual must be a 
resident of the state for one year and the county for six months.^ The 
immediate purpose of this legal maneuver was to limit to some extent the 
number of eligible Negro voters, and thus to lessen the possibility that 
a rejuvenated Republican party would seriously contest for control of the 
state in 1874. Actually, the amendment, together with the activities of 
the Ku KLux Klan, had the desired effect because the colored vote was 
virtually powerless in this election. That this v^as true is amply demon­
strated by the fact that although the Negro population of Georgia v?as 
almost eq.ual to that of the white it was only in three counties that 
their voting strength iras sufficient to elect colored representatives to
G^eorge A. Glynn (comp.), The Convention mnual for the Sixth 
New York State Constitutional Convention, ÏÜ9Ï, American Constitutions 
(Albany: Argus Printing Co.,'18$^ ), II, Part II, pp.' 400-06.
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the legislature.^ Even had more Negroes been registered, however, the 
result would have been little different because the Democratic whites 
were solid in their determination not to permit a revival of Republican
rule. The leading Democratic newspaper of the state left no doubt of
this when it published the party ticket with the comment that here "is 
the ticket selected by the Democratic party . . . which will of course
be elected, as there is no opposition, and would be if there ifas
In 187I+ and in succeeding elections which came during the period 
under discussion the Republican party did not pose a serious threat to 
Democratic ascendancy. Legal stumbling blocks and intimidation of the 
potential supporters of the Republicans was largely responsible for this 
during the early years of the period. After the Compromise of I877, 
however, the policy of the National Republican party was largely geared 
to the philosophy that success in state politics ifas problematical as 
long as that party was associated with the colored men. Consequently, 
while the Republican machinery was maintained and \ras oiled in presi­
dential years to marshal votes for its nominee, it was rare indeed when 
they bothered to nominate a state ticket. In spite of this, however, 
the Negro did remain a factor to be considered in state politics— not so 
much because he posed a threat to Democratic ascendancy, but as an
T^he counties from which Negroes were elected were McIntosh, 
Glynn, and Liberty. Four white Radicals were elected in other counties. 
Wardlaw, Negro Suffrage in Georgia, p. 38. The census of 188O, more 
accurate than the one I87O, givesthe population as consisting of 
725,133 Negroes and 616,906 whites. U.S., Bureau of the Census, Negro 
Population in the United States, 1790-1915 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1918), chap. m ,  table I3, p. Vt-.
^Atlanta Constitution, December 2, 1874.
91
emotional issue employed to rally whites to continued loyalty to the 
party of white supremacy.
The leaders who seized power in the Democratic party of Georgia 
during the period under discussion were not representative of the small 
farmer class or even of the old planter oligarchy. Although their names 
and manners often resulted in their being associated in the electorate's 
mind with the ante-bellum planter element, in economic philosophy they
7
represented more the rising class of industrialists. Early during the 
the period they became convinced that a maintenance of the traditional 
agrarian economy by their state and section could only result in con­
tinued domination by the North. Thus, they reached the conclusion that 
they must take the initiative in bringing about a diversification of the 
economic system in their state. Such an event would be possible, how­
ever, only if investment capital could be enticed into Georgia and it 
would not come where there was political chaos. Consequently, whether 
these individuals rationalized it in this manner or not, they developed 
the attitude that it was their collective responsibility to assume the 
posture of a political Moses and lead their state to the promised land 
of industrialization.
In their efforts to improve the economic situation in Georgia 
the leaders turned to political action, and, in so doing, they violated 
many democratic principles. Led by the so-called "Triumvirate" of Joseph 
E. Brown, John B. Gordon, and Alfred H. Colquitt, the Georgia Bourbons 
traded the primary political offices of the state back and forth among
'^C. Vann Woodward, "Tom Watson and the Negro in Agrarian Poli­
tics," Journal of Southern History, V (February, 1938), ih.
92
a selected few. By so doing they were successful in their efforts to 
prevent political instability, but they also succeeded in arousing op­
position among the numerous members of their party who believed that the 
Bourbon's policy iras disadvantageous to the majority of the citizens of 
Georgia. Yet, because the Bourbons directed the party responsible for 
Redemption, their antagonists found that the road to party revolution was 
indeed a rocky one. IVhenever it appeared that success might be attendant 
upon their efforts, the Bourbons called forth the specter of Recon­
struction and demanded strict allegiance from all classes in the hallowed 
name of white supremacy.
While the Georgia Bourbons had no intention of allowing a re­
vitalized Republican-Regro combination to threaten their political domi­
nance they did seek to give a semblance of legality to their actions and 
to solidify their position by adopting a new constitution for the state.
As would be expected, the convention which was assembled for that purpose 
in 1877 'ras largely dominated by the Bourbons. It did, however, contain 
an element which accepted the idea that limitations should be placed upon 
the right of the colored men to exercise the franchise. Prominent among 
the delegates holding to that attitude was Robert Toombs, former general 
and Secretary of State of the Confederacy, who had refused to ask a 
pardon from the Federal government and who had consequently not had his 
citizenship restored. Toombs reminded his fellow delegates that a new 
and ignorant element had been enfranchised. "We must not only protect 
ourselves against them," he said, "but in behalf of the poor African, I 
would protect them from themselves." The Negro is kind and affectionate, 
he continued, "but their previous condition, whether by your fault or not.
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\-ias such as to disqualify them for self-government. In spite of the 
arguments advanced by Toombs the Georgia convention did not deem it 
necessary to include in the new constitution restrictive qualifications 
on the franchise. In fact, the finished article on the suffrage was not 
vastly different from the provisions included in the Constitution of 
1868.^ The completed product was such that a Northern journal commented 
that among the good features of Georgia's new instrument of government 
were those effecting the colored man because they secured to him his 
civil rights. It was noted by this editor, however, that the provision 
requiring the payment of all taxes in order to be eligible to vote might 
for a time disfranchise many of the colored race.^^
It was not necessary for the Bourbons to employ strict legal 
methods to prevent the Negro from voting the Republican party back into 
power because after about 1876 that organization made no real effort to 
win in state elections. Occasionally, but with no success, a Republican 
candidate would seek election to Congress, and once in awhile a member of 
that party campaigned for minor state office.One reason for this was
O
Quoted in Pleasant A. Stovall, Robert Toombs : Statesman, Speaker, 
Soldier, Sage (New York: Cassell Publishing Co., 1893), P* 3^1. By 
raising the specter of the Negro vote, Toombs was seeking to prevent the 
convention from adopting a provision which would require state judges to 
stand for election. In this he was successful.
g
The franchise section of the constitution provided that male 
citizens who had resided in the state one year and the county six months, 
and who had paid all taxes were eligible to vote. Excluded were all 
persons convicted of a list of crimes which included larcency and moral 
turpitude. For the complete text see Glynn (comp.), American Consti­
tuions, II, part II, 405-07.
^^Nation, XXV (August 30, 1877), 128.
^^ Some Republicans sought election to Congress in almost every 
election. In l884 a Negro named Wright ran in the Tenth District, but
sk
that the Republicans became convinced that their best chance of breaking 
the Bourbon stranglehold on state politics would be to cooperate with the 
numerous whites who were dissatisfied with the Bourbon leadership.
Opposition to the Bourbons had arisen in Georgia as early as 1874
when an Independent movement led, among others, by Doctor William H.
Felton threatened a permanent division of the white vote. Despite the
fact that the Bourbons sought to offset the revolt in their party by use
of the Negro vote, Felton was elected to Congress in 1074 and again in
1876 and 1878. Even more success was achieved in the last election for,
in addition to Felton, two other Independent Democrats were chosen over
12
the regular nominees of the party.
Dissatisfaction of the small farmer class of the rural counties 
with the ring-rule of the Bourbons intensified with an event of 188O.
polled only 1,277 votes to g,l66 for his Democratic opponent. The Tribune 
Almanac and Political Register (New York: The Tribune Association, yearly) 
for the year 1885. Not only were Republicans unable to win any important 
state office, but their presidential candidates never came close to win­
ning the electoral vote of the state. In l380 Garfield polled 54,006 
votes to 102,470 for Hancock; Blaine in 1084 garnered only 40,446 to 
100,449 for Cleveland. See ibid., for the years 1881, 1805, and I809.
1 PCharges were later made that in these campaigns money was freely 
spent by the Bourbons in order to purchase the vote of the Negro.
Alexander H. Stephens, himself a Bourbon, quoted a Georgia newspaper in 
1879 which said that at the polls "money was freely exhibited and as 
freely and as openly taken. The price of a vote ranged from ten cents 
to five dollars . . . .  Hundreds of votes were thus openly disposed of 
in plain view of everybody . . . ." Augusta Evening News, n.d., quoted 
by Stephens in James G. Blaine, et.al. "Ought the Negro to be Dis­
franchised? Ought He to have been Enfranchised?" North American Review, 
CCLXFIII (ly&rch, 1879), 252. For an account of the theft of ballot 
boxes, use of tissue ballots, intimidation, and general fraud employed 
in these campaigns see Mrs. William H. Felton, My Memoirs of Georgia 
Politics (Atlanta: Index Printing Co., I9II), pp. 656-63. In IÜ76 
Felton polled 13,269 votes to 10,807 for the regular Democrat, and in 
1870 his total 17as 14,015, and his opponents was 12,905* Tribune Almanac 
for the years 1077 and 1879*
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In that election year former General John B. Gordon suddenly resigned his 
position in the United States Senate— a position to which he had just been 
elected for a second term--and was replaced by Governor Alfred Colquitt 
with the millionaire industrialist, Joseph E. Brown. Gordon, who had in­
formed the North in I878 that "the causes that divided us are gone, and 
gone f or e v e r , "^3 had ostensibly resigned to pursue a railroad career. The 
white Independents, however, considered his action merely another mani­
festation of the Bourbon's intention permanently to divide the major 
offices among themselves. This smacked too much of machine rule to a 
public already shocked by disclosures of corruption in the administration 
of Governor Colquitt. Consequently, when the governor sought renomination 
in an effort to vindicate himself and his administration, a revolt erupted 
within the Democratic party, previously the Independent Democrats had 
been content to seek election to Congress and to minor state positions —  
probably because of the Bourbon's insistence that a split within the party 
might result in a revival of Republican rule. In I88O, however, the Inde­
pendents risked such a possibility by running Thomas M. Norwood against 
Colquitt. The ensuing campaign was one of charges and countercharges, 
but one in which both Norwood and Colquitt sought the electoral support 
of the colored man. This v^as not the first time that the Bourbons had 
manifested an interest in such support. In I876, for example, Benjamin 
H« Hill marched "arm in arm" to the polls with a Negro saying that he was 
"glad to be voted by a colored Democrat.Whether or not the Negroes
^^Quoted in Paul H. Buck, The Road to Reunion, 1865-I9OO (Boston; 
Little, Brown and Company, 1937)^  P* 105-
Jackson Weekly Clarion, November 22, 1876, quoted in C. Vann 
Woodward, Origins of the New South, l8l7-191 .^ Vol. X of A History of
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marclied to the polls with the Bourbons in 188O, when the smoke of the 
election cleared it \ras found that Colquitt had won a resounding victory. 
Norwood immediately charged that the machine had stolen the election with 
colored votes. Newspapers throughout Georgia and the South speculated 
that Norwood's contention was correct and that continued Bourbon control 
A-ras indeed due to the electoral support of black Republicans.^^
While the Bourbons undoubtedly did employ the colored vote in 188O 
they very quickly began to attack Felton and the Independent Democrats for 
seeking to effect a division in the party of white supremacy. In general, 
the theme of their attack was that division meant a revival of the con­
ditions which existed during Reconstruction. One editor, for example, 
said of Felton that "he knew that Independent success meant a rein­
statement of Republican rule in Georgia, and a victory of the Negro over 
the white man. He consented to lead a movement with this disgraceful end 
in view, and justly merits the contempt and political ostracism in which 
he will be held."^^
the South, eds. Wendall Stephenson and S. Merton Coulter (Baton Rouge; 
Louisiana State University Press, 19^7— ), p. 80.
^^Raleigh News and Observer, October 8, 188O, reported that the 
Negro vote in Georgia was largely for Colquitt and predicted he would be 
elected by a 50,000 majority. The actual vote was 64,001 for Norwood and 
118,349 for Colquitt. Tribune Almanac for I88O. The Columbus (Ga.) 
Enquirer, said after his election that Colquitt probably owed his victory 
to the Negro while the correspondent of the New York Times in Atlanta said 
that fully 65,000 colored men took advantage of the split among the Demo­
crats to resume voting in safety. Nation, XXXI (October 21, I88O), p. 28O.
^^ Athens Banner-Watchman, April 1, l884, quoted in Wardlaw, Negro 
Suffrage in Georgia, pp. 48-9. Felton was defeated in his bid for Con- 
gress”in 1882 by a vote of 10,746 to 12,408 for the regular Democrat. He 
ran again in 1886 and polled 1,537 to 5,043 for his opponent. Other In­
dependent Democrats suffered the same fate. Tribune Almanac for the 
years 1881-I887.
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After the election, of I88O the Independent Democrats did not pose 
much of a threat to Bourbon ascendancy. One reason for this ivas un­
doubtedly the colored man who in at least two ivays contributed to main­
taining the Bourbons in power. First, the. Bourbon newspapers could and 
did continually harp upon the theme that the Negro constituted a distinct 
threat to white supremacy. By so doing they were able to convince many 
disenchanted whites that they must remain constant in their support of 
the Democratic party. Secondly, although the Macon Telegraph proclaimed 
the colored men to be "a corrupt and corrupting element in Georgia poli­
t i c s , t h e  Bourbons did not hesitate to utilize his vote whenever and 
wherever possible.
That the Republican party could not always depend upon the Negro 
vote and that the Bourbons sometimes could is evident from an event of 
1882. In that year white Republican leaders again offered support to 
Independents of an;y- political persuasion in an effort to defeat the 
Bourbons, capture control of the state government, and, by electing anti- 
Bourbons to Congress, break the Solid South. Negro members of the party 
were reluctant to follow their white leaders because it would mean co­
operating with the class of Southern whites most antagonistic to the 
colored men. Consequently, a colored convention, called by the Negro 
leader W. A. Pledger, met in Atlanta for the purpose of discussing the 
situation. Most of the white Republicans, led by General James 
Longstreet, met in a convention of their own. Eventually harmony was 
restored and it ;/as agreed that the Republicans would support an
^^Macon Telegraph, n.d., quoted in Raleigh News and Observer, 
April 7, 1883. '
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l8Independent, Lucius J. Gartrell, in his campaign for the governorship.
The oven^helming defeat suffered by Gartrell at the hands of Alexander H. 
Stephens convinced Longstreet and another white Republican leader, 
Jonathan Rorcross, that their party could little hope to win an election 
as long as it was identified with the Negro. Consequently, by l884 they 
determined that the party should rid itself completely of its colored 
following, and a meeting was called to convene at Atlanta for the purpose 
of organizing a white Republican party. The convention issued an address 
in which it \ras noted that Georgia had ten Congressional districts and 
that the Negroes had a numerical majority in several of them. Yet, they 
maintained, no sensible man could hope that under Negro leadership a Re­
publican Congressman could be elected in any of them. "We have tried 
Negroes as party leaders for sixteen years," said the address, "and find 
them totally inefficient."^^
Exclusion of the colored men by at least one wing of the
^^Gartrell polled 4^,889 votes to 107,253 for Stephens. The 
Negro leader. Pledger, received 27,226 votes to 119,861 for his Demo­
cratic opponent in the race for secretary of state. A comparison of the 
vote in these two contests is interesting. The Democrat running for 
secretary of state polled 12,6o8 more votes than did the party's candi­
date for governor. At the same time the Independent Democrat running 
for governor polled 17,643 more votes than did Pledger in his contest. 
This would indicate that a large number of whites voting against the 
Bourbon gubernatorial candidate refused to support a Negro against the 
Bourbon for the minor office. For the vote totals see Tribune Almanac 
for 1883.
^^Quoted in Washington Post, April 5, l884, as quoted in Smith, 
The Negro in Congress, p. I39. The movement to make the Republican party 
"lily-white'* elicited the conment from the Athens Banner-Watchman,
April 1, l884, that it was "the initial step made by the Republican party 
to shake off the negro . . . ." To the çditor it meant that the white 
Republicans realized that they could never gain a foothold in the South 
by using the colored vote because ". . .so long as the negro is made the 
issue, the South will protest with an unbroken ballot . . . ." Quoted in 
Wardlaw, Negro Suffrage in Georgia, p. 48.
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Republican party did not mean that they ceased to be important in Georgia
politics. In l884, for example, they played an important role in an
election which aroused considerable interest. The legislature of the
state had enacted legislation providing for general county local-option
on the sale of alcholic beverages. Fulton County, which included Atlanta
within its boundaries, was the first to hold an election on the question.
After a campaign which was remarkable for the breaking down of party and
color lines a majority of 225 votes out a total of about 7,000 cast were
POsecujred for prohibition. Both sides actively sought the colored vote
for, as a North Carolina newspaper commenting on the election noted, "the
21negro vote the bone of contention and the balance of power." The
colored men were divided on the question, but a majority cast their
ballots against prohibition. This fact elicited the comment from a local
newspaper that "the negro vote is consolidated and wielded in . . . the
South today with more disastrous effects upon Southern ideas. Southern
progress. Southern virtue, intelligence, and property interests than at
22any time since the negro ms endowed with the ballot."
This was only one of the many expressions of opinion upon the 
Negro vote and its effect which came out of Georgia in the period before 
1890. Another theme was that advanced by former governor and then United 
States Senator Alfred H. Colquitt in 1887. Colquitt insisted that Northern
20See Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important 
Events (New York; D. Appleton and Co., yearly),' XII, 409-10. See also 
Nation, XLI (December 3, I885), 455-&, and (December 10, 1885), 477.
21
Raleigh News and Observer, November 27, I887.
22Southern Star (Atlanta, quoted in Texas Baptist and
Herald (Dallas), August 8, 1888.
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contentions that the colored men had their vote suppressed were erroneous. 
"Friendly relations," he said, "habitually exist between our white and 
black citizens, and are never disturbed except on those rare occasions 
when the exigencies of party politics call for an agitation of race preju­
dice . . . He denied that the colored vote ivas suppressed— a con-
pli
tention which was seconded by the editor of the Atlanta Constitution.
To some extent such claims were based on fact. . In state elections, such 
as the one in 1888 when the question of prohibition was again the major 
issue in some counties, Negroes were apparently permitted to vote in large 
numbers. During most of the period under discussion, however, the 
colored men, except in those instances where the Bourbons could use their 
vote to combat insurgents within their party, were prevented by fraud and 
intimidation from casting a ballot. Thus, the Negro did continue to parti­
cipate in the political life of Georgia after Reconstruction, albeit in 
varying degrees of intensity, during the entire period before I89O.
The situation which prevailed in Georgia during the Bourbon period
vras comparable to the one which arose in Louisiana. This state ras one
of the first to be occupied by Union troops during the Civil War and one 
of the last to secure home rule. The latter \ras accomplished after the
election of I876 when a badly maimed Confederate veteran, Francis T.
^^Alfred H. Colquitt, "Is the Negro Vote Suppressed?" Forum, IV 
(November, I887), 220-21.
p|i
Atlanta Constitution, April 8, 1888, answered a statement by 
the Kentucky editor, Henry Watterson, to the effect that the Negro vote 
was suppressed at the South. The Constitution said that this might be 
true "in the neighborhood of the whiskey ring . . .," but that such was 
not the case in Georgia. On my 12, I888, the Atlanta Constitution, pro­
claimed that the Negro voted as he pleased and if he did not please he 
stayed home.
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Wicholls, opposed the Republican, Stephen B. Packard, for the right to 
occupy the governor's chair, lihen the ballots were counted each of the 
two rivals, hurling charges of fraud against the other, claimed to have 
received a majority of the legitimate votes cast and thus to have been 
legally elected. Rival governments, each with its o\m legislature, were 
established by the claimants and for a time Louisiana teetered upon the 
brink of anarchy. It was not until after the dispute over who had been 
elected President had been settled that the situation in Louisiana ms 
resolved. Soon after Rutherford B. Hayes m s  inaugurated, and apparently 
as part of a "deal, " Federal support ms withdrawn from Packard and 
Kicholls became governor.25 Thus, amidst an admixture of charges and 
countercharges of venality, fraud, and intimidation, began the period 
of Democratic dominance in Louisiana..
The experiences of Radical Reconstruction in Louisiana were such 
that it mi^t be expected that once the native white man had regained 
control through the medium of the Democratic party the colored men of the 
state would either be disfranchised or relegated to a secondary position. 
Certainly the former did not immediately occur. Registration figures 
indicate that the Negro continued to be eligible to vote, and, at least
'^^ During the election of 1876 the incumbent governor, William P. 
Kellogg, predicted a heavy Negro vote would be polled unless the Demo­
crats resorted to intimidation and fraud. One Southern newspaper said 
that the reason for the decline of the colored vote throughout the South 
ms not what Kellogg maintained, but m s due to the fact that the mor­
tality rate ms higher among Negroes than among whitesi Alexandria 
Gazette and Virginia Advertiser, August 26, 1876. After the election 
neither of the rival governments had a quorum in their legislature, and 
money, probably supplied by the Louisiana Lottery Company, ms used to 
induce Republican legislators to move to the Democratic legislature. 
Woodmrd, Origins of the New South, pp. 11-12.
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in some areas of the state remained a potent political force. This is not 
overly surprising, however, because according to the Census of 189O the
26
colored population outnumbered the white by 8^3,655 to ^5^;95 *^ As a 
result of this disparity in population there were always more Negroes than 
whites registered as electors in the period prior to 1890.^? The immedi­
ate result of this situation iras that during the entire period Negroes 
continued to seek and to be elected to office, black leaders continued to 
exert a powerful influence, and Democrats and Republicans continued to 
vie for colored support.
Beginning even prior to the crucial political canvass of 1876 and 
continuing throughout the entire Bourbon period. Democratic leaders in 
Louisiana followed the policy of securing, so far as was possible, the 
cooperation of the vast Negro electorate. During the course of the cam­
paign of 1876 colored men were often enrolled in the same political clubs 
with Conservative whites and, in some instances, formed Conservative clubs
28of their own. Members of these organizations were encouraged to
Bureau of the Census, Negro Population, chap. Ill, table I3, 
p. 44. Three parishes were al^ys included in black districts even when 
the state was gerrymandered. These parishes— Tensas, Last Carrol, and 
Madison— all had a population which ifas over ninety par cent colored. 
Ibid., 776-93-
^(Louisiana is the only Southern state that maintained regis­
tration figures according to race. In I867 there were 44,670 whites and 
83,065 Negroes registered as electors. By I876 the total for both races 
had increased until there were 92,354 whites and 115,268 colored men 
registered. See the Tribune Almanac for the year 1877. The figures cited 
by the Tribune Almanac may be in error for in 1878 the white registration 
was listed at 77,34l and the colored at 78,123. In I88O the figures were
85,451 and 88,024, and 1886 they stood at 110,445 and 111,791, and in 
1888 they were 125,407 and 128, 15O respectively. These figures are 
listed in Report of the Secretary of State of the State of Louisiana,
1902 (Baton Rouge, 1902), cited in Philip D. Uzee, "Republican Politics 
in Louisiana, 1877-1900" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation. Dept, of 
History, Louisiana State University), p. 196.
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participate in campaign rallies, parades, barbecues, and, of course, to 
mark their ballots for the candidates of the Democratic party. Nicholls, 
the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, assured the Negroes that if he 
\Tas elected their rights would be "amply protected and a new era enacted
29
in the State administration . . . Whether large numbers of colored
electors supported the Democratic candidate in this campaign is impossible 
to determine, but, after being recognized as governor, Nicholls did reward 
a number of Negroes by appointing them to minor offices.3^
Efforts by the Democrats to attract the colored vote did not cease 
with the election of 1876. Continually the leaders of that party sought 
to convince the colored men that their best interests would be served by 
supporting politically the party which was representative of their former 
masters. It was difficult, however, for the Louisiana Bourbons to so 
couch their appeals as to convince the majority of the colored electorate. 
Consequently, since the Negro generally followed the advice of the leaders 
of his oTO race, the Democrats evolved a plan whereby these individuals
qO
Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, I, 48$. Because there \jas still 
a suspicion of the Democratic party on the part of people at the North 
the leaders of that party, in several Southern states, renamed it the 
Conservative party. By the mid-eighties, however, the title Democrats 
\Tas generally used.
29
Nicholls later wrote that after his election he \-ras determined 
to bring about good relations between the races. He appointed a number 
of Negroes to minor offices, but said that they were sandwiched on boards 
between white men where they could do no harm. Earner E. Lathrop (ed.), 
"An Autobiography of Francis T. Nicholls, l834-l88l," Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly, XVII (April, 1934), 257.
30
Charges of fraud were hurled by both Democrats and Republicans 
after 1876 and it is impossible to determine if the listed vote totals do 
accurately represent the correct number of electors who cast ballots.
For the vote total of I876 see Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana,"
p. 199.
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woulcL "be willing to herd their cohorts to the polls to cast their ballots 
for Bourbon candidates. This scheme, a fusion plan locally called the 
"mixed-ticket," went into effect with the election of I878. Under this 
plan Republican candidates, and most of the colored men remained nominally 
Republican, would be assured a portion of parish offices and seats in the 
state legislature.In exchange, they would not contest with the 
Bourbons for the remainder of the offices.
That the fusion plan was effective in Louisiana is very obvious. 
Negroes went to the polls freely in 1878 and many cast their ballots for 
the Democratic candidates. For example, the Natchitoches Vindicator re­
ported that "election day here was spent joyously by white and black.
' First they went arm-in-arm and voted the Democratic ticket, and then 
went to their old ante-bellum plays." The editor, after recounting the 
surprise of the white men at the tremendous groundswell of Negro support, 
proclaimed to the colored men that "... .we salute you as citizens, 
friends and brothers. Undoubtedly the major purpose of this statement 
\rs.s to convince the Negro and the people in the North of the purity of 
the Democrats' intentions. The same was true of one of the first reso­
lutions adopted by a convention which met in IS79 for the purpose of pre­
paring a new constitution for the state. This Democratically-controlled
^^ Under the mixed-ticket scheme, parish leaders of both parties 
would agree to share local offices and legislative positions. Each party 
nominated a slate, but it listed the same candidates. A candidate in 
such a ticket informed an audience composed primarily of colored men that 
he \ias a Democrat, but "I am on the Republican ticket, and the last one 
of you kinky-headed - - -'s has got to vote for me." Weekly Democrat, 
November 2, I878, quoted in ibid., p. I38.
^^Quoted in New Orleans Weekly Democrat, November 28, I878, as 
quoted in ibid., p. 13h.
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body promised that there was no Intention of imparing the political, 
social, or religious rights of any citizen. On the contrary, said the 
resolution, "the intention is to defend and maintain the rights of the 
colored citizens . . .
The new instrument of government prepared by this convention did 
nothing, on the surface at least, to beggar the promise incorporated in 
the resolution. While the residence requirements for eligibility to the 
franchise were tightened, it was expressly stated in the constitution 
that "no qualification of any kind for suffrage or office, nor any re­
straint upon the same, on account of race, color, or previous condition
Sh
shall be made by law."
Adoption of the new constitution in 1879 did not greatly lessen 
the active participation of the colored men in the political life of 
Louisiana during the period of the eighties. Many Negroes obviously gave 
their support to Democratic candidates during these years, especially in 
state politics. For example, in the gubernatorial campaign of 1879 the 
Democrat, Louis A. Wiltz polled a total of 7^^098 votes to 42,559 for 
his opponent, Taylor Beatuie. This would not be surprising was it not 
for the fact that registration statistics compiled in l880 show that
85,451 whites and 88,024 Negroes were registered. It would be too much
33Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, IV, 564. The membership of the 
convention included 98 Democrats, 32 Republicans, and 3 Independents.
Glynn (comp.), American Constitutions, I, Part II, 731-82. To 
be eligible to register a male citizen, twenty-one years or older, had to 
be a resident of the state for one year, the parish for six months, and 
the precinct for thirty days before the election. General elections were 
to be held in April. Ibid. It might be noted that more stringent resi­
dence requirements did not lessen the number registered.
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to expect that every white who was registered voted in this election and 
that nearly seventy-five thousand cast their ballot for Wiltz. Even more 
to the point, however, are the statistics for the year 1888. In the 
gubernatorial campaign of that year the Democrat v&s the same one who had 
emerged victorious from the disputed election of I876, Francis T. Nicholls. 
He polled 136,7^6 votes and his Republican opponent, Henry Warmoth, 
garnered only 51,993* At this time there were 125,407 whites and 128,150 
Negroes registered in Louisiana. Thus, if every white man registered as 
an elector had voted for Nicholls, 11,850 colored men would have had to 
do the same in order for him to have polled this total. 35
While the Bourbons— playing upon the supposed loyalty of the 
Negroes for their "white foUvs"— were able to attract numerous colored 
electors to the Democratic banner, it should not be thought that the 
Negro of Louisiana entirely deserted the party of Abraham Lincoln. Black 
leaders such as Henry Demas and Pinckney B. S. Pinchback generally en­
couraged their brethern to remain true to their traditional allegiance.3^
3 C^omplete registration and election returns for these years are 
to be found in Report of the Secretary of State of the State of Louisiana, 
1902 (Baton Rouge, I9O2), cited in Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisi-
ana," pp. 196-99*
■^ *^ Henry Demas, a veteran of the Union army, v^as the 'hlack boss" 
of St. John the Baptist parish. His lieutenant, John Webre, \7as sheriff 
of the parish almost continuously from I876 to 1895* Demas was also able 
to keep a member of his race in the state legislature, except for the 
years l884 to 1888, during the same period. Demas served as state sena­
tor for twenty years. Ibid., pp. l40-42. Pinchback, a Georgia born 
mulatto and Union army veteran, vra.s the most widely known Negro leader. 
During Reconstruction he was elected Lieutenant-Governor of Louisiana 
and, when Governor Warmoth v/as impeached, briefly served as governor.
He published the Weekly Louisianian, and held several Federal appointive 
offices. Agnes Smith Grosz, "The Political Career of Pickney Stewart 
Pinchback," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXVII (April, 1944), 527-607.
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Once in a while, generally in state contests, Negro leaders would bolt the 
Republican party to campaign for Democratic candidates, but this was the 
exception rather than the rule unless a fusion arrangement was in oper­
ation.^^ On the whole a majority of the colored men blindly followed the 
advice of their leaders and maintained their allegiance to the Republican 
party. Several points bear out this fact. First, most of the colored 
men seeking and holding office in Louisiana during this period belonged 
to the Republican party.Secondly, during some campaigns there were 
complaints by Negroes that they were not free to cast their ballot and 
have it counted in this state.Thirdly, there i-ras the fact that in l882 
the Democrats deemed it necessary to change the boundaries of the state's 
Congressional districts so as to enhance the chances of their candidates 
defeating those of the Republican party. All of these points, plus the 
fact that the Democratic leaders were willing to enter into fusion ar­
rangements, is an indication that the majority of colored men who were
3'^ In 1886 three Negro Republican leaders were temporarily ex­
pelled from the party because they supported the Democratic candidate,
E. J. Gay, for Congress from the Third District. New Orleans Daily 
Picayune, October 20, 1886. Gay polled llf,782 votes and his Republican 
opponent, C. B. Darrall, received 11,692. Tribune Almanac for the year
1887.
gO
From 1876 to I9OO Negroes served continuously in the state 
legislature. As late as 188Ô nine of the twelve Republicans elected to 
the lower house were colored and the four Negroes elected to the senate 
in l884 were reelected. For a complete listing of all Republicans 
serving in the legislature see Uzee, "Republican party in Louisiana,"
pp. 203-07.
og
In October of I878 the Republican State Convention, assembled 
in New Orleans, adopted a resolution setting forth the proposition that 
unless the colored people were allowed to vote and have their ballot 
counted they would emigrate. Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, IV, 572. In 
January, I879, it \ras reported that the leading colored citizens of Loui­
siana had for men the Young Man's Progressive Association for the pur­
pose of protecting the Negro in his right to the franchise. Nation,
XXVII (January 9, I879), 22.
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registered were regarded as potential electors for the Republicans.
Although a majority of the Negroes undoubtedly retained their 
Republican label, the Democratic party largely controlled the political 
affairs of Louisiana during the entire period. After 1876 the presi­
dential electoral vote of the state alirays went to the Democratic nomi­
nee. Also, that party was aDvays in control of the state house, and, 
with an occasional exception, the Congressional delegation of Louisiana 
was composed of Democrats.Undoubtedly, the success achieved by the 
Bourbons was due to their ability to prevent an independent movement of 
the type which troubled Georgia from threatening a split in the party of 
white supremacy. While some dissatisfaction was manifested toward the 
Bourbon program, it was never so intense that their domination of the 
Democratic party was seriously challenged. This was probably due to the 
fact that in Louisiana the Negroes outnumbered the whites. Thus, when 
revolt ivas threatened the Bourbons were able, as in some of the other 
states, to turn for assistance to the colored population. Consequently, 
the Democrats and especially the Bourbons were successful in their efforts 
to prevent a split in the party of white supremacy and a return to Re­
publican dominance in Louisiana.
to
In 1880 the Republicans elected C. B. Darrall to Congress from 
the Third District; in I882 W. P. Kellogg iras chosen from the Second Dis­
trict; in l884 it f^as Michael Hahn from the Second, and in I888 R. D. 
Coleman \ras elected from the same district. For the vote in these contests 
see the Tribune Almanac for the years 1881-89. The only Negro ever elected 
to Congress from Louisiana was a mulatto, Charles S. Nash, who was chosen 
in l884. See Smith, The Negro in Congress, p. 6, and William F. Nowlin,
The Negro in American"National Politics (Since 1868) (Boston; The 
Stratford Co*7 1 9 3 1 P> 21 Henry Demas stood for election in the second 
district in I882, but he polled only 2,666 votes to 7,701 for E. J. Ellis, 
his Democratic opponent. Smith, The Negro in Congress does not list Demas 
as being a candidate, but the vote for this Negro leader is included in 
the Tribune Almanac for the year 1883.
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In the state of Mississippi during the period between 1875 &&&
1890 the political situation in regard to the colored man was worthy of 
a Machiavelli. This state, one of only three of the former members of 
the Confederacy with a Negro population which outnumbered the white, iras 
redeemed to native control in l875«^  ^ Since the whites were in a minority 
in the state, the Bourbons were faced with the continuing problem of how 
to maintain political control. Under the Mississippi Constitution the 
colored men were eligible to exercise the franchise, but if they voted in 
large numbers against the party of the Bourbon's it might result in the 
latter's program becoming sidetracked. If, on the other hand, measures 
were taken which denied the colored men their rights the Federal govern­
ment might once more intervene in the political affairs of the state. 
Truly, the Mississippi Bourbons were faced with a dilemma, and the
methods they pursued in an effort to arrive at a satisfactory solution
l±p
took many turns.
In the year when Mississippi was redeemed the colored men of the 
state were primarily members of the Republican party. Consequently, the 
leaders of the Democratic party resorted to all sorts of stratagems —
^^In 1880 there were 650,291 Negroes and 479,388 whites in Missi­
ssippi. The 1890 census, an undercount, gives a total of 7^0,559 Negroes 
and 944,851 whites. Bureau of the Census, Negro Population, chap. Ill, 
table 13, p. 44. The I88O census listed six Mississippi counties in 
which the population iras overwhelmingly black. The percentage of Negroes 
in these counties ranged from a low of 77*6 in Coahoma to a high of 91*7 
in Tunica. Ibid., p. 795- The other former Confederate states in which 
the colored men"outnumbered the whites were Louisiana and South Carolina.
42One Mississippi historian notes that only on one issue were 
the Bourbons of the state in agreement— the necessity of controlling the 
Negro vote in order to assure white supremacy. Willie D« Halsell, "The 
Bourbon Period in Mississippi Politics," Journal of Southern History, XI 
(November, 1945), 523.
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including intimidation and outright violence— to lessen the effect of the 
colored vote and to win the state to native control. After the election 
was over Democratic journals, such as the Jackson Weekly Clarion claimed, 
mainly for the benefit of Northern doubters, that they had never seen the 
colored people so contented and happy. This contention \jas not always 
seconded, however, by statements coming from the Negroes. Immediately 
prior to the election of 1876, for example, a colored man from Nouxbee 
County informed the governor that "we are anxious for you to know the con­
dition of our county. Here is about 25,000 raticals/"sicj/of we colored 
population never got to cast a vote . . . ." He continued by declaring 
that the Democrats "have been shooting and raring around these two 
months . . . .  Although we colored people wish to have peace; but I 
do say we cannot live at this rate."^^
The "shooting and raring around" of which the Negro correspondent 
complained was a favorite part of the so-called "shot-gun policy" and was 
designed to frighten the colored population into staying away from the 
polls. Other methods were also utilized to accomplish that end. One 
was a complicated election law enacted by the Democrat-controlled legis­
lature in 1876. This measure required every prospective voter to give, 
under oath, his occupation, employment and employer, and the district or 
vrard in which he resided.Some local registration boards interpreted 
this to mean that they could legally require registrants to know the 
section, range, and township in which they lived and worked. Inability
43
Quoted in Vernon L. J^harton, The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-189O 
(chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947), P* 200.
p. 199.
^Mississippi, Session Laws (1876), pp. 66-67, cited in ibid..
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to provide the correct answers to these questions would often result in 
a request; especially if the prospective registrant was a ïfegro, to "stand 
aside." This rather crude attempt at disfranchisement was not overly 
satisfactory or successful, and, during the course of the campaign of 
1876, there ivas in many sections of the state a return to the methods em­
ployed to achieve Redemption.
In an effort to coax the colored men to support their ticket in
this election, the Democrats formed Negro Democratic clubs and furnished
barbecues, parades, and orators. VJhile this appealed to the colored man's
love of show and may have attracted some support to the Democratic cause,
a more effective procedure in lessening the Negro vote and assuring a
Democratic victory was the utilization of economic pressure, intimidation,
and fraud. Colored men were threatened with the loss of their positions;
ballot boxes were stuffed or stolen; bodily harm was mentioned as being a
distinct possibility.^^ The immediate result of all these machinations
’.^as a drastic decline of the Republican vote in 1876. Consequently, the
Democrats were able to elect all of their candidates to Congress and to
h ireturn the state's electoral votes for Tilden. '
^^Ibid., p. 200.
^^Ibid., p. 201. See also Albert D. Kirvran, Revolt of the Red­
necks, Mississippi Politics, 1876-192  ^(Lexington: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1951), and William A.bfebry, "Disfranchisement of the 
Negro in Mississippi," Journal of Southern History, IV (August, I938).
'^^ The total vote polled by Hayes was 52,625 and Tilden's total 
was 112,173" Tribune Almanac for the year 1877* More to the point is 
the vote polled in the Sixth District. In 1876 a Negro Republican, John 
Lynch, stood for Congress from that district. He polled 12,386 votes to 
15,783 for his Democratic opponent. Ibid. The interesting thing about 
this is that the counties comprising this district were overwhelmingly 
colored. VJhile no registration figures are available by race for 1876,
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Election results in 1876 foreshadowed what generally to he 
the order of the day in Mississippi politics for the next fifteen years. 
During that entire period the Bourbons were able to dominate the state, 
but they often had to resort to various devices to insure continued con­
trol. One thing that they strived to achieve was a division among the 
Negroes on questions of political import. After 1876 the Bourbons, 
hoping to convince large numbers of colored men to desert their tra­
ditional allegiance to the Republican party, began assiduously to court 
the Negro vote. One prominent Democratic newspaper, the Jackson Clarion, 
became an ardent supporter, on the surface at least, of Negro suffrage. 
During the campaign of 1876 the Clarion pointed out that the Democrats 
had placed colored men on their ticket in several counties and urged all 
Negroes to realize that this -vths proof that this party truly had the best 
interests of the colored race at heart.The Clarion continued its cam­
paign throughout most of the eighties and in many instances it vras joined
■ 49
by other members of the Mississippi press.
such a listing was published a short five years later. The 1881 figures 
do not give the registrants for two of the twelve counties in the district, 
but in the other ten there ivas a total of 32,78? Negroes and 9,8$1 whites 
registered. It is surprising that Lynch was unable to command more 
colored support 1 For the figures see U. S., Congressional Record, 4?th 
Cong., Special Session, 188I, XII, 357- In the two counties for which 
registration figures are not given Lynch polled 1,254 votes to 1,663 for 
his opponent. Tribune Almanac for the year iS??-
^^Jackson Weekly Clarion, October 25, l8?6, July 25 and October 3, 
1877, cited in Kirvran, Revolt of the Rednecks, p. 15* This author main­
tains that some colored men were dissatisfied with the Republicans and 
willingly joined with the Democrats. Ibid., pp. ?"!•*+• It should be 
noted that some Negroes were elected to the state legislature in l8?6. 
According to figures in Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, I, 56O, there were 
five colored men in the senate and sixteen in the house.
^%or example, in October of I883, the Aberdeen Examiner compli­
mented "the gallant colored men who at so much personal sacrifice come 
to us ... ." Quoted in Kirvran, Revolt of the Rednecks, p. 15.
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IVhere platitudes did not elicit the hoped for response, however, 
it \<ras not at all rare for threats to be voiced. On July 3, 1883, for
example, a Democratic journal, the Copiah Signal, published an article
which \ras designed not only to ijarn the Negroes, but also to convince the 
poorer whites that the colored man posed a threat to white supremacy. "We
must," wrote the editor, "have the triumph of the white man's ticket; we
would be more than pleased to see the colored men join our ranlîs, and 
should they do so, we agree to give them all the rights guaranteed them 
by the constitution." The editor went ahead to say, however, that the 
white man had no intention of being dominated by the N e g r o . on Oc­
tober 18, 1883, the same newspaper proclaimed that the whites were not 
going to be ruled or dictated to any longer, and the colored race might 
as well understand it. "If they will not vote with the Democrats," said 
the editor, "it would be better'for them and the co'untry that they refuse 
to participate in the election. The weather might be f^arm that day and 
they might possibly get sunstruck."^^ The sentiments expressed by the 
Copiah Signal, and for that matter by the Jackson Clarion, were not 
echoed by all of the Mississippi journals, but they do indicate that the 
Negro continued to be an important political factor in the state. In 
fact, he was something more than a factor. As the editor of the Jackson
Weekly Clarion wrote on August 2, 1882, "in this State for some time to
52come there is but one issue. All know what it is."
5 Copiah Signal, July 6, 1883, quoted in U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Mississippi in I883: Report of the Special Committee to Inquire into the 
Mississippi Election of IÜÜ3 with the Testimony and Documentary Evidence, 
Report No. 512, 4bth Cong., 1st 'Se'ss., 1884, I, XXXVII- " ~
^^Copiah Signal, October I8, I883, quoted in ibid.
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Factor or issue, during the entire period under discussion the 
Negro remained a force with which the white leaders in Mississippi had to 
cope. Actually, some advantage accrued to the Bourbon leaders of the 
party of white supremacy from the fact that the majority of colored men 
retained their Republican label. The Redeemers, by identifying that party 
with the Negro and the Carpetbagger, found it possible to play upon the 
fears and prejudices of the mass of whites. They could and did insist 
that it was requisite for all whites to remain solid in support of the 
party of white supremacy in order to prevent a return to political con­
trol of the Republican-Negro combination. By harping upon this theme 
the Bourbons also made it more difficult for any white third party or 
dissatisfied independents successfully to cooperate with the Republicans 
in overthrowing their pro g r a m .53 This purpose of the Bourbons was recog­
nized for what it was by the white Republicans. One of the leaders of 
this group, George C. McKee, complained to the chief patronage dispenser 
of president Chester A. Arthur that "Bruce and Lamar humbug the different 
Republican administrations and keep up negro rule in the Rep. party in 
order that the fear of negro rule in the State may keep the white man in 
the Dem. party.
52Jackson Weekly Clarion, August 2, 1332, quoted in Woodward, 
Origins of the New South, p. $1.
^^Ibid., p. 103.
^^George C. McKee to William E- Chandler, July 26, 1883, quoted 
in Willie D. Halsell (ed.), "Republican Factionalism in Mississippi, 
1882-1884," Journal of Southern History, VII (February, l$4l), 4g. 
Chandler was at this time secretary of the navy. The Bruce of whom McKee 
referred, was Blanche K. Bruce, a prominent and wealthy Negro Republican. 
He ivas a mulatto Carpetbagger who, before moving to Mississippi in I868, 
had attended Oberlin College. In Mississippi he became a planter and, in
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One device which was employed by the Bourbons to accomplish the 
end of which McKee complained and also to mollify the Negroes was the 
one commonly known as the "fusion principle." Under this system Bourbon 
leaders in the state and in the county would reach an agreement with the 
colored leaders as to the number of local offices and seats in the state 
legislature which were to be held by Ne g r o e s .55 As a result of this type 
of agreement colored men in a given county would be encouraged by their 
leaders to support Democratic candidates and the white leaders would not 
oppose the election of a small number of Negroes.5  ^ The "fusion princi­
ple" had the effect which was desired by colored leaders because a number
ISTOj entered politics. He held a number of minor offices until l875 when 
he \fas elected to the United States Senate. After his term expired he tras 
appointed to a minor Federal office. Carter G. Noodson, "Blanche K.
Bruce/' Dictionary of American Biography, III (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 192b— ), 1Ü0. The Bourbon Senator, L. Q. C. Lamar, moved the unani­
mous confirmation of Bruce as Register of the Treasury. Bourbon assistance 
to Bruce, John R. Lynch, James Hill, and other Negro Republican leaders 
caused white Republicans to believe that they had secretly agreed to sup­
port Democratic candidates in state and local elections. Woodward,
Origins of the New South, p. 104.
55\ftiarton, Negro in Mississippi, p. 203, says that in general the 
fusion principle was confined to six or eight counties where the white 
population was small and almost totally dependent on Negro labor. He also 
points out that except in the city of Jackson the Republican control of 
municipal governments practically disappeared after 1876. Ibid., p. 201.
In 1888 an election \jb.s held in Jackson in which the Negroes agreed not 
to participate. The Atlanta Constitution, January 2, 1888, noted that 
there was peace in the city, but predicted trouble if the Negroes 
attempted to vote in the election.
^^ Negro leaders were often able to virtually dictate to their 
■ colored brethern the candidate they should support. For example, John R. 
Lynch informed a meeting of Mississippi Republicans in 1883 that it made 
no difference whether the county machines decided "to fuse with the In­
dependents instead of the Democrats, or with the Democrats instead of the 
Independents, or to make straight party nomination instead of fusing with 
either;" all good party men should follow the machine, "although they may 
honestly believe the decision to be unwise." Quoted in New York Globe, 
October 30^  I883, as quoted in Wood\'%rd, Origins of the New South'^
pp. 217-18.
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of the members of that race gained office in Mississippi during the period
under discussion. In general they were chosen to fill minor county po­
sy
sitions, but some were elected to serve in the state legislature.^ '
Fusion thus resulted in continued Negro participation in the political 
life of Mississippi--as both candidates and electors.
The fusion device was undoubtedly a valuable aid to the Bourbons 
in their efforts to retain political dominance in Mississippi. Agrarian 
discontent with Bourbon policies intensified in the early eighties and 
an independent movement began to contest with the Bourbons for control. 
Greenbackers and Independent Democrats, sometimes aided by white Republi­
cans, challenged Bourbon candidates for seats in the legislature in I879, 
1881, and again in In 1881 the dissatisfied elements nominated
an Independent candidate to oppose the regular Democrat who was running 
for governor, but he was easily defeated by the Bourbon's choice. ^9 In one
^^ As previously noted, the election of I876 brought sixteen 
colored men into the lower house and five into the senate. At every 
election until I89O a number of Negroes were chosen to serve in the 
popular branch of the legislature, but none were chosen to the upper 
house after 1886. For a compilation of Negro membership in the state 
legislature see Nharton, The Negro in Mississippi, p. 202.
^^ Two Greenback candidates were elected to the senate in I878 
and fourteen were chosen to the lower house. In I88O their total in the 
legislature declined to the point where none were elected to the senate 
and only two to the lower house. This year, however, saw Republican 
membership in the legislature increase. In I878 there was one Republican 
senator and six members of the house. All of these were Negroes. In 
1880 three Republicans, none of whom were Negroes, were elected to the 
senate, and fifteen were chosen to the house. Of the fifteen, eight 
were colored. The year 1882 saw the Greenback membership in the house 
increase to four. Republican membership in that body declined to 
fourteen— ten of whom were colored— and one of the two Republicans in 
the state senate was a Negro. For the total membership and party 
affiliation in the legislature see the Tribune Almanac for the years 
1879, 1881, and 1883.
59In the race for governor in 1877 the Democratic candidate
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instance, however, the Independents were successful. In 1883 General 
James R. Chalmers, the Confederate villain of the Fort Pillow massacre, 
charging that his defeat for Congress in 188O by the Negro Republican,
John R. Lynch, v^as due to the Bourbon's agreement with the Negroes, left 
the Democratic party to run as an Independent. With the aid of white Re­
publicans and dissatisfied Democrats, Chalmers vras elected to Congress.
The success achieved by Chalmers, coupled with the possibility of in­
creased Independent revolt, resulted in the Bourbon leaders and Negro 
politicians uniting to combat the Independent-white Republican com­
bination.^^
Although the Bourbons were themselves cooperating with the colored 
man, they did not hesitate to raise the cry of treason to the white man's
polled 97;727 votes and a scattering of l,l68 ^ vas given to an informal 
Republican candidate. In 1881 the total polled by the Bourbon candidate 
declined to 7^,857 and the Fusion nominee secured 51;056. See ibid. for 
the year 1878. The increase in votes for the opposition indicates that 
dissatisfaction with the Bourbon \fas widespread.
*^^ Running as an Independent in 1882, Chalmers received 9,729 
votes to 8,749 for his Democratic opponent but was seated only after a 
contest. Ibid., for the year I883. He was defeated in his bid for 
reelection in l884, I886, and 1888.
^^ One Negro leader, John R. Lynch, made it clear that he con­
sidered fusion to be only a temporary expedient. At a fusion meeting 
held in Hinds County in 1883, he informed the Democrats that they were 
naive if they thought the colored men were accepting their control. 
According to Lynch his people would vote with the party of white supremacy, 
or any other political group offering concessions, only until it was once 
more possible to cast their ballots as Republicans. Quoted in Raymond 
Gazette, October I3, 1883, quoted in VJharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 
p. 203. Lynch was born a slave in Louisiana on September 10, 1847. After 
gaining his freedom he came to Mississippi. From I869 to 1873 he served 
in the Mississippi legislature. In l874 he was elected to Congress, but 
in 1876 he was defeated in his bid for reelection. In 188O he ran against 
Chalmers and, after a contest, I'/as seated. From 1881 through 1889 he was 
Chairman of the Republican Committee of Mississippi. U.S., Congress,
House, Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1927 
(Washington; Government Printing Office, 1928), p. 1246.
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party against the Independents. L. Q. C. Lamar, for example, blasted 
both Greenbackers and Independent Democrats as "selfish and unscrupulous 
men who have publicly made a shameless partnership with the negroes of 
Mississippi."^^ Undoubtedly Lamar's purpose was to associate the third 
party movements in the mind of the whites with the Republican party— the 
one blackened by the memories of Reconstruction. Such efforts by Lamar 
and other Bourbons were largely successful in the early eighties--thus 
dooming such movements to defeat. But the Bourbons did not limit their 
opposition to ranting and railing against the purposes of the Inde­
pendents. As one Mississippi historian describes the situation, "Inde­
pendent candidates were run out of their counties, beaten, or murdered 
. . . .  Ballot boxes were stuffed, fraudlent returns were made, and 
thousands of opposition votes were thrown out on technicalities. With 
mock solemnity, newspapers reported that boxes containing anti-Democrat 
majorities had been eaten by mules or horses.
Wot only were the methods utilized to achieve Redemption employed 
against those Independents contesting with the Bourbons for control, but 
those colored men who refused to reach a satisfactory arrangement with 
those political leaders also felt their effect, ifhile the Bourbons, 
largely for the benefit of the Worth, continually pledged themselves to 
a policy of equal rights for all citizens, they actually had no intention 
of allowing the Negro vote seriously to endanger white supremacy. Thus,
62Quoted in Sd\7ard Iv&yer, Lucius Q. C. Lamar-. His Life; Times, 
and Speeches, 182$-1093 (2nd ed.; Nashville ; Methodist Episcopal Church 
South,”1895), p. 435.
^^Wharton, Negro in Mississippi, p. 204.
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when the colored leaders refused to cooperate with the Bourbons, or when 
they sought election to Congress or to other high office, the usual state 
of affairs during the canvass v^as one of fraud, intimidation, and general 
corruption.
Although the Bourbons were willing to resort to extra-legal de­
vices to insure their continued domination, such a situation was not 
satisfactory because discrimination against the Negroes increased the 
possibility of Federal intervention in state elections. Legislation by 
Congress accomplishing this and loomed on the political horizon with in­
creasing frequency after l8y8. In the Congressional elections of that 
year the Democrats, for the first time since the advent of the Civil War, 
secured a working majority in the House of Representatives. This event 
elicited the introduction into 'the Senate of à resolution authored by 
James G. Blaine which asked for an investigation into the possibility 
that the constitutional rights of American citizens had been denied in 
some of the states. It obvious that the resolution was aimed directly 
at the South. Immediately, Southern Senators answered Blaine by main­
taining that such a committee was unnecessary. Lamar of Mississippi went 
even further and made the flat statement that "... the negro vote has
6 hThere were several instances during the period when Negroes 
sought election to Congress. There has already been mentioned the fact 
that Lynch, after a contest, was seated in 1881. For the charges he 
leveled against the Democrats see U.S. Congress, House, Miscellaneous 
Document, No. 12, ^Tth Cong., 1st Sess., I88I, 228. See also Chester H. 
Rowell (ed.), A Historical and Legal Digest of all the Contested Election 
cases in the House of Representatives of the United States from the First 
to the Fifty-Sixth Congress, IY89-I9OI (Washington; Government Printing 
Office, 1901), p. 375* Lynch was defeated in 1882 by a vote of 7,617 to 
6,706. He ran again in l884 and I886, but was defeated. Tribune Almanac 
for the years 1883-1887. Another Negro, James Hill, i/as an unsuccessful 
aspirant in 1882. Smith, The Negro in Congress, p. 135*
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not been suppressed in the South . . . ."^5
1-Jhile the South might protest that the rights of all citizens 
were respected in that section, Northern leaders continued to make poli­
tical capital out of a suspected violation of the Negroe's rights. In 
1883 a Senate Committee investigated reports of election disorders in 
Copiah County, Mississippi, and the following year Blaine, in a speech 
at Augusta, N&ine, again called for further intervention of Federal power 
into Southern political affairs.To the average Southerner a Federal 
election law meant that the Negro would be protected in his right to the 
exercise of the franchise, and, as the Bourbons were quick to point out, 
a majority would undoubtedly choose to cast their ballots for candidates 
of the Republican party. Such an event would pose a dire threat to the 
hegemony of the Bourbons; to the mass of Southern whites it presaged a 
return to the saturnalia of Reconstruction.
To lessen the possibility of such an unhappy state of affairs, 
there vas increased agitation in Mississippi, during the latter half of 
the decade of the iBBO's, for a convention to change the fundamental law 
of the state. Little came of this movement, however, until 1890 when the 
Lodge Election Bill, or, as the South came to term it, the "Force Bill," 
was introduced into Congress. Reaction to this proposed measure was
^5Quoted in Mayes, Lucius Q. C. Lamar, p. 355.
66U.S., Congress, Senate, Mississippi in I883, Report No. 512,
48th Cong., 1st Sess., l834. I, XOCVIJ. The majority report claimed that 
evidence of fraud had been found. This \ms vehemently denied by the 
minority, all Southern Democrats. See also John S. McNeily, "History of 
the Measures Submitted to the Committee on Elective Franchise, Apportion­
ment and Elections in the Constitutional Convention of 189O," Publications 
of the Mississippi Historical Society, ed. Franklin E. Riley (Oxford, 
Miss.; The Society, 1902)“, VI, 129.
121
immediate, bitter, and intense. Southern Congressmen, newspapers, and 
the average citizen maintained that such legislation vras unnecessary.
All were insistent that the colored man ifas freely allowed to exercise 
the franchise, and that introduction of the measure \fas another example 
of Northern meddling in the affairs of the South.
In Mississippi the Lodge bill provided an excuse for agrarian 
leaders in the white counties to insist upon the calling of a consti­
tutional convention.Opposition to the proposed convention, however, 
was widespread. Particularly disenchanted with the entire idea were the 
conservative press and the Bourbon leaders in the black counties who had 
utilized the colored vote to remain entrenched in power. Despite such 
powerful opposition, however, a campaign reminiscent of the one of I875 
brought about the election of a slate of candidates favorable to the 
calling of a convention.
eight.
^^Southern relation to the Lodge bill is detailed in chapter
Another factor ’.ra.s that the Republican party, for the first 
time since 1875; nominated a full slate of candidates in I889. The 
nominee for secretary of state was a Negro. Democratic action— whooping 
and hollering; force and intimidation— broke up Republican meetings and 
forced a withdra\fal of the letter's ticket. ITharton, The Negro in 
Mississippi, p. 209.
6o"Several years after the convention had completed its work the 
president of that body, S. S. Calhoon, gave his impression as to why the 
convention had been assembled. In general, his opinion iras that there 
was a reaction to the use of force to lessen the Negro vote and the 
thought tliat such measures might become chronic unless a legal method 
could be found to bring about disfranchisement. S. S. Calhoon, "The 
causes and events that Led to the Calling of the Constitutional Con­
vention of 1890," Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, ed. 
Franklin L. Riley (oxford. Miss. : The'Society7 19Ô2 ),“ VI, 106. The" 
only Negro in the convention, seated after a contest, was a former slave 
of Jefferson Davis. With poetic justice he was made a member of the 
Committee on Franchise and Elections.
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The constitutional convention which was convened was primarily
favored by the white farmer class— a group which at this time was less
concerned with the possibility of Negro domination than they were with
continued Bourbon control. The convention was early beset with clashes
between the two white factions. Eventually, however, a compromise was
concluded whereby the delegations from the black counties agreed to the
creation of thirteen new legislative seats— with the idea that they would
be assigned to the white counties— and representatives of the white farmer
element acquiesced in the establishment of the poll tax and the literacy
70
test as restrictions upon suffrage. The effect of these provisions 
\/as not, however, all that was desired by the small farmer class. Not 
only did the literacy test result in the disfranchisement of a majority 
of the Negroes, but because thousands of whites were also unable to meet 
the requirements set forth by the new constitution, the political domi­
nation of the Black Belt oligarchy was temporarily solidified. Thus, not 
only did the new instrument of government effectively remove the colored 
man as a political force in Mississippi, but, for the time being, a largo
majority of the whites remained subject to the control of a minority of
71their oim race in the black counties. The new constitution of the
70_
The literacy test provided that after l8$2 a voter must be able
to read the Constitution, understand it when read to him, or else be able
to give a reasonable interpretation of its passages. The Constitution 
also provided disfranchisement for a list of specified crimes and for the
payment of a poll tax. The complete text may be found in Glynn, American
Constitutions, I, part II, IO95-IIO7. The so-called "understanding 
clause" opened the way for wholesale disfranchisement.of the colored man-- 
and for that matter of many whites— and did it in a manner entirely 
legal under the Fifteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United 
States ruled that educational qualifications were not discriminatory 
unless it could be shown that their administration was evil. Williams 
vs. Mississippi, 17O U.S. 213 (1898).
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State, however, had another effect. As a result of the success attendant 
upon the disfranchisement of the Negro in Mississippi under the provisions 
of the new constitution, other Southern states began to follow her ex­
ample, and by the middle of the decade of the nineties the colored man 
was no longer a potent political force in the South.
One state which found it unnecessary to follow the lead of Missis­
sippi in adopting this method of disfranchisement was Texas. This state, 
which did not even determine it necessary to adopt a poll tax until 1904, 
had a population in 188O consisting of 1,197,237 whites and 393,384 
Negroes.Thus, since the colored people of Texas comprised only 24.7 
per cent of the state's population there was little danger during the 
period under discussion that the members of that race, even by cooper­
ating with white Republicans, could ever control the state politically.
Apparently there was little fear in Texas of Negro domination— at 
least to the extent that fraud and intimidation became the order of the 
day. Colored men continued to exercise the franchise in the state during 
the entire period under discussion, and, while no Negro was ever chosen 
to serve in Congress, there was never a session of the legislature that 
did not include at least one member of the colored r a c e . "^ 3 Negroes were
"^“In 1892 a Northern journal said that recently completed regis­
tration figures showed that the Negro had been eliminated politically in 
Mississippi. It reported that 68,127 whites and 8,651 Negroes were en­
rolled. Colored males of voting age numbered about 147,000 and there 
were about 110,000 whites of the same class. Thus, about one Negro in 
seventeen and two whites in three were entitled to vote— provided they 
paid their poll tax and kept the receipti "The Ballot in Mississippi," 
Nation, I (August 25, 1892), I39.
7%ureau of the Census, Negro Population, chap. Ill, table I3, 
p. 44 and chap. iv, table 5, P* 51*
^3prom 1868 to 1895, twenty-six counties were, at one time or
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also elected to fill some county positions--generally as Republicans— and 
the party of Abraham Lincoln nominated a colored man for Lieutenant-
7I1
Governor as late as 1878.
It was to the advantage of the Democratic party of Texas, as of 
other Southern states, to keep the Negro identified with the Republican 
party. That does not mean, however, that the party of white supremacy 
did not actively seek colored electoral support. In I878, for example, 
a prominent Democratic journal noted that in Montgomery County a Negro 
leader was working with the Democrats and dividing the colored vote.^  ^
Four years later the same journal applauded the statement of Richard 
Nelson, colored Secretary of the Republican State Executive Committee, 
that the Negro had been duped by the Republicans and that candidates of 
that party were no longer worthy of colored support.?^
While some colored leaders early became disenchanted with the 
Republican party, as a rule its national candidates could depend upon
another, represented by a Negro. In the Central Texas counties of Brazos, 
Burleson, Milam, Robertson, Limestone, Falls, and McLennan the colored 
population never exceeded the white. Yet, twelve colored legislators 
were elected from these counties. J. Mason Brewer, Negro Legislators of 
Texas and Their Descendants (Dallas ; ly&this Publishing Co., Ï935), p. 39. 
The Galveston Daily News, April I9, 1876, noted that two colored men had 
been elected to the Texas Senate. One, a quadroon, :fas characterized as 
being a person with "an intelligent look, a keen eye, and a well-shaped 
head, but his deportment is rather modest than otherwise." Brewer, Negro 
Legislators of Texas, p. 39, gives only one Negro as a member of this 
session.
74‘ The nominee, formerly an alderman in Houston, was regarded by 
one newspaper as being "bright." Galveston Daily News, October 4, I878.
Galveston Daily News, November 6, 1878.
^^Ibid., July 25, 1882. His statement probably had little effect. 
Indicating this is the fact that the Republican candidate for president 
in 1384, James G. Blaine, polled a larger total of popular votes than did 
any Republican presidential aspirant between I876 and 1892. Tribune 
Almanac for the years 1876-91.
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77Kegro votes during the entire period under discussion. In state 
elections, however, such ;vas not always the case. In 1876, for example, 
the Greenback party chose to contest with the Democrats for control of 
the state house. VJhile unsuccessful in their effort, the strong showing 
made by this farmer-oriented party and the fact that many colored men 
supported its candidate, led the Republicans in 188O to offer a fusion 
arrangement with the Greenbackers— an offer which \7as immediately re­
fused. Consequently, the Greenback total in this election year drasti­
cally declined. Two years later, however, Greenbacker Congressman Wash 
Jones demonstrated that in Texas, at least, there was increasing dis­
satisfaction with Bourbon policies by polling the largest vote ever
78rolled up to that time in a losing gubernatorial effort.
Despite some success on the part of the Greenbackers and other 
independent candidates, no real threat to Bourbon political hegemony in 
Texas came until 189O. In that year James S. Hogg, cooperating with but 
not dominated by the Southern Alliance, overthrew the Bourbons. Un-
7?See Tribune Almanac for the years 1876-89. The Republican vote 
totals for president were alivays larger than those of their gubernatorial 
aspirants. One exception to this ■^ras in 188O when the Republican candi­
dates for president and governor received exactly the same number of 
votes— 57,893. Ibid., for the year 1881. Evidently all Republicans 
voted a straight ticket.
78In the gubernatorial election of 1878 the Democratic candidate 
polled 158,933; the Greenbacker 55,002; the Republican, 23,402. Ibid., 
for the year 188O. Negroes probably gave some support to the Green- 
backers. On September 17, I878, the Galveston Daily News reported that 
the colored men were deserting this party because it refused to put a 
Negro on the ticket. On October 2, however, the same newspaper reported 
that in a Greenback convention in Calvert, Texas, about sixty of the 
delegates were colored and only eight were white. In this election Inde­
pendent candidates also opposed the Democrats for Congressional seats. 
One, Wash Jones, running as a Nationalist in the Fifth District, polled 
21,101 votes to 19,721 for his antagomist. Democrats were elected, how­
ever, in the other five districts. Tribune Almanac for the year 188O.
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doubtedly some of his support came from the members of the colored A1-
liance who by this time were manifesting dissatisfaction not. only with
the Texas Bourbons but also with the Republican leaders of that state.
One reason for this, aside from economic causes, was that the Republican
party of Texas had reached the conclusion that it would be to its ad-
79
vantage to make the party "lily-white." Undoubtedly this helped drive 
many of the Negroes--small farmers who were dissatisfied with Bourbon 
economic policies— into the arms of the Alliance and eventually into the 
Populist movement.
For a time, however, there was some doubt as to whether the 
Negroes would be welcome in the party which was largely composed of the 
small white farmer class. When the Populist party held its first state 
convention the issue of whether the organization would accept the support 
of Negroes was prominent. A white delegate introduced a resolution 
which would have denied colored men representation on party committees.
A colored delegate immediately took issue with the suggestion. "The 
Negro vote," he said, "will be the balancing vote in Texas. If you are 
going to win, you will have to take the negro with you . . . ." In full 
agreement with this idea was the white president of the convention. "I
^^ %he Republican V/hite League of Texas postulated in I892 that 
"the union is safe only in the hands of the Anglo-Saxon race, and that a 
Republican party in Texas to merit the respect of manlcind must be in the 
hands of that race." Quoted in Dallas Morning News, June 9, 1892. This 
"lily-white" movement in Texas was a continuation of the movement already 
pnderiray in,other states. Obviously, the white Republican leaders had 
reached the conclusion that the Negro iTas a millstone around the neck of 
the party and that as long as the Southern white associated the colored 
race with the Republican party it had no opportunity to win elections in 
that section.
80The colored Alliance originated at Houston in l836.
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am In favor," he said, "of giving the colored man full representation.
He is a citizen just as much as we are, and the party that acts on that
8lfact will gain the colored vote of the South."
Action by the Populist convention in electing two Negroes to the 
party's State Executive Committee was a logical continuation of the policy 
pursued by the whites of Texas after 1876. Since the colored population 
was not so numerous as in some of the former Confederate states there 
was no real danger of Negro domination. Actually, to the Bourbons, 
Greenbackers, and Populists the colored vote was an asset when it could 
be weaned avray from the Repub]leans. Consequently, the Negro was not 
subjected to much fraud and intimidation after Redemption, and he ivas 
fairly free to vote and seek minor office in this western-most state of 
the Lower South. Such, however, tos not always true in those former 
Confederate states comprising the Upper South.
^^Dallas Morning News, August I8, 189I.
CHAPTER V
THE IffiGRO AID SOUTHERN POLITICS: THE 
CAROLINAS, TENNESSEE, AND VIRGINIA
On the plains of Texas; among the hayons of Louisiana; along the 
Mississippi delta; in the hills of Arkansas; the colored men remained a 
factor and an issue in the political life after white rule vras restored. 
Just as they were exploited in an economic sense, so did the Bourbons, 
including among their numbers many former slave holders, seek to use the 
vote of the Negro to insure their entrenched position in the governments 
of the Southern states. I'Jhat vias true in the states which were the an­
cestral homes of Jefferson Davis, Alexander H* Stephens, and Robert 
Toombs, was no less true of those proudly claiming Robert S. Lee, Andrew 
Jackson, and John C. Calhoun as their native sons. In the Smoky Mountains 
of North Carolina and Tennessee; through the Great Valley of Virginia; 
along the coastal plain of South Carolina, here, too, the Negro was both 
a political factor and issue in the period after l8j6.
Radical Reconstruction spent its force more quickly in North 
Carolina than in some of the other Southern states. Taking the state as 
a whole, there was at no time colored rule in the most strict definition. 
Negroes never occupied the highest elective offices in this state, nor 
did they ever constitute a majority in the legislature. They did, how­
ever, control numerous city and county offices in the Black Belt counties,
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where they were in a numerical majority, during the entire period of Re­
construction.^ This situation was, by 187O, threatened by an avalanche 
of Conservative votes. In that year the Conservatives, soon to reassume 
the title of Democrats, won control of both houses of the legislature and 
impeached and removed the Radical governor. By I874 their strength in 
that body was sufficient to secure enactment of a measure calling for a 
Constitutional Convention to assemble the next year.
The campaign for election of members to the convention was bitter
2
and intense. Fearing that the vote of the mass of Negroes would go to 
Radical candidates, the Conservative press began just before election day 
to raise the race issue. For example, the Charlotte Democrat, obviously 
seeking to convince the whites to come out in strength and vote for Con­
servative candidates, asked the white men of North Carolina if they were 
ready for "mixed schools, for Negro judges, for Negro Representatives, 
for Negro Senators?" Were they ready, queried the editor, to forget that 
"this is a white man's government, framed by the wisdom of the white man 
and secured by the blood of the white race?" If they were ready to 
forget they should remain away from the polls on election day; other­
wise, they should "come up . . . and vote for the man of your race."^
W^illiam A. Mabry, The Negro in North Carolina Politics Since 
Reconstruction ("Trinity College Historical Society, Historical Papers," 
Vol. XXIII; Durham, N.C.: Dulœ University Press, 1940), p. 12.
2
The Census of 188O gives the population of North Carolina as 
consisting of 367,242 whites and 531,277 Negroes. U.S., Bureau of the 
Census, Negro Population in the United States, 1790-1915 (Washington; 
Government Printing Off ice, 19IÜ), chap. Ill,' table 13, p. 44.
C^harlotte Democrat, August 2, 1875, quoted in Mabry, The Negro 
in North Carolina Politics, p. 15.
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The advice given by this and other journals was obviously followed by 
the white citizens. Although the vote was heavy and the race was close, 
enough Democrats and their Independent cohorts were elected that they 
could control the convention and write the new instrument of government.
The constitution which was prepared and submitted to the elector­
ate for its approval by this body was the one under which North Carolina 
was to be governed during the entire period under discussion. As was 
true of constitutions prepared in other Southern states during this time, 
no effort was made to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment and disfranchise 
the Negro as a race. Provisions were included, however, which were aimed 
directly at the assumed characteristics of the colored man. For example, 
because in this Southern state as in the others the Negro >ra.s often 
itinerant, it was provided that to be eligible to exercise the franchise 
a citizen must have resided for twelve months in the state and ninety 
days in the county prior to the election. Another provision designed 
with the Negro in mind Afas that any individual convicted of felony or 
otherwise infamous crime was barred from the privilege of the ballot.
These provisions, together with the one asserting that secret political 
societies would not be tolerated, lessened the possibility of a revival 
of Negro-Republican domination.^ They did not, however, have the im­
mediate effect of greatly reducing the number of colored participants 
in North Carolina elections.
The first election held under the provisions of the new
Vor the complete text of the constitution see George A. Glynn 
(comp.), The Convention Nhnual for the Sixth New York State Constitutional 
Convention, 1Ü94, American Constitutions (Albany; Argus Printing Co., 
ib sky , II, Part II, pp. 72-Ü6 .
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constitution occurred in 1876. In this election, after a campaign in 
which the race issue was of paramount importance, the Democratic candi­
date, Zebulon B. Vance, was chosen to fill the office of governor.^  This 
election marked the downfall of Republican power and apparently made white 
supremacy secure for the state as a whole. Yet, the immediate position 
of the able Vance and his Bourbon cohorts was somewhat tenuous. In the 
western counties of the state the small white farmer class possessed 
great political strength, and in eastern North Carolina there were twenty- 
two counties in which the population was over fifty per cent colored.^
If the whites of the up-country ever decided to revolt from Bourbon rule 
and in so doing cooperated with the Republican directors of the Negro 
vote, the position of the Bourbons was in danger. By the very nature of 
the political situation, then, it was requisite for the leaders of the 
party of white supremacy to try and divide the colored vote and, at the 
same time, to maintain the loyalty of the mass of whites by continually 
expounding on the possibility and dangers of Negro domination.
In an effort to assure Bourbon ascendancy the Democrat-controlled
legislature enacted legislation in I877 which, according to one historian,
7
"violated every principle of local self-government." This law, known as 
the county-government act, provided that justices of the peace would be 
appointed by the legislature. These individuals were in turn to select
V^ance polled 123,339 votes to 110,909 for his Republican op­
ponent. The Tribune Almanac and Political Register (New York; The 
Tribune Association, yearly), for the year l877«
^Bureau of the Census, Negro Population, pp. 78^ -85.
G. de Roulhac Hamilton, North Carolina Since i860 (Chicago; 
Lewis Publishing Co., I919), PP* 192-93•
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from three to five persons in their counties to serve as a hoard of county 
commissioners. Thus, the principal county offices were made appointive. 
Consequently, since the legislature was largely composed of white Demo­
crats, the potentially Republican "black" counties of the eastern section
8
were subject to the control in their local affairs of a powerful machine.
The undemocratic county-government act undoubtedly contributed to 
the fact that independent political movements did not sweep North Carolina 
in the period before the 1890's as they did some of the other Southern 
states.  ^ The Bourbons were too firmly entrenched in the legislature for 
Independents, of whatever political persuasion, to compete successfully 
for political control without arranging a fusion agreement with the Re­
publicans and their Negro allies. Even had the white farmer element been 
willing to conclude such an alliance, their task would have been diffi­
cult. Not only did the Bourbon-dominated legislature of 1076-77 solidify
their control by enacting the county-government law, but other measures 
were passed by this session in order to fortify the position of the Demo­
cratic party. For example, the party benefited from the fact that this 
session of the legislature gerrymandered wards in some of the cities to 
the advantage of Democratic candidates In addition, the legislature 
0
Lfebry, The Negro in North Carolina Politics, pp. I8-I9.
T^he Alliance movement vra,s an important feature of North Carolina
politics after I889, but the Greenbackers and Independent Democrats posed 
little threat to the Bourbons. The Republican party was the primary con­
testant of the Democrats before I89O. See the Tribune Almanac for the 
years 1876-91.
^^Congressional districts were also gerrymandered. The "Black 
Second" was more or less surrendered to the Republicans. Mabry, The 
Negro in North Carolina Politics, p. 19.
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changed the election lavs so that the registration books were to be 
opened two working days before the election. This posed a problem for 
those who had to travel long distances. They would be reluctant to make 
the trip for the purpose of registering and then return such a short time 
later to cast the ballot. This, coupled with the fact that the registrar 
could demand proof of identity, age, and residence, lessened the number 
of those seeking to register and worked to the benefit of the Democratic 
party.All of these devices, enacted into law shortly after the down­
fall of Republican power, enabled the Bourbons of North Carolina to re­
sist any political challenges which might be hurled by dissident groups 
within the state.
Any recounting of the political situation in North Carolina in 
the period between 1877 and 189O, however brief, must give some con­
sideration to two seemingly incompatible attitudes of the Bourbons. First, 
as in other Southern states, there vths the idea that the people of North 
Carolina respected the colored man and had no intention of depriving him 
of his rights. Secondly, there was the continuing expounding of the idea 
that the Negro vote posed a distinct threat to the white man's way of 
life and it \fas necessary for whites of every economic station to con­
tinue to cooperate politically.
Despite the fact that electoral procedures were changed by the 
Democrat-controlled legislature in l877""changes which seemingly assured 
the ascendancy of the party in power— the colored man did not cease to be
^^Nlection judges were to be appointed by justices of the peace. 
Public Laws of North Carolina, 1876-I877, chap. CCLXXV, pp. 518 ff., 
cited in ibid., pp. 20-21.
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a factor in the politics of North Carolina. Leaders of the Democratic 
party, while in favor of Negro suffrage only when it was to their benefit, 
did not as immediately become as rabid on the subject as did their counter­
parts in some of the other Southern states. For instance. Governor Vance 
informed a touring member of the English Parliament in 1878 that colored 
members of the state legislature, while for the most part illiterate, 
were generally well disposed and sensible individuals.^^ Only one year 
earlier the state legislature— the same one that enacted restrictions 
which made it possible to lessen the effectiveness of the colored vote—  
adopted a resolution which proclaimed to all the purity of North Caro­
lina's intention toward the colored man. This resolution stated that the 
General Assembly recognized the amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and the laws of North Carolina which conferred suffrage 
and citizenship upon the Negroes, and said that "we are disposed and de­
termined to carry out in good faith these as all other constitutional 
13provisions."
Although the Bourbons continued throughout the period to state 
their acceptance of the right of the colored man to exercise the franchise 
freely and without fear, they also continued to attempt to maintain white 
solidarity by evoking the specter of prospective Negro domination. Dis­
satisfaction of the whites in the western section with the county-
12George Campbell, V/hite and Black; The Outcome of a Visit to 
the United States (New York; R. Worthington, 1879), P- 298.
13Quoted in Guion G. Johnson, "The Ideology of l-Jhite Supremacy, 
1876-1910," Essays in Southern History, ed. Fletcher M. Green ("James 
Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science," Vol XXXI; Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 19^9), p. I5O.
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government law intensified as the period progressed. That it did not 
result in open rebellion against the Bourbons was not the least caused 
by the fact that the press of the state continually warned of the dangers 
inherent in the colored political control. For instance, the prominent 
Bourbon newspaper, the Raleigh News and Observer, stated its acceptance 
in l83l of the idea that the Negro should be treated with justice and 
kindness, but said "we are against their holding high office of trust 
among our people where their dealings will not be entirely with their 
own race."^^ Three years later, in the face of white revolt, the same 
journal proclaimed that the whites must hold together or their interests 
would be in jeopardy. "The issue," said the editor, "is white supremacy, 
with all tliat exalts and enobles humanity, in opposition to a base 
amalgamation, seeking respectability under the name of coalition.
Again, another three years later, the same partisan journal carried an 
editorial on the purpose of the Conservatives— an editorial which closed 
with the statement that "we are primarily organized to maintain Anglo- 
Saxon supremacy in North Carolina and in every part of it. We wish to 
dwell on this fact; we wish to make it plain.
l4Raleigh News and Observer, hferch 2 h, 1881.
'•'Ibid., June 29, l884. Republican candidates often attempted 
to arouse the passions of the Negro against the Bourbons. For example, 
James L- Moore, Republican candidate for the state senate in l83h, said 
that the only cry of the Democratic party was "Nigger, Nigger, Nigger 
. . . The Nigger is the Democratic stalking horse. Down in Hell--and 
Hell's where the Democrats belong— Down in Hell you can tell a Democrat 
every time. There he sets holding some skinny-headed Negro between him 
and the fire." Quoted in Robert W* Winston, It's a Far Cry (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1937); P- 157.
^^Raleigh News and Observer, December 18, 1687.
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Undoubtedly the Bourbons of North Carolina wished to dwell on the 
fact that it was necessary to maintain white supremacy. Robert Winston, 
active in the politics of the state during the period, said that it became 
the purpose of the Bourbons to dwell on this subject and to continually 
ask the white man if "he was going to give up his government to the black 
raan."^ "^  A partial answer to the question as to why the Bourbons emphasized 
the dangers of the Negro domination may be provided by a brief consider­
ation of colored participation in the politics of the state.
Albion W. Tourgee, a Negro Carpetbagger, proclaimed in 1878 that 
the Republican party was dead in North Carolina. An examination of the 
political situation, however, indicates that not only was his statement 
not justified but also that a majority of the members of his race main­
tained their loyalty to the party of Abraham Lincoln.Despite Tourgee's 
pessimism, Republicans— many of whom were colored--continued to stand for 
and be elected to local and county offices, the state legislature, and 
even to the National Congress.
17Winston, It's A Far Cry, p. 159»
l3Democratic efforts to attract Negro support may be seen from 
the fact that the General Assembly elected several colored magistrates 
in 1877* Nine white Democrats protested this as being "inconsistent 
with the principles and purposes of the party." North Carolina, House 
Journal, 1876-1877, PP* 872-74, quoted in C. Vann Woodward, Origins of 
the New South, 1877-1914, Vol. X of A History of the South, eds. Wendall 
Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State Uni­
versity Press, 1947--), p. 80.
19
During the entire period Negro Republicans sat in the General 
Assembly. For a summary of their numbers see Monroe N. Work (comp.),
"Some Negro Members of Reconstruction Conventions and Legislatures and 
of Congress," Journal of Negro History, V (January, 1920), 76-78. Of 
the Negro Congressmen elected from Worth Carolina the first, John A.
Hyman belongs to the pre-Redemption era and the last, George H. I'Jhite, 
to the post-Bourbon period. Of the others, James 0 'Barra ran in 1878
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To a great extent, the success achieved by these Republican candi­
dates was due to the colored vote. While official figures breaking down 
the registered voters by races are not available for Worth Carolina, con­
temporary statements indicate that colored membership in the Republican
party was between ninety and one hundred thousand and that some thirty-
20five thousand whites belonged to the same organization. This disparity 
in numbers, when related to the Republican vote polled in the various 
presidential campaigns of the period, indicates that most of the success 
achieved by the Republicans was due to the Negro vote. For example, in 
1880 Garfield polled 115,874 votes in North Carolina and Hancock garnered
pn
124,208. By accepting at face value the estimation of thirty-five 
thousand white Republicans, it would mean that some 80,874 colored men 
marked their ballots for Garfield. Assuming, however, that the estimation 
was incorrect and that there iras twice as many white Republicans, it would 
have been necessary for some 45,874 Negroes to have voted for Garfield for 
him to have achieved that total.
Perhaps even more to the point, however, is the vote cast for 
gubernatorial candidates during the period. For example, in 188O the
and was defeated, but won in the "Black Second" in l882 and l884. His 
defeat in 1886 by a white Democrat may have been due to the fact that he 
iras also opposed by another Negro, Israel B. Abbott. Henry p. Cheatham, 
a mulatto, won in the Second District in 1888 and I89O. Tribune Almanac 
for the years I879-9I. " ~
20
The Goldsboro Star, a Negro newspaper, estimated in I88I that 
96,500 Negroes and 35,000 whites comprised the Republican party of the 
states. Quoted in Raleigh News and Observer, IV&y 21, 1881. The latter 
estimated on June 25, 1882 that 90,000 colored men belonged to that 
organization and on Nfey 20, l884, its' estimate was 96,000.
21Tribune Almanac for the year I881.
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Republican nominee, Buxton, polled 111,590 votes and the Democrat, Jarvis, 
eased his way into the governor's chair by commanding 112,830 ballots— a
O p
differential of only 1,2^0 votes. Four years later the Democratic 
candidate did somewhat better— polling 1^3,249 votes to 123,010 for his 
opponent.23 Nevertheless, the fact that the vote in statewide elections 
was sometimes relatively close was alarming to the Bourbons. It meant to 
these leaders that any white revolt which resulted in fusion with the Re­
publicans could bring about their political downfall. Largely for that 
reason, then, it was to the advantage of the Bourbons of North Carolina 
to keep the idea that the colored man was a staunch supporter of the Re­
publican party firmly implanted in the mind of the whites of the state. 
Consequently, the specter of Negro domination and the experiences of Re­
construction were continually raised, and Bourbon journals, such as the 
Raleigh News and Observer continually editorialized that "those who vote 
with the negroes in behalf of radicalism should be rendered odius. Those
who undertake to direct the negro vote in opposition to white supremacy
p k
should be taught their treachery to their race in no uncertain terms."
VJhile the political situation in North Carolina -was of interest 
to the people at the North, it was undoubtedly the attitude of the white 
citizens of South Carolina toward the colored population which attracted 
the greatest interest. First of the Southern states to secede, ravaged 
by war, and exploited to the utmost by the Carpetbagger-Scalawag-Negro 
combination during the long and dismal period of Reconstruction, it might
^^Ibid. for the year 1885.
^^Raleigh News and Observer, February 1+, l838.
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be expected that in this state the conservative whites would never again 
condone a recurrence of colored participation in politics. This is es­
pecially true because the population of South Carolina iras composed of a 
greater percentage of colored people, and it was potentially possible for 
them to dominate the political life of the state.
Home rule was not restored in South Carolina until 1877• The 
election of 1876, termed by one prominent South Carolinian ". . . a 
struggle . . . for emancipation from negro and alien rule . . pitted 
Republican Daniel Chamberlain against Democrat Wade Hampton for the office
26
of governor. After a campaign in which both contestants appealed for 
colored support, and one which was" marked by fraud, intimidation, and 
outright violence,Hampton v?as eventually declared elected. His as­
sumption of the governorship, coming directly as a result of the Compro­
mise of 1877, inaugurated fourteen years of Bourbon rule— a period during 
which the Negro vote uas greatly reduced from the peak it had reached 
during Reconstruction, but one in which the colored man continued to vote 
and be elected to office. During this period, however, the Republican 
party actually became a nominal force in the state, and the doctrine of 
white supremacy became of overriding importance to the Democratic party.
^^According to the Census of 188O there were 6c4,322 Negroes and 
391,105 whites in the state. Bureau of the Census, Negro Population, 
chap. Ill, table I3, p. 44.
26Arney R. Childs (ed.). The Private Journal of Henry William 
Ravenel, 1859-I887 (Columbia : University of South Carolina Press, 1947), 
p. 385-
27A biased observer, a former abolitionist then resident in the 
state, gives an indignant account of the fraud perpetrated by the Demo­
crats in this election. Rupert S. Holland (ed.). Letters and Diary of 
Laura M. Towne, Written from the Sea Islands of South Carolina, 1862-1884 
(Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1912), p. 225-
iko
It would be inaccurate to state that the Republican party of South 
Carolina disappeared when the Red Shirts redeemed the state in 1876, but 
after that date it was more or less moribund in state politics. As vas 
true in other areas of the South, some whites maintained their Republican 
affiliation because of the patronage which came to them when the national 
party was in power. In election years the party went through the motion 
of holding state conventions, but usually dispensed with the nomination
28of a slate of candidates for state offices. Republican candidates did, 
however, continue to seek election to Congress and to county and municipal 
positions. In some instances their quest was not in vain.
In the area of local politics Republican candidates, both white 
and colored, continued to vie for positions in the state legislature 
during most of the period of Bourbon rule. The election of 1876 resulted 
in some thirty-five members of that party being seated in the lower house 
and seven in the senate. These numbers ware diminished in 1878 to three 
in the house and five in the senate, a figure which, except for continued 
reduction and final elimination of the Republican members of the upper 
house in I888, remained fairly constant until l895*^^ In addition to
28In 1880 the Republicans nominated a state ticket, but the slate 
made no campaign. James Welch Patton, "The Republican Party in South 
Carolina, 1876-I895," Essays in Southern History, ed. Fletcher M. Green 
("James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science," Vol. XXXI;
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 19^9)? P* 95* In l884 
another slate was nominated, but every candidate except Daniel Straker, 
a Negro running for Lieutenant-Governor, withdrew before the election. 
George B. Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, l877~19QO (Columbia; Uni­
versity of South Carolina Press, 1952), p. kl. In 188O and 1882 an effort 
\7as made to fuse with Greenbackers, but this combination had indifferent 
success.
29Of the thirty-two Republicans who served in the legislature 
between I878 and I896, thirty were Negroes. All were from the "black"
l4l
these, other members of the Republican party were sometimes chosen to 
fill minor county and municipal positions.
Unlike in Tennessee or North Carolina, where the white mountaineers 
often added their numbers to the Republican party, the membership of that 
organization in South Carolina was almost entirely composed of colored men. 
For that reason most of the men chosen by the Republican party to seek 
office in the state were of the Negro race. This was especially true in­
elections on the local level of government. Not always ivas it the case, 
however, when the party nominated men to seek election tc Congress. In 
those contests white Republicans, termed by one prominent Negro as . .
political parasites who seek to use us for power and office . . often 
made such races as proof of their loyalty to the National organization, 
and thus to establish their eligibility for a lucrative appointive posi- 
tion.^ Their efforts to win election to Congress were, however, usually 
in vain, and it was only colored Republicans who achieved any success as 
candidates for such positions during this period.
From 1876 until 1332 South Carolina was entitled to five Congress­
men, but increased population and a new apportionment in the latter year 
raised the number to seven. In 1876 three of the five Republicans seeking
31election to Congress were Negroes and all three were elected. Resto-
counties of Beaufort, Berkeley, and Georgetown. Patton, Essays in 
Southern History, p. 9 h.
30
The Negro making this charge was Straker. Columbia Register, 
August 3I; 188k, cited in Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, p. 9%!
31The three were Joseph H. Rainey, Robert Smalls, and Richard 
Cain. Cain, a preacher, \;as free born, of pure Negro blood, and had 
some college training. Samuel D. Smith, The Negro in Congress, 187O-I9OI 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), pp. 5-3.
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ration of home rule in I877, however, made repetition of such event ex­
tremely unlikely. Thus, in 1878 when two of the incumbent Negroes, Joseph 
ÏÏ. Rainey and Robert Smalls sought reelection they were resoundingly de­
feated. This fact did not deter Smalls from again standing for election 
in 1880. His perseverance was re:farded by the Republican-dominated 
Congress who investigated his charges that his apparent defeat was the 
result of fraud and gave him the contested seat. In I882 seven new 
districts were created and one of these, the Seventh, was a gerrymandered 
"black district" usually conceded to the Negro Republicans by the Demo­
crats. First elected from this district, however, \ms a white Republican, 
E. W. M. Mackey. IVhen he died in office a special election was held and 
Robert Smalls trounced his opposition in a successful bid to return to 
the halls of C o n g r e s s . 33 Smalls was reelected in l88^ , but two other 
colored candidates, E. H. Deas and E. J. Dickerson, were unsuccessful in 
their bid for nomination from other districts.3  ^ In 1886 Smalls \ias again 
victorious--he was the only Republican seeking a Congressional position in 
this election— but two years later he was replaced by another Negro, Thomas 
E. Miller.33 Colored candidates continued with some success to seek
3^Chester H. Rowell (ed.), A Historical and Legal Digest of all 
the Contested Election Cases in the House of Representatives of the United 
States from the First to the Fifty-Sixth Congresses, 1789-19OI (Washington; 
Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 381.
33jn the special election held on N^rch 18, 188I+, Smalls polled 
9,092 votes to 32 cast against him. Tribune Almanac for the year 1885.
3 S^mith, The Negro in Congress, p. 135* Deas polled 3,289 votes 
to 10,469 for the Democrat. Dickerson was swamped by a vote of 1,920 to 
11,419« Tribune Almanac for the year 1885.
33ibid., for the year I889 gives the total vote of Miller as being 
7,003 and 8,358 for William Elliott, his Democratic opponent. Miller
1^ 3
election in South Carolina throughout most of the l8$0's, hut certainly 
the heyday of the colored man in Congress from this state was the fateful 
year of 1876.^^
There were many reasons for the paucity of Republicans elected 
to office in South Carolina during these years, but not the least were 
the attitudes and practices of members of the opposition party. Negroes 
were certainly not eliminated from public life after the Bourbons gained 
political dominance in 1877, but their participation was greatly reduced. 
Actually, the Bourbons adopted the policy of winning the colored vote 
where possible and intimidating it when necessary. The latter method of 
controlling the voting by Negroes, however, ivas an expedient which the 
Bourbon leaders preferred not to use. As has been pointed out by one 
historian of the Negro in South Carolina, the Bourbons of the state were 
characterized by the ante-bellum ideal of noblesse oblige toward the 
colored man. Unlike the poor white they did not fear his economic com­
petition, and once there was no longer danger of his political domination 
they were willing to accept him in public life--but in a clearly sub-
37ordinate position.
wade Hampton, South Carolina's first Bourbon governor, entered 
the office in 1077 and pledged to "know no race, no party, no man, in
contested but the House of Representatives refused to seat him. Rowell 
(ed.). Digest of the Election Cases of the House of Representatives, 
p. hèl.
 ^George W. Murray was elected in the Seventh District from 1892 
through 1896. Smith, The Negro in Congress, p. 6.
3^George B. Tindall, "The Campaign for the Disfranchisement of 
Negroes in South Carolina," Journal of Southern History, XV (l#.y, 19^9), 
212.
the administration of the law, and he was watched closely by men of 
both races to see what course he would follow. It soon became apparent 
that he intended to pursue a policy of moderation. Colored men were 
promised that rights already granted were safe in the hands of the Demo­
crats, and a number of colored men were appointed to minor office. Never­
theless, Hampton's program, negatively liberal though it v/as, did win some 
Negro support. When it r^as learned, for example, that the governor would 
seek reelection in 1878 many prominent colored men spoke out in his favor. 
Robert Smalls, then a Negro Congressman, while addressing a Republican 
meeting in Beaufort County referred to the "just and liberal course of 
the Governor which has recommended him to the confidence of the people. 
Ex-Justice Jonathan Wright informed a newspaper reporter prior to the 
election that Hampton "... has kept every pledge he has made and . . . 
he will be reelected Governor almost unanimously. He will get nine-tenths 
of the colored vote . . . .  There is not a decent negro in the State will 
vote against him."^^ This idea vjas seconded by a meeting of colored men 
in Barnwell County. Resolutions were passed by this group condemning the 
Republican State Convention for refusing to endorse Hampton and advising
the colored people to witness that since his first inauguration "unprece-
l|.l
dented peace and security has pervaded all classes of people."
Hampton's program of moderation was not pleasing to all Negroes
S8
Charleston News and Courier, April 7, 1877, quoted in Tindall, 
South Carolina Negroes, p. 20.
^^Charleston News and Cowier, July I7, 1878, quoted in ibid.,
p. 25.
*^^ Columbia Daily Register, August 21, 187O, quoted in ibid., p. 25. 
^^Galveston Daily News, September 29, I878.
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nor acceptable to all whites. Although some clubs were organized among 
and some minor candidates selected from the colored population, many 
Negroes supported Hampton only because they had no opportunity to cast
p
their ballots for a Republican nominee. The acceptance of colored men 
within the party of white supj^ emacy, however, evoked some criticism among 
the whites— especially those in the lower economic strata. In Edgefield 
County, for instance, Negroes were excluded from the Democratic primary 
in the election of I878, and a resolution was adopted by white members 
of that party stating that ". . .we regard the issue between the white 
and colored people of this state, and of the entire South, as an antago­
nism of race, not a difference in political parties. "^3 jt was only in 
Edgefield County, however, that an extreme policy was adopted in 1878. 
Negro Democratic clubs were organized in several other counties and many 
colored men voted for Hampton in his successful bid for another term as 
governor.
The clash over racial policies was evident in the abortive Edge­
field revolt in I878 and was symptomatic of the dissatisfaction which 
arose against Bourbon policies in South Carolina. Leader in the early 
stages of the revolt was General Martin Gary of upland Edgefield County.
lip' The previously cited member of the English Parliament was in 
South Carolina during this election, and he did not notice a great amount 
of violence or intimidation. It was his impression, however, that the 
Negroes almost considered it a religion to support the party responsible 
for their freedom. Campbell, lAiite and Black, p. I8I.
^^charleston News and Courier, June k, 1878, q^ uoted in Tindall, 
South Carolina Negroes, p. 26.
^^Hampton polled 119,550. The Republicans had no candidate and 
only 213 diehards voted against the incumbent. Tribune Almanac for the 
year I88O.
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At the outset this leader of the small white farmers denied Bourbon con­
tentions that the colored vote had largely contributed to the Democrats 
success in achieving Redemption in 1876. This, coupled with Hampton's 
policy of moderation toward the colored electorate, was more than Gary 
could accept. He maintained that he would prefer to lose his right arm 
rather than to support the Bourbon policy of "fusion” with the Negroes.
It was for that reason, then, that Gary called in 1878 for South Carolina 
Democrats to return to the "Mississippi plan."^^
The demagogic appeal of Gary, as previously noted, had no effect 
in the campaign of I878. It does, however, demonstrate that uplanders in 
South Carolina were early dissatisfied with Bourbon racial policies, and 
affords some clue as to the reason for the rise of an Independent party 
to contest with the Bourbon's for control. The primary political op­
position afforded by groups opposed to Bourbon policies in the period 
prior to I890 came in 1882 when the National Republican party endorsed 
the Greenbackers in South Carolina.This farmer-oriented party nomi­
nated a candidate for governor and either Greenbackers or Republicans
47sought election for all of the Congressional seats. The campaign brought
^^The statements made by Gary may be found in the Charleston News 
and Courier, May 4, 1877, September 20, I877, and February 3, I87S, quoted 
in VJood\ra.rd, Origins of the New South, p. 80. A Northern correspondent, 
describing the election of I878, claimed that Hampton's vaunted moderation 
meant nothing because the Negro was bulldozed and his votes thrown out of 
the ballot box after he contrived to get it in. Edward Hogan, "South 
Carolina Today," International Review, VIII (February, 188O), 106.
^^Coalition was an important part of the Republican program. 
William Chandler, patronage dispenser for Arthur, seconded the opinion 
expressed in his newspaper that "the cry should be 'anything to beat the 
Bourbons.'" Washington National Republican, August 9, I882, quoted in 
Wood-v/ard, Origins of the New South, p. 102.
^^one of the Independent Greenback and Republican candidates was
lk7
forth reports of foiir political murders, a lynching, and intimidation of
various types, and it also resulted in an overwhelming defeat for the
1+8Greenbackers and their Republican allies. The resounding defeat, how­
ever, had another effect. It was the last time that opposition to Bourbon 
policies elicited an Independent challenge until the advent of the 
Farmer's Alliance.
One reason for Bourbon success in combating the Independent move­
ments ■^Tas undoubtedly the fact that Hampton's policy tovreird the colored 
man was continued even after he was elected to the United States Senate. 
The Negro population of South Carolina, ostensibly Republican, largely 
preferred to cooperate with the Bourbons in state elections rather than 
to follow the example of their white leaders and endorse candidates of 
Independent parties--candidates largely drawn from the class which was 
the traditional antagonist of the colored race. Consequently, the Negro 
entered into "fusion" arrangements with the Bourbons, and, as has already 
been noted, were rewarded with some minor state offices and with one seat 
in Congress. Yet, the Bourbons were manifestly not satisfied that this 
psuedo-liberal policy would alrays be successful for the Democrat-con­
trolled legislature early enacted legislation which i+as designed to
E. B. C. Cash. As a Democrat he had been accused of atrocious murders 
by the Republicans, but when he quarreled with his party and came out as 
an Independent he was given patronage to aid in his election. Ibid.
Cash, running in the Fifth District, polled 7,171 votes to 8,518 for his 
opponent. Tribune Almanac for the year 1883.
^^ The Greenbacker gubernatorial candidate, Melane, polled 11,719 
votes to 67,158 for his opponent. No Greenbacker ++as elected to Congress, 
but the Republican, lyfeckey, was chosen in the "Black Seventh." No Demo­
crat contested Mackey and he overwhelmed his Independent Republican 
opponent. Tribune Almanac for the year I885.
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curtail potential Republican majorities. In March of 1878, for example, 
the legislature passed legislation which abolished voting precincts in 
areas with a heavy Republican vote. This resulted in colored men, if 
they desired to cast a ballot, being required to travel twenty miles or 
more and to cross rivers where the ferries were somehow always "out of 
order" on election day.^^ In other instances the colored population was 
sometimes subjected to bulldozing and other intimidating practices, and 
in 1873 and 1880 the use of tissue ballots was widespread.
Widespread use of fraudulent methods to insure continued Bourbon 
control resulted in many Democrats arriving at the conclusion that perhaps 
such practices also posed a threat to the party of white supremacy. 
Certainly continued use of force would not convince many Negroes that 
the Democrats had their best interests at heart. Also, there was the 
distinct possibility that a Republican-controlled Congress would deem it 
politically advantageous to enact a restrictive Federal election law--a 
result of which in South Carolina would undoubtedly be a breakdown of 
"fusion" and a return to power of the Republican party.
To cope with the situation a joint committee of the General 
Assembly was established in 188O for the purpose of recommending new 
registration and election laws which would obviate the use of violence. 
This committee requested a prominent attorney and historian, Edward 
McCrady, to examine the situation and make suggestions for its con­
sideration. After careful consideration, McCrady presented a proposal 
which he believed would make unnecessary the continued use of fraud and
^^Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, III, 77I.
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violence— an educational qualification for eligibility to the franchise.
He informed the committee that "we complain of the great and cruel injury- 
done to the white race . . .  by forcing upon us the ignorant negro vote 
. . . .  The remedy is in our hands. Raise the standard of citizenship, 
raise the qualification of voters." But, admonished McCrady, "raise them 
equally. If we are the superior race we claim to be, we, surely, need 
not fear the test."5*^
Prominent South Carolinians such as Christopher G. Meraminger 
agreed that McCrady had arrived at the correct solution, but it vzas not 
until 1882 that the legislature acted upon his suggestion and enacted a
51complicated and stringent registration law. At the same time, the 
legislature provided for a voting device known as the Eight Box Law 
which, in essence, did include an educational qualification.These
"^^ Ed-ward McCrady, Jr., The Necessity of Raising the Standard of 
Citizenship and the Right of the General Assembly of South Carolina to 
Impose Qualifications Upon Electors (Charleston; Walker, Evans and 
Cogswell Printers, 1881), p. 38.
^^ C. G. Memminger wrote McCrady on April I3, I88I, that McCrady 
had the answer to the situation. "I feel," he wrote, "that the real 
objection to your solution is concealed. It is the apprehension that 
many whites will be exposed by exclusion." Ibid., p. 111. The legis­
lature made registration a prerequisite for voting and required pro­
spective electors to register during tfey and June of I883. After that 
the books would be opened on the first Monday of each month from December 
to July in order that persons coming of age or whose certificates had 
been lost or defaced to register. Supervisors were given full discretion 
as to who was entitled to register. Statutes at Large of South Carolina, 
XVII, 1110-15, cited in Patton, Essays in Southern History, p. 104.
5?The Eight Box Law accomplished disfranchisement through in­
direction. It was provided that at each polling place there would be 
as many boxes as there were offices to be filled and that each elector 
must, without assistance, deposit each ballot in the correct box. Those 
found in the wrong box would not be counted. Statutes at Large of South 
Carolina, XVII, 1116-21, cited in ibid., p. lOEl By occasionally shifting 
positions of the boxes, election managers could prevent poll etchers
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measures largely bad the desired effect. After their enactment the 
Bourbons could not only regulate the number of colored men participating 
in any election without resorting to intimidation, but they could also 
control the white supporters of Independent organizations.
The legislature of l882 was also charged with the responsibility 
of dividing the state into seven instead of five Congressional districts. 
The responsibility for the drawing of new boundaries came at a time when 
there was increasing criticism of Bourbon economic policies by disgruntled 
whites, and this undoubtedly contributed to the fact that the Bourbon 
legislature devised one of the most complete gerrymanders ever drawn by 
a legislative body. When their artistic endeavor was completed there were 
white majorities in two districts, a small colored majority in four dis­
tricts, and a colored majority of over twenty-five thousand in the Seventh 
or "black" district.Thus, while there were many more Negroes than 
whites who were registered electors, it was only in one district that 
the colored men were allowed to bring, the full weight of their number to 
bear in the period prior to l890.^  ^ There is no doubt that this was the
from memorizing and communicating to illiterates the order in which the 
various ballots should be deposited. It was also easy for the managers 
to give assistance to those who would vote for the "right" candidates —  
generally Democrats.
^^he Seventh District a curious gerrymander. Its boundaries 
ran from Columbia nearly to Savannah, Georgia--a distance of 15O miles.
It embraced the Republican portions of three former districts, but in­
cluded only tliree whole counties and a portion of six others. At one 
place the boundary was extended into the Atlantic Ocean in order to ex­
clude some Democratic precincts. Patton, Essays in Southern History, 
p. 1 0 k .
^^ In 1882 a total of 116,969 Negroes and 86,900 whites were 
registered. Of these, 32,839 colored and 7,695 whites were located in 
the Seventh District. Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, VII, 7 8^.
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intention of the Democratic leadership. To the majority of the members 
of that party the Republicans were "under the lead of the most unprinci­
pled, brutal leaders ever known . . and the Democrats were justified
in any action which might be taken to insure white supremacyÎ Consequently, 
while the Bourbons freely entered into "fusion" arrangements with the Negro 
leaders in an effort to utilize the colored vote for their own purposes, 
the Negro in South Carolina was subject to such control that he ’/ras never 
able to bring to bear the influence which his numbers might well have 
justified.Even more was this to be the fate of the Negro after the 
political wings of the Bourbons were clipped by the agrarian element. As 
the primary representative of that class, Benjamin Tillman, proclaimed in
his inaugural address in 189O: "The whites have absolute control of the
57government, and we intend at any hazard to retain it It goes almost
without saying that they did just that I
The political situation in Tennessee during the Bourbon period ifas 
almost completely alien to that which arose in South Carolina. Undoubtedly
^^Columbus Daily Register, July 22, 1882, quoted in Patton,
Essays in Southern History, p. 110.
 ^Nhile most of the Negroes in South Carolina were Republicans, 
that party tos never able to return the state's electoral vote for Republi­
can presidential candidates. It is interesting to note the decline in 
the popular vote of both parties after the enactment of the Eight Box Law. 
For instance, in 188O Garfield polled 38,071 votes and Hancock 112,312.
In 188A Blaine received 21,733 aüd Cleveland a total of 69,890, and in 
1888 Harrison garnered 13,736 while Cleveland's total dropped to 65,829. 
Tribune Almanac for the year 1889. It should be reiterated that Negroes 
were elected to office as Democrats as well as Republicans in South 
Carolina. The editor of the Charleston News and Courier lists a number 
of such instances. See William Watts Ball, The State That Forgot: South 
Carolina's Surrender to Democracy (Indianapolis; Bobbs-Merril Co., 1932).
^^Quoted in Johnson, Essays in Southern History, p. 133.
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a major reason why Tennessee, first of the ex-Confederate states to he
redeemed, did not have as distinct and pressing a problem with the colored
voter was that she had a smaller Negro population on a percentage basis
£-0
than did any of her sister Southern states except Texas. Important, 
too, was the fact that while the Republican party was relatively strong 
in this state, its major strength among the whites was in the mountainous 
region of East Tennessee--an area .in which the whites despised the Negro 
as a race. Consequently, in order not to alienate the whites of the 
eastern section of the state, the Republican leaders, although continuing 
to seek the electoral support of the Negro, were hesitant in granting
59colored men too much recognition. Nevertheless, Negroes registered, 
voted, and were elected to minor offices during the entire period under 
discussion.
In 1870 the Democrats of Tennessee elected John C. Brown to the 
office of governor and also succeeded in capturing control of both houses 
of the state legislature.Almost immediately the newly elected Demo­
cratic legislature made its presence felt because a committee of the
^^There were 403,151 Negroes and 1,138,831 whites in the state in 
1880. Bureau of the Census, Negro Population, chap. Ill, table I3, P* 
Percentage-wise only Texas had a smaller Negro population among the former 
Confederate states. Ibid., chap. IV, table 5; P> 51*
^^Robert E. Corlew, "The Negro in Tennessee, 187O-I9OO," (un­
published Ph. D. dissertation. Dept, of History, University of Alabama),
p. 105.
^^ It might be noted that there was discord among the Redeemers of 
this state during most of the period. Of the two main factions in the 
Conservative party, one wing the Nhig-industrialist group led by 
Colonel Arthur S. Caylar; the other, led by Senator Isham G. Harris, tms 
based mainly on the support of the cotton farmers of western Tennessee. 
V/ood;jard, Origins of the New South, pp. 2 -k , 21.
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senate proposed to redistrict the state along lines which would benefit 
the majority party. The chairman of the committee that proposed the bill 
stated that its main purpose was so "to redistrict the State that for the 
next ten years not a Republican can be elected to the Legislature . . . .
I believe," he said, "in the law of revenge. The Radicals disfranchised 
us, and now we intend to disfranchise them."^^
If the Democrats really hoped that gerrymandering the state would 
prevent the Republicans from seriously contesting for control, then their 
dreams were built on sand. As a matter of fact, the election year of l8%2 
saw the Republicans and their Independent allies win a majority of the 
seats in the very body from which some Democrats hoped to exclude them 
for at least a decade. In this campaign there is little question that 
the pliant Negro vote was utilized largely by the Republicans. Not cnly 
was this true, but it is interesting and perhaps significant to note that 
for the first time in the history of Tennessee a colored man was elected 
to serve in the General Assembly. Speaking of this individual, Sampson 
W. Keeble of Davidson County, the Nashville Union and American said, on 
December 6, 1872, that "he is by no means a 'bigoted nigger,' as might 
reasonably be expected, but upon the contrary, while he knows the laws of 
the country guarantee him equal political rights with the other members, 
he is fully conversant of the fact that there is a social difference
62between them, as great as the difference between night and day."
°^Quoted in Philip M. Hamer (ed.), Tennessee; A History, 1673-1932 
(New York; American Historical Society, Inc., 1933), II, P* 676.
Quoted In Alruthesus A. Taylor, The Negro in Tennessee, 1865- 
1880 (Washington, D. C. : Associated Publisher's Inc., 19^1 ), p. 247.
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Keeble -v/as the only Negro elected to serve in the state legislature 
of Tennessee by either party before 188O. Some members of his race, how­
ever, were either elected or appointed to municipal positions and no 
barrier was placed in the way of colored candidates seeking election to 
any office in the state.  ^ In fact, during the canvass of 1876 a promi­
nent Knoxville Negro, William F. Yardley, caused consternation among Demo­
crats and Republicans alike by announcing he would run as an Independent 
for the office of governor. Not only did he announce; he also campaigned 
for the position--an event which elicited from Republican orators and 
journals the charge that he had been hired to make the race by the Demo-
6 kcrats in the hope that he would split the colored vote. The Democrats 
denied this charge and a party newspaper, the Daily Memphis Avalanche, 
predicted that Yardley would win if the white Republicans decided to 
support him. Little fear of that event was entertained, however, for, 
as the Avalanche said on September 8, I876, "the white Republicans, like 
the Democrats, do not want a negro for governor.It was obvious from
^^In 1876 colored men were candidates for positions in several 
muncipalities. The Daily Memphis Avalanche, on January I3, I876, noted 
that two Negro candidates had been defeated for school visitors and the 
same v/as true of a colored candidate for councilman. Two Negro magi­
strates, however, were elected. A report from Lebanon, published in the 
Nashville Daily American, on August 3O; I876, stated the Negroes had voted 
solidly and had elected a colored magistrate for Wilson County over four 
white candidates. In 1878 two Negro alderman were elected in Chattanooga 
and two were elected councilman in Nashville. Others were also elected 
to municipal positions in this and later years. See ibid., pp. 2^9-50•
^^The Knoxville Tribune noted that this charge r^as being levied 
by some Republican and the Knoxville Chronicle noted that the colored 
Hayes and Wheeler club of that city had denounced him as a traitor to 
the party. Cited in ibid., p. 294-99'
^^ Daily Memphis Avalanche, September 8, 1876, quoted in Corlew,
"The Negro in Tennessee," p. 195- Yardley occasionally debated with the
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the results of the election that the Avalanche was correct and that the 
whites of Tennessee were not as yet ready to have a Negro In the gover­
nor's chair. Of the four candidates who offered their names to the 
electorate the Democrat polled 123,740; another Independent commanded 
the support of 73,^ 12; the Republican nominee received 10,4-36, and 
eliciting the support of 2,165 electors was Yardley.It is inter­
esting to compare the vote cast for the gubernatorial candidates in this 
campaign with those polled by the presidential aspirants. The Democratic 
candidate for governor, as previously noted, polled 123,740, and in the 
same election Tilden received the ballots of 133^166 electors. Hayes, 
the Republican presidential nominee, received 89,566 votes and a combined 
total of 86,217 voters exercised their franchise for the three candidates 
opposing the Democrat for the governor's off ice.VJhile it is not unusual 
for presidential candidates to receive more support than those seeking 
state positions, it might be conjectured that Tilden received the vote 
of some electors who refused to cast their ballots for a Democrat for 
governor and likewise refused to give it to any of his opponents.
After the election of I876 there is little doubt that, except for 
a brief period during the eighties, the political significance of the 
Negro in Tennessee declined. That is not to say that steps were taken by 
either of the major parties which looked to the disfranchisement of the
Democratic candidate and consequently received a lot of free publicity. 
He \ras a mulatto and was representative of the Negro political leader of 
3ast Tennessee. A la-v/yer by profession, he was a Knoxville alderman in 
the years immediately prior to 1876. Ibid.
66
Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, II, 7IO.
'^^ For the total vote see the Tribune Almanac for the year 1877*
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colored race;^^ nor does it mean that either organization abandoned its 
efforts to attract colored electoral support. It does mean, however, 
that the Negro sought few elective positions after that date.^^
Without doubt one of the primary reasons that the colored men, 
unlike in some of the other Southern states, held no high elective office 
in Tennessee iras that their numbers were relatively small. Colored leaders 
such as gdward Shaw and James C. Napier realized that their race was viewed 
with distruct even by the Eepublicans and they considered it futile to 
seek election to anything more than a minor office. Consequently, it was 
their purpose to demonstrate their loyalty to the Republican party, and 
thus to make themselves and their people eligible for Federal appointive 
offices. That they had some success in this effort is apparent from a
^^Under provisions of the constitution adopted in 187O, the one 
which remained in force all during the period, an individual was eligible 
to vote if ha was a citizen, twenty-one years of age, and a resident of 
the state for one year and the county for six months preceding the 
election. Up until 187^ , when it iras repealed, he must be able to 
furnish proof to the judge of elections that his poll tax had been paid. 
Glynn (ed.), American Constitutions, II, ff. In 189O the legislature 
passed the Dortch law which provided the state would employ a printed 
ballot and it would be cast in secrecy. Because an elector must be able 
to read the names printed on the ballot it might be argued that it was 
something of a literacy test. Since it applied equally to black and 
white, however, it cannot be maintained that its purpose was to dis­
franchise the Negro. For a brief discussion of this law see Corlew,
"The Negro in Tennessee," pp. Ih 0 -k2 .
^^Some colored men were chosen to the lower house of the state 
legislature; one served in the session of I879-8I; four in I88I-83; three 
from 1883-85; five in 1885-87; one in 1389-91* None served in the state 
senate. Monroe N« Work (comp.), "Some Negro Members of Reconstruction 
Conventions and Legislatures and of Congress," Journal of Negro History,.
V (January, 1920), p. II3. No Negro was ever elected to Congress from 
Tennessee and there iras only one unsuccessful aspirant from that state.
See Smith, The Negro in Congress, p. 135, and A. A. Taylor, "Negro 
Congressmen A Generation After," Journal of Negro History, VII (April,
1922), pp. 127 ff.
157
communication of L. C. Eouk, Republican Congressman and chief patronage 
dispenser, to Oliver Temple, another politician from East Tennessee. In 
1883 Houk complained to Temple that too many positions were going to 
Negroes and that "it would not only be good politics but . . . equitable 
Republicanism" to distribute appointments "among all classes— Americans, 
Ge\.. I 1, Irish, and Colored people.This statement is symptomatic of 
the attitude held by the white Republicans of Tennessee toward the Negro 
duTing the entire period. They desired to use his vote in contest with 
the Democrats, but because the Republican party of Tennessee va.s not en­
tirely dependent upon the colored vote as was the case in most of the 
Southern states, they were unwilling to allow the Negro to stand for 
major offices or to have much of a voice in party councils.
Although a majority of the colored men continued to exercise their 
franchise for candidates of the Republican party, the Democrats sought to 
solidify their position as the majority party by encouraging the Negro to 
desert his traditional alliance.This was especially apparent in
70Houle especially complained of the situation in the Ninth Ward 
of Knoxville "where the colored men have everything." Quoted in Corlew, 
"The Negro in Tennessee," p. 179. Napier \Tas successful in getting ap­
pointments for himself. As late as 191O he was named United States 
Register of the Treasury. Shaw worked with the Republicans until 1885 
when he left the party and received a Federal appointment from the Demo­
crats. Ibid., 151-59.
'^4phat the Democratic party was the major party can be seen from 
the fact that the electoral vote always returned for its presidential 
aspirant. That the Republican party was strong in the state may be seen 
from the popular vote. In 188O Garfield received 107,677 votes to 128,191 
for Hancock; in l884 Blaine polled 124,078 and Cleveland 133,258; in I888 
Harrison garnered 138,988 and Cleveland 158,779. Tribune Almanac for the 
years I881, 1885, and 1889. Sectionalism in Tennessee is evidenced by a 
breakdown of votes cast by sections in the presidential election of 1888. 
In East Tennessee, a Republican stronghold, Harrison received 60,275 and 
Cleveland 35,206; in Middle Tennessee the totals were 44,842 and 72,499;
1$8
elections beginning in 188O and continuing throughout the remainder of 
the Bourbon period. In IS80 the Democrats organized Negro clubs in vari­
ous communities, but they had little success in attracting the colored 
vote. It \ra,s in this year that the Republicans surprised the Democrats 
by electing their candidate for governor and by greatly increasing their 
membership in the state legislature.
Probably as a result of the debacle of I88O the Democrats made a 
greater effort to win colored votes in succeeding elections. In 1882, for 
example, the Nashville Daily American addressed the Negro electorate of 
Davidson county as some of the "most intelligent in the South." They were 
informed by this journal that the Republicans had given them little for 
their years of loyalty and that they were "bound by the laws of self- 
preservation to draw nearer ... to the political majority of this state 
. . .," and that if they did so they "need not fear a sequestration of 
. . . rights." Nhile the Democratic appeal to the colored voters of 
this and other counties may not have been the reason, enough of the
in West Tennessee they ware 33,871 and 51,2$4. Ibid., for the year 1889. 
Republican Congressmen were elected from the districts of East Tennessee 
during the entire period. Ibid., for the years 1877-91»
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The Republican candidate, Hawkins, polled 102,969 votes and 
Wright, the Democrat, 79,191» The Republicans also won control of the 
lower house of the legislature. Ibid., for the year I88I.
^Nashville Daily American, September I8, 1882, quoted in Corlew, 
"The Negro in Tennessee," p. 129. In this election a Negro newspaper in 
Virginia noted that a Negro in Memphis had announced for governor, and 
predicted that, even though he could not be elected, if he would stay "on 
the track" it might be possible to bring the Republican party in the state 
to terms. Two months later the same journal noted that the Democrats had 
placed two colored men on the ticket and said this indicated the color 
line was disappearing in Tennessee. Lancet (Petersburg, Va.), August 19 
and November 4, l882.
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electorate switched their vote that the Republican incumbent was defeated
7k
in his bid for reelection.'
It was not at all rare in the years after 1882, a period in which
the Democrats dominated the state politically, to find members of the
party of white supremacy in Tennessee advising the colored man that his
best interests would be served by deserting the Republican party. For
instance, in l884 when the Republicans were warning the Negroes that the
election of Cleveland would result in their reenslavement, the Democratic
press was endeavoring to marshal colored support for their nominee. The
Clarksville Semi-Weekly Tobacco Leaf termed Republican charges "too absurd
to refute . . . ." The editor said that "for twenty years the Republican
party has taught the negro to fear the ascendancy of the Democratic party
. . . but this is a bugaboo . . . .  The Democratic party is the friend
of the negro and we predict that no longer will the colored vote be cast
75solidly for the Republican party." At the same time a Pulaski journal 
warned the colored man that "white Republicans have got no use for the 
negro except to get his vote," and the Jonesboro Journal invited the 
colored man to "cast a solid vote" against the Republican candidates.?^ 
Although Cleveland won the electoral vote of Tennessee in l884 
there is little evidence to suggest that his relatively narrow victory 
over Blaine was the result of Negro voters deserting the Republican party.
74
Bate, the Low-Tax Democrat, polled 119,2$?, and Hawkins, the 
Republican, received 91,693. Tribune Almanac, for the year 1883.
75Clarksville Semi-Weekly Tobacco Leaf, September 12, l884, quoted 
in Corlew, "The Negro in Tennessee," p. I3I.
^ P^ulaski Citizen, April 10, l384; Jonesboro Journal, August l4, 
l884, quoted in ibid.
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Nevertheless, the campaign of the Democratic press continued the following
year with the Bolivar Bulletin assuring the colored men of West Tennessee
that "the Democratic party is the true friend of the colored people and
77will defend their rights . . . ." This campaign of the Democrats was 
recognized as an attempt to build their totals by the Pulaski Citizen 
which charged that the Nashville Daily American was so patronizing of 
the Negro that it was trying to "slobber" him into the Democratic party. 
This fascination of the Democrats with the possibility of attracting the 
Negro vote, as is evident from articles comparable to the ones quoted
above which appeared with regularity in the party press, continued during
79most of the Bourbon period. Nevertheless, Negro interest in politics 
appeared to wane after Cleveland's election, and little success was 
achieved from the Democrats propaganda campaign. 1-Jhen the Negro chose 
to cast his vote it generally went to the Republican party. This may be 
accounted for by the fact that there was little intimidation in Tennessee, 
and, unlike in some of the other ex-Confederate states, the Republican 
party was a relatively strong organization. Consequently, in this state
77''Bolivar Bulletin, quoted in Clarksville Semi-Weekly Tobacco 
Leaf, May 17, l88$, quoted in ibid., p. I33.
^^Pulaski Citizen, July 3O, 1885, quoted in ibid.
^^Thorton Alden, a minor colored politician from West Tennessee, 
became a Democrat when Cleveland was elected. In 1888 he informed his 
colored brethern that "... while I belonged to the Republican party I 
was taught so many bad things I got in the penitentiary for a short time, 
but thanks to the influence and teaching of an honest Democrat, I \<ras 
liberated and am now trying to lead an honest life . . . .  Thieves and 
gamblers by birth and inclination drift into the Republican party."
Quoted in Paris Post-Intelligencer, September l4, 1888, quoted in ibid., 
pp. 16^ -65. During the election of 1888 reports from Chattanooga said 
Republican Negroes were bulldozing those of this race trying to vote the 
Democratic ticket. Atlanta Constitution, November 8, 1888.
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the Negro largely remained loyal to the party responsible for his freedom 
in the years before 1890.
Unlike in Tennessee, events of the period in Virginia largely ex­
plain not only why antagonism toward Negro suffrage developed in that 
state, but also, to some extent, throughout most of the South. In the 
Old Dominion the colored population \t3.s located mostly ■ in- the Tidewater
and Piedmont sections and constituted a majority in about thirty-five of
Sothe counties. With the advent of Radical Reconstruction the colored 
man vas for the first time injected into the political life of the state 
as a voter. Virginians could not believe that their former ser-vants, 
only so recently freed from the tobacco patch, were educationally or 
morally competent to engage in the political game at which the whites 
of the state had so long been adept. Negro suffrage came quickly to be 
associated with Carpetbag and Radical rule— anathema to nearly everyone 
who had ever uttered a Rebel yelll
Former Rebels in Virginia had something about which to yell in 
1869. In that year the Conservative party won a victory which, the next 
year, brought the state back into the Union under the control of the 
native whites. This ifas a tenuous control, however, for a Republican 
still occupied the \fliite House, blue-clad soldiers still rode the valleys 
of Virginia, and in some communities of the state the Radicals still domi­
nated. By 1874, however, the Conservatives had so increased their numbers 
in the legislature that they were able to defeat the Radicals with the
80In 1880 the Negro population of Virginia vras 631,616 and the 
white was 880,858. Bureau of the Census, Negro Population, chap. Ill, 
table 13, p.
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ballot as decisively as they themselves had been defeated by the bullet, 
and there began a period of white domination during which the process of 
undoing Reconstruction was to be completed.
The process of curtailing the Radical program through legislative 
enactment began in 1871 when the state was reapportioned. Five times in 
the period before 189I this device was employed to add seats in the legis­
lature for the Conservatives. Of immediate importance, however, was the 
first reapportionment because it enhanced Conservative strength in the 
legislature and enabled that party to amend the constitution of the state 
in lüyh so as to abolish the New England township system which had been 
imposed upon Virginia by the Carpetbaggers. Extinguishing this legacy of 
Reconstruction resulted in about one-third of the local offices in the 
state, many of which were occupied by Negroes, being abolished. The next 
year the constitution was again amended in order that a citizen could be 
disqualified from exercising the franchise unless he had paid a poll tax. 
This change in the fundamental law, coupled with the one which added con­
viction on a charge of petty larcency to the list of actions for which an 
individual was subject to disfranchisement,'^  ^was undoubtedly designed to 
eliminate the political influence of both the Carpetbagger and his poli­
tical cohort.
p.i
Richard L. Morton, The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1865-I902 
(Charlottesville; University of Virginia Press, 1919), pp. 91-9 1^. See 
also Frank B. Williams, Jr., "The Poll Tax as a Suffrage Requirement in 
the South, 1870-1901," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation. Dept, of History, 
Vanderbilt University), p. 19. The legislature of 1883 altered the city 
charters so that representation given to large Negro communities would be 
reduced. Paul Lewinson, Race, Class, and Party: A History of Negro Suf­
frage and White Politics in the South (New York: Oxford University Press,
1932)/ pp. 65-66.
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With the elimination of the Carpetbagger, the race issue in poli­
tics was temporarily in abeyance in Virginia. Negroes continued to occupy
a few seats in the state legislature and appeals were made by both parties
ftpfor their vote, but it was not until a controversy over the state debt 
gave rise to the Readjuster party in 1079 that the colored elector again 
assumed the position of importance which he had occupied during the brief 
period of Reconstruction. The origin of the state debt was in the ante­
bellum period when Virginia had contracted financial obligations in order 
to pay for a system of internal improvements. During the \far payments 
were not made on the principal and accumulating interest increased the 
total amount which was owed. This, coupled with the extravagance of the 
Radical government during the period of Reconstruction, burdened the
tax-payers of Virginia with a debt which approached forty-three million
83
dollars. The culmination of Reconstruction saw a movement underway 
in most of the former Confederate states for a general scaling down of 
monetary obligations, but in the "Old Dominion" certain elements of the
82In the legislative session of 1875-76 there were three Negro 
senators and thirteen colored members of the house. In the session of 
1877-79 the senators were still there, but only four Negroes were elected 
to the house. Work, "Some Negro Members of Reconstruction Conventions 
and Legislatures and of Congress," Journal of Negro History, V (January, 
1920), 118-19. The Alexandria Gazette and Virginia Advertiser claimed, 
on November 7, I876, that in a contest of that year many Negroes had 
voted for Conservative candidates. On November 10, 1876, the same news­
paper said that "it \jas a grievous sin . . . for the radicals to scare 
the negroes as they did at the late election. The poor, ignorant 
creatures had been led to believe that, in case of Tilden's election,
everyone of them would be remanded to slavery . . . ."
83^Virginia and West Virginia engaged in a long drawn-out contro­
versy as to what share of the debt would be assumed by the latter.
Eventually a compromise \ias reached. Virginia later scaled her debt 
down a $19,000,000. Francis B. Simliins, The South Old and New; A 
History, 182O-I9U7 (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), p. 232.
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Conservative party— including some lawyers, businessmen, and members of 
the old aristocracy— insisted that "honor" demanded that Virginia must 
meet her financial obligations. Under the direction of this wing of the 
party, the state legislature enacted legislation in March of 1871, which 
funded the debt on a basis favorable to her creditors. Unfortunately, 
the Conservatives did not also deem it necessary to pass legislation to 
accumulate a fund which would make possible a systematic retirement of 
the bonds.Instead, only one week after enacting the Funding Act, that 
body authorized the sale at a sacrifice of the state's stock in her most 
valuable asset, the railroads. After this, with corporate interests in­
voking charter exemptions to escape taxation, and with falling wages and 
lower profits during the depression of the ISTO's making higher taxes un­
feasible, the Virginia Conservatives found it increasingly difficult to 
meet the state's obligations. Consequently, they turned, as did the 
Bourbons of so many other states, to effecting savings by curtailing 
expenditures on vital state services.
By 1877 there was so much dissatisfaction with the financial 
policies pursued by the Funder wing of the Conservative party that some
was provided that the old bonds could be exchanged for new
ones bearing six per cent interest at the rate of two-thirds of the amount
of old bonds plus accrued interest. Interest bearing certificates would
be given for the other one-third and payment on these would be made in
accordance with the future set/clement with Vfest Virginia. Morton, The 
Negro in Virginia Politics, pp. 88-91. For a complete account of this 
entire controversy see Charles C. Pearson, The Readjustment Movement in 
Virginia (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1917)»
gc
-^ The Conservatives, soon to be called Funders, diverted some 
money belonging to new public schools by withholding sums due them. Some 
Funders, including Governor Holliday, announced their willingness to 
scuttle the schools in order to fund the debt. Woodward, Origins of 
the New South, p. 92.
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twenty-two Independents were elected to serve in the state legislature.
Most of these individuals were followers of William Mahone, a former major- 
general in the Confederate army and a prominent railroad organizer and ex­
ecutive. mhone had failed in his quest for the gubernatorial nomination 
of the Democratic party in I8TT, and he siezed upon the idea of "read­
justment," or partial repudiation of the state debt, as a means of gaining 
popular support for his political ambitions. Although Lfehone's allies 
were able to make their presence felt in the state legislature, they did 
not possess sufficient strength to side-track the corporate orientation 
of the Conservative-Funder wing of the party. Consequently, the Read­
justers concluded by I879 that there was no hope for their policies within 
the Conservative party and that the time was propitious for revolt.
In February of 1879 the Readjusters, led by kfehone, John >fessey,
H. H. Riddleberger, and Abram Fulkerson, met in Richmond and organized for 
a state campaign against the entrenched Funders.While the governorship 
was not at stake in this election, the Readjusters hoped to be able to 
choose enough members of the legislature that they could launch their pro­
gram of debt reduction. The campaign which ensued was bitter and intense 
with candidates of both parties seeking to win the support of the colored 
man. Funder leaders sought to maintain white support for their party by 
charging that the Readjusters were seeking to ride into office on the back
87of the colored voter. ' At the same time these conservative whites, well
^^Some members of the old aristocracy were Readjusters. Among 
these were John Barbour, William I. Cameron, and John S. Wise. Leading 
Funders were Governor Holiday, J. L. M. Curry, John R. Tucker, and John 
W. Daniel. Morton, The Negro in Virginia Politics, p. IO6.
^ The Readjuster John Massey answered the Funder charge that his 
party was trying to use the Hegro vote by saying that he was a Democratic
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aware that Mahone and the Readjusters were informing the Regro that the 
Funders would increase their tax burdens but that they would respect the 
rights which had been bestowed upon them, strived to divide the Negro vote 
by working through colored leaders. Negro speakers were hired to extoll 
the virtues of the Funders, clubs were established for the benefit of the 
colored man, and individuals bearing the label of Republicans were entered 
as candidates in an attempt to split the Negro vote away frdin the Read-
oo
justers. All such efforts on the part of the Funders were futile. In 
this campaign the colored men largely remained loyal to their old leaders, 
now on the side of the Readjusters, and voted against the Funder nominees. 
This event drew the comment from the Conservative Richmond Dispatch that 
"if it had not been for the negro vote there would have been scarcely a 
dozen agitators elected.Although this complaint may have been 
"whistling at the darky," it is apparent that the Readjusters utilized 
newly found Negro allies to elect enough members to both houses of the 
state legislature to control those bodies.Consequently, they were
Readjuster and would continue to be sol He asked his opponent if it -v/as 
not true that the Funders also desired their vote? Each party, he said, 
"wishes to secure all the votes it can, and if it secures them fairly, 
neither one can complain of the other for doing it." Elizabeth R. Hancock 
(ed.). The Autobiography of John E. Massey (New York : Neale Publishing 
Co., 1909)V p. 176.
^^he Republican party had been on the decline in Virginia for 
several years. A Republican Congressman was elected from the Fourth or 
"Black" District in 1876 and again in I878. The party polled 95,558 votes 
for Hayes against 139,670 for Tilden, but the Republicans did not bother 
nominating a candidate for governor in 1877- Tribune Almanac for the 
years 1876-79.
89
Richmond Dispatch, n.d., quoted in Nation, XXIX (November I3,
1879), 317.
^^In the lower house there were eighty-two Democrats. Exactly
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able to launch their program of debt reduction.
The Readjuster program of debt reduction was prevented from 
reaching maturity for a time because the Conserrative-Funder, Colonel
F. ¥. M. Holliday, occupied the governor's mansion. His veto power 
neutralized the Readjuster majority in the state legislature from I879 
to 1881, but before the end of the second session of the legislature of 
1879, Governor Holliday acquiesced in the passage of the McCulloch bill. 
Supported by the Council of Foreign bondholders and by prominent New York 
bankers, this measure offered creditors new bonds with tax receivable 
coupons and a sliding scale of interest.The McCulloch bill, however, 
■was too conservative for many of the Readjusters and in 1880 they sought 
to have it replaced with a measure known as the Riddleberger bill. Al­
though the Readjuster-dominated legislature passed the bill, it was im­
possible to get it past Holliday's veto. Consequently, the Readjuster's 
determined to remove the last vestiage of Conservative control by winning 
the crucial election of l88l.92
half of these were Readjusters and they combined with fifteen of the 
seventeen Republicans to choose a Readjuster Speaker. Eleven of those 
cooperating with the Readjusters were Negroes. That party also con­
trolled the senate with Republican assistance. Tribune Almanac for the 
year 188O; Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia, IV, 199" Work, "Some Negro 
Members of Reconstruction Conventions, Legislatures and of Congress," 
Journal of Negro History, V (January, 1920), II8.
9^Becoming law on March 28, l879, the McCulloch bill provided 
that the tax free bonds would bear three percent interest for ten years, 
four per cent for twenty years, and five percent for ten years. Pearson, 
The Readjuster in Virginia, pp. 103-04.
^^In the election of 188O Garfield polled 83,639 votes in Vir­
ginia. Mahone and the Readjusters refused to cooperate with the regular 
Democrats in support of Hancock. The Readjuster ticket for Hancock polled 
31,527 votes and the regular Hancock ticket 96,449. Tribune Almanac for 
the'year 1881.
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In 1881 Mahone, who had been elected to the United States Senate 
b} his rubber-stamp legislature, led his party in a bitter campaign to 
capture the governor's office for the Readjuster nominee. Earlier in the 
year Mahone had been forced by a curious set of circumstances to show his 
affinity for the Republicans. VJhen the Senate ^ ras ready to organize by 
appointment of committees in tferch of 188I, the membership of that body 
TOs equially divided between Republicans and Democrats. One Independent, 
elected by Democratic votes said that he would ballot with that party for 
the purpose of organization. This left only ifehone, supposedly a Demo­
crat although he wore the label of Readjuster. Ifehone cast his vote for 
organizational purposes with the Republicans, a tie resulted, and, with 
the Republican Vice-President casting the tie-breaking vote, that party 
\ms able to organize the Senate. As repayment for this favor Mahone was 
allowed to dispense the patronage for the Republican party in Virginia. 
Uliile Ivîahone \ms attacked during the statewide election of 188I as a 
traitor to his race and as a Republican in Readjuster clothing, there was 
so much dissatisfaction among the agrarian class with the policies of the 
Funders— the Virginia Bourbons--that îfehone's machine was able to elect 
William C. Cameron as governor of the state.His victory elicited pre­
diction of a woeful future for Virginia from Bourbons tliroughout the 
South. The Raleigh Hews and Observer more or less set the tone of such 
forecasts by declaring that"Mahone and his cohorts will eventually sur­
render to the dictates of the lower strata of the party . . . .  Vîhatso- 
ever the negroes demand as the price of future allegiance will be granted."
^^Qameron received 111,473 votes to 99^757 for his Democratic 
opponent, John Daniel. Ibid.
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According to this editor, however, that f^as not all that was in store for 
Virginia. "Political equality," he said, "will certainly be followed by 
social equality, and the barriers being doTrra the prejudices of that race 
whose votes are courted will certainly be observed.
While there was early some discontent manifested within the Read­
juster party with the political methods of Mahone, it held together long 
enough to enact into law several liberal measures. Confirming the worst 
fears of the Conservatives were acts which abolished the poll tax as a 
prerequisite for voting, authorized the chartering of labor unions, in­
creased the funds alloted for public education, lowered taxes on the
95farmers, and required that insurance companies post a higher bond.
The Conservatives could certainly have lived with these liberal measures, 
but anathema to the leaders of this party was the fact that the tax as­
sessment against the property owned by railroads and other corporate 
interests \ras increased. Piling woe upon misery, also, vreis the Read­
juster settlement of the debt question through the medium of the Riddle­
berger bill. In the eyes of the Conservatives this act, which lowered 
the principal of the debt that the state was willing to admit that it owed 
to approximately twenty million dollars, "besmirched the honor of Vir-
q6ginia." Nevertheless, during the political canrass of 1883 the
^^Raleigh News and Observer, November 11, l83l.
95Other Readjuster measures abandoned the whipping post as a form 
of punishment and outlawed dueling. Pearson, The Readjuster Movement in 
Virginia, pp. iH-hV.
96Bonds on this amount were to bear three percent interest.
Neither the bonds nor the coupons were tax exempt, and the coupons 
were not tax receivable. The legality of this measure was upheld by 
the highest courts. Morton, The Negro in Virginia Politics, p. I l k .
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principle incorporated in the Riddleberger bill vras accepted by the 
Funders as the final settlement of a confusing question.
By 1883 Virginia had been under the political direction of the 
Readjusters for two years, and the groups which were dissatisfied with 
their program were closing their ranks. The Funder wing of the Conserva­
tive party was, of course, antagonistic toward the liberal legislation 
which had been passed. Of more importance, however, was the fact that 
the development of a personal political machine by Mahone had alienated 
many of his former adherents. Consequently, these groups united into the 
newly-named Democratic p a r t y . the political canvass of that year 
the major issue was "î4ahonism," and especially the policy of his party 
toward the colored man. V/hile the Readjuster movement had never been a 
predominately Regro affair, Mahone had sought the support of the colored 
electorate. As a result of this, the Democratic candidates in I883 
charged that the party of I-fehone favored mixed schools, mixed marriages, 
and complete social equality between the races. Throughout the state 
Democratic orators, seeking to solidify the whites in opposition to Mahone, 
ranted that the election of his party would mean a continuation of Regro 
rule. John Daniel, defeated by the Radicals in his race for governor in 
1881, informed one cheering audience that "I am a Democrat because I am 
a white man and a Virginian.The Executive Committee of the Waynesboro
97One of the individuals who assisted in the writing of the Demo­
cratic platform was the former Readjuster, John lyfessey. Allen W. Moger, 
"Origin of the Democratic Machine in Virginia," Journal of Southern 
History, VIII (my, 1942), 187.
^^Quoted in Richmond Dispatch, October 26, I883, quoted in Morton, 
The Regro in Virginia Politics, p. 120.
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Democratic Club informed the electors that the issue in 1869 was whether
Virginia would have a Negro government and "the same issues are involved
now." In order to prevent such a state of affairs it urged that on
election day, rain or shine, the whites should come out and vote for the 
99white man's party. The Richmond State, an organ of the Democratic 
party, informed the people of the state and nation that Virginians did 
not hate the colored man nor were they prejudiced against him, but, said 
the editor, "socially and politically we do. not admit his equality, but 
insist upon his inferiority and the superiority of the white race."^^^
Aided by increasing solidification of the white vote, by the 
electoral support of some dissatisfied colored men, and by the Danville 
riot,^^^ the party of white supremacy succeeded in its effort in 1883 to 
wrest control of the state legislature from the Readjuster party. Immedi­
ately upon the assembling of that body a resolution passed requesting 
that Mahone and his Readjuster satellite resign their seats in the United 
States Senate. vJhile nothing came of this request, the Democratic
99Quoted in U.S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Committee to In­
vestigate Alleged Outrages in Virginia, h8th Cong., 1st Sess., VII, p. v.
*^^ ®Richi'ûond State, n.d., quoted in ibid.
^^\rhe riot in Danville, in which a few whites and blacks were 
killed and injured, occurred a few days before the election. News of 
the clash spread rapidly over the state and probably contributed to in­
creased determination of the whites to achieve complete victory. For 
contemporary evidence presented by both sides as to the causal factors, 
see ibid. After the election a Negro newspaper, one that claimed to be 
non-partisan, bitterly attacked the colored men who had voted for the 
Democrats. "You who sold yourself for a dollar to the Bourbon Funders," 
asked the editor, "you feel ashamed of your conduct? Infamous scoundrels 
and nefarious traitors to the race, if truth had a hearing you would be 
placed under the whipping post and the blood run freely from under the 
lash." Lancet, November 17, 1883.
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legislature did move to implement Democratic domination of Virginia's
future Congressional delegations by gerrymandering the state so as to
102benefit that party. Thus, as one historian has analyzed the results
of the election of 1883, "white solidarity yras made complete and was not
changed to any great extent so long as the Negro remained potentially a
power in Virginia politics. "^^3
That the Negro did remain a potential power in the politics of
the state is evident from the fact that in the years after the Democrats
defeated Mahone colored men continued to be chosen to fill local offices,
especially in the "Black District," and to serve in the state legis- 
10k
lature. In addition to this, there was an increasing contest between 
102The effect of the gerrymandering may be seen from an examination 
of the Congressional elections. In 1882 eight Republicans stood for 
election in eight of the nine districts and the at-large position. None 
of these candidates polled a large number of votes because they were rene­
gades who were not abiding by the party's decision to cooperate with the 
Readjusters. In 1832 the Readjusters won four of the ten seats available, 
but in 188k, after the Democrats had gerrymandered the state, the Read­
justers --now calling themselves Republicans— won in only two of the 
Congressional districts. In I886 their fortunes improved and seven of 
the ten seats went to opponents of the Democrats, but in I888 that party 
reversed the situation and won seven seats. See the Tribune Almanac for 
the years 1881-89. In 1888 the seat in the Fourth District went to a 
Negro, John Langston, but only after he contested his apparent defeat. 
Rowell (ed.). Digest of the Election Cases of the House of Representatives, 
p. k$8.
1 g?
“’Moger, "Origin of the Democratic Machine in Virginia," Journal 
of Southern History, VIII (May, 19k2), 205.
^^ ^There was never a session of the legislature between 1876 and 
1890 which did not have at least one Negro member. A significant com­
mentary on kfehone's control of the Republican party is the fact that de­
spite agitation from Negroes the Congressional candidates of the party 
were usually whites. One Negro ran in l88k as an Independent. The only 
one to achieve his goal, however, vreLS John Mercer Langston who, despite 
opposition from the jyfehone Forces, stood for election from the Fourth 
District in 1888. He apparently iras defeated by the Democrat, S. C. 
Venable, but contested and was seated by the House. Rowell (ed.). Digest
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the Democrats and Republicans for the support of the colored electorate 
in state elections. In 1889, for example, Mahone, whose party had given 
official credence in l884 to what ws already a recognized fact by changing 
their title from Readjuster to Republican, tried to recoup his political 
fortunes by standing for the office of governor. Earlier a prominent 
Negro journal had complained that "... Mahone undoubtedly has stabbed 
and mortally wounded the hopes and aspirations of intelligent and able 
colored m e n , a n d  the colored men increasingly became reluctant to sup­
port candidates endorsed by his p a r t y . 1889 there was full-scale 
revolt against Ifehone. John S. Wise and William E. Cameron, former 
stal\ra.rts of the Readjuster party answered his candidacy by holding a
convention which issued a statement that his defeat was essential to the
1 07
future of the Republican party. ' In the campaign itself pressure \jas 
brought upon the colored men through the agency of their leaders, but 
more Negroes probably voted for Nfehone than against him. Despite this 
fact the Democratic candidate, Philip W. McKinney, won a decisive victory, 
and in the legislative races the Democrats won the greatest majority since 
the Negro iras enfranchised.His defeat was applauded throughout the
of the Election Cases of the House of Representatives, p. For
Langston's version of his race see John Mercer Langston, From Virginia
Plantation to the National Capital (Hartford, Conn.: American Publishing 
Co., 18914-)'.
L^ancet, January 17, 1885.
^^^In 1885 it iras reported that in Norfolk many Negroes were
voting Democratic. Nation, XL (June I885), 4$1.
*^^ M^orton, The Negro in Virginia Politics, p. 128.
*^^ M^cKinney polled 162,64$ votes and Mahone 120,477, Tribune 
Almanac for the year 189O.
l?4
South and elicited from one Democratic journal the comment that "Virginia 
shakes hands with Georgia, and the Democracy of the whole south may sleep 
peacefully, for we have scored the biggest victory since 1876."^ *^ ^
The fact that the Negro was a potent political force in Virginia 
and that I/Iahone had been able to attract enou^ support from that race to 
threaten Bourbon dominance \fas alarming to the entire South. While the 
Democrats also sought to win their vote. Bourbon journals in every state 
often pointed to the situation in Virginia when admonishing the whites to 
remain loyal to the party of white supremacy.They noted that Negroes 
continued to be elected to office and that they blindly followed the 
dictates of their leaders and made the Republican party a force to be 
considered in Virginia. VJlien some of the colored men tired of the politi­
cal game it was a noteworthy event to Southern journals. Thus the Atlanta 
Constitution found the statement of an old Negro living in the country a 
few miles from Richmond to be worthy of publication. "Boss," said the 
colored man in reply to a question from a newspaper reporter, "I ain't no 
democrat, I ain't no 'publican, I ain't no readjuster, and all I axes is 
to be left alone by these Angry-Saxons. Such an attitude was un­
doubtedly pleasing to the majority of the whites of Virginia and of the 
entire South. They would have been more pleased at the end of the Bourbon 
period had a majority of the Negroes manifested such a disinterest I
109
Richmond State, n.d., quoted in Atlanta Constitution,
November 6, 1889.
110
For example see the Atlanta Constitution, Atlanta Journal,
New Orleans Picayune, Galveston Daily News, and Raleigh News and 
Observer for this period.
Ill
Quoted in Atlanta Constitution, November 3, 1889.
CHAPTER VI .
SOUTHERN ATTITUDE TOWARD NEGRO
VOTING-PROPONENTS
The political situation which developed in the former Confederate 
states during the period from the end of Reconstruction to the advent of 
the Populist uprising was one in which the basic issues which might have 
been expected to divide the electorate were often subordinated to the 
single, overriding one of race.^ As was noted in preceding chapters there 
was a cleavage within the white man's party in some of the Southern states 
because of dissatisfaction with and distrust of the governmental and eco­
nomic policies pursued by the Bourbon leaders. As a whole, however, this 
latent animosity did not errupt in full-scale revolt for a relatively long 
period because of the racial problem. Nevertheless, there was al^ vays a 
divergence of opinion among white residents of the South as to the niche 
in the political structure which should be occupied by the colored race.^
O^ne author contends that it was an economic factor which led to 
the race issue and that without the planter element there would have been 
no such question or it would have assumed a different form, "it was pri­
marily his Zthe planter'§7 need for labor," contends this observer, "and 
for authority over labor in a situation where men did not voluntarily 
offer themselves as laborers which led to the idea of race as a principle 
of control." Edgar T. Thompson, "The Planter in the Pattern of Race 
Relations in the South," Social Forces, XIX (December, l$4o), 2 kk.
2
Naturally, some members of the colored community were little 
concerned as to whether they had the franchise. At the outset of Recon­
struction and for several years thereafter, however, a relatively large
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During the Bourbon period some Southerners^. probably a preponder­
ance, were unwilling to accept the fact that the Negro tos legally en­
titled to the franchise and to some other basic rights bestowed upon him 
by the states under the direction of the Federal government. IVfeny of 
these individuals, most of whom belonged to the poor white class, were 
exponents of the theory that the colored men should be relegated to a 
political and social limbo through the medium of disfranchising and other 
restrictive legislation. A smaller portion of the Southern body politic 
was willing to accord to the Negro the minimum rights guaranteed by the 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States, by Federal law, and 
by the fundamental law of the individual states. An even smaller body of 
protagonists held to the view that the colored men were legally the equal 
of their white neighbor and that they were due protection and encourage­
ment not only in the exercise of their basic political rights but also in 
those which might be characterized as social privileges. Thus, to borrow 
the nomenclature of current political philosophy, it might be said that 
during the Bourbon period the attitude of the Southern white toward the 
Negro vote fell either into the category of radical, moderate, or liberal. 3
percentage of the Negroes registered and voted. Some of this interest in 
political affairs was undoubtedly due to the fact that the ballot was 
tangible evidence of their emancipation. Most of the Negroes maintained 
membership in and, where possible, voted for candidates of the Republican 
party as a mark of their gratitude. As late as 1959; s. one-hundred year 
old Missouri Negro, born a slave, when asked her political affiliation 
replied that "I'm a Republican. Heavens, yes, he^incoln^set us freel" 
George Gallup and Evan Hill, "The Secrets of Long Life," Saturday Evening 
Post, 232 (April 15, 1959); 18.
8jt should be noted that use of the terms radical, moderate, and 
liberal as classifications of attitude implies no connection with those 
so-identified in earlier chapters as groups within the political parties.
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It is easily recognized, however, that there is danger in such broad 
classifications. Certainly some of the radicals were more liberal in 
their attitude than were others, and it is just as obvious that some who 
might be termed liberal or moderate would necessarily be more radical than 
would others. Not only did the subject of the Negro vote result in the de­
velopment of these broad and fluid classifications, but when attitude is 
considered two other elements enter in--colored leaders in the South and 
politicians in the North who sought to make political capital from this 
issue. With all of these groups, liberals, moderates, radicals, Negroes, 
and Republicans, expressing a different and often antagonistic attitude 
toward the colored vote, it is little wonder that the issue of race became 
the subject of the "Great Debate" during the Bourbon period.
The only body of white Southerners who consistently expounded the 
thesis that the colored man was morally as well as legally entitled to the 
franchise were those who occupied the category of liberals. Such indi­
viduals were sincere in their belief that the Negro race could be advanced 
educationally, socially, economically, and morally only if its members 
could be assured that their rights as citizens were respected by the people 
who had held them in bondage. To some extent they could agree with the 
New York Times when it said that "the old slave masters must domineer and 
tyrannize; they must keep the colored man in subjection and misery; they 
must raise a barrier of intolerance against enlightened ideas, and fight 
against the incursion of those who would work for free institutions 
. . . Liberals would agree with the editor of the Times that the
'^The editorial continued with the statement that Southerners must 
recognize that "they can never again tyrannize over the nation . . . .
The civilization of the South is past . . . ." New York Times, January 5,
1880.
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Negro was subject to restrictive devices which the Southern leadership 
class had inaugurated to assure its continued political dominance. They 
would, in the main, seek a mitigation of this situation by guaranteeing 
the colored man a free ballot and a fair count in all of the Southern 
states.
Probably the most caustic critic of the policy pursued by the po­
litical leaders of the South toward the Negro v/as the erudite George W. 
Cable. This able individual was the product of a union between a father 
who was born in Virginia and a mother who was of New England stock. Being 
reared amidst a Creole background in New Orleans resulted in this future 
critic of the South serving in the Confederate army. After the victory of 
Northern arms, he watched "the great Reconstruction agony from its first 
day to its last," and later admitted that he found his "sympathies ranged 
upon the pro-Southern side of the issue, and his convictions drifting irre­
sistibly to the other.Yet, his belief that the Negro was being pushed 
into the depths of political and social degradation by the policies of the 
Bourbons was not expressed to any great extent in the period immediately 
after Reconstruction. Instead, he turned his facile pen to exploring the 
past grandeur of his native state. In 1878 he gained lasting fame as the 
author of Old Creole Days and within the next two years he followed this 
literary triumph by publishing The Grandissimes and Madame Delaphine.
The wide acclaim with which these works were received undoubtedly made it
^George W. Cable, The Silent South (New York; diaries Scribners 
Sons, 1885), p. 25. Cable was often the subject of bitter attack by 
Southern newspapers. The Atlanta Constitution, May 18, 1888, charac­
terized him as a cranlc who knew nothing about the Negro question. The . 
New Orleans Times-Democrat said he was temporarily deluded by a mania. 
Quoted in Atlanta Journal, February 26, I89O.
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difficult for Cable to turn to a criticism of the South and its attitude 
toward its colored citizens. Yet, he believed that someone must take up 
a cudgel in behalf of the Negro and insist that those rights which had 
been soberly bestowed upon that race must not be honored in the breach.
The development of this belief by Cable resulted in his becoming, 
by the middle years of the eighties, one of the most outspoken of the 
propagandists who actively advocated free and unrestricted exercise of 
the franchise by the Negro. In 1385, for example, he wrote in an article 
prepared for the Century Magazine that "there are those among us who see 
that America has no room for a state of society which imakes its lower 
class harmless by abridging their liberties . . . .  There is a growing 
number," he insisted, "who see that the one thing we cannot afford to 
tolerate is a class of people less than citizens . . . . This article 
\ras only the opening gun in a salvo which Cable \n s preparing to unleash 
against what he conceived to be the prevailing Southern attitude toward 
the Negro. In the same year there appeared a book. The Silent South, 
which was to constitute the most bitter indictment of Southern racial 
policy penned by a Southern white during this period. Publication of the 
article and the book impinged upon Southern sensibilities and elicited a 
storm of protest throughout the region. Undoubtedly this contributed to 
Cable's decision to seek a more favorable climate of opinion by removing 
with his family to Northhampton, Massachusetts, in 1866.
Removal from his Southern homeland, however, did not result in a 
cessation or even a dimunition of Cable's literary bombardment against the
'^ George W. Cable, "The Freedman's Case in Equity," Century 
Magazine, VII ( January, I885), '^13.
l80
policies pursued in the South toward the colored race. As he viewed the 
situation from his Massachusetts retreat, the Negro question had become 
the gravest matter in American affairs simply because a small minority of 
Southern whites were denying to some seven million Negroes the full measure 
of rights which they would have been freely accorded had they been of Suro-
Y
pean rather than African descent. As Cable pondered the situation he 
reached the conclusion that political leaders of the South sought the pro­
scription of the Negro race as a part of their acceptance of and belief in 
an orientally inclined theory of divine rights. Their theories, main­
tained Cable, "declares public safety and highest development to require 
subjugation of the lower mass uiider the arbitrary protective supremacy of 
an united but hereditary privileged class, a civil class." He did not 
believe, however, that this philosophy had as its ultimate purpose the 
establishment of an aristocracy for, as he saw the situation, "an aris­
tocracy exists, presumably . . . with wide consent of all classes, and
men in any rank of life may have some hope to attain it by extraordinary
8merit and service . . . ." As a corollary to this idea. Cable expressed 
his belief that as a free man the Negro was not allowed to assert himself 
and was prevented from emerging from the lower echelons of the caste 
system because the Southern white feared that his service as a subservient 
laborer would be irretrievably lost if he \fas allowed to advance too far.
A concomitant to this was, according to Cable, a physical fear of the
7
'George U. Cable, "The Negro Question in the United States," 
Contemporary Review, LIII (March, 1888), 44].
^George W. Cable, The Negro Question (New York; Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1890), p. 27.
l8i
o
Negroes in the areas where they outnumbered, the whites. Thus, he wrote 
in 1885, "it is only where a people are moved by the fear of Negro su­
premacy that the simple belief in a divinely ordered race antagonism is 
used to justify the withholding of impersonal public rights which belong 
to every man because he is a man, and with which race and its real or 
imagined antagonisms has nothing whatever to do."^^
The theme that the colored man v/as subject to stringent social, 
economic, and political restrictions because Southerners feared losing 
his labor and also political dominance to him in those areas where he out­
numbered the whites was a subject to which Cable often returned. In l838 
he attacked what he termed the "ultra-Southern" position as one in which 
"to be right is the only real necessity; but where is the community that 
will not make, and define with treasure and blood, the assumption that 
what is necessary is right?" Southerners, he said, "may sometimes lack 
a clear, firm-founded belief that they are right . . . but they have at
least a profound conviction that they are moved by an imminent, unre-
11mitting, imperative necessity." This conviction resulted, he maintained, 
from the fact that thousands of people in the South were being taught in 
their schools, churches, homes, and by the press that depriving the Negro 
of his fundamental rights as a free man was a legal and moral prerequisite
^Guion G. Johnson, "The Ideology of 'Jhite Supremacy, 1876-I9IO," 
Essays in Southern History, ed. Fletcher M. Green ("James Sprunt Studies 
in History and Political Science," Vol. XXXI; Chapel Hill, N.C.: Uni­
versity of North Carolina Press, 19^9); P* I38.
^^George W. Cable, 'ïn Plain Black and VJhite," Century Magazine,
VII (my, 1885), 98.
^^Cable, "Negro Question in the United States," kk'^.
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to maintaining cherished Southern institutions.
The only hope that Cable could see for a change in the system 
whereby the Negro was deprived of his rights was for the members of that 
race to protect themselves through the medium of the ballot box. In an 
article prepared for the Contemporary Beview in I888, he noted that the 
subject of the Negro vote was commanding increased attention in the North 
and South. "Northern men," he vrrote, "often ask perplexedly if the 
freedman's enfranchisement was not . . . premature and inexpedient; 
while Southern men as often call it the one vindictive act of the
]_3
conqueror, as foolish as it vras cruel."
Cable gave the opinion that the situation in regard to the 
franchise \js.s cruel, but only because it was belatedly bestowed upon the 
Negro race. Certainly, he admitted, the colored man had sometimes been 
guilty of using the ballot injudiciously; he had given it freely to one 
party out of a misguided sense of gratitude and had consequently evoked 
a suspicion of his intent from the whites of the South. It \m.s therefore 
requisite for the Negro, said Cable, to quell the fears of his white 
neighbors by making it plain that he did not desire "Negro supremacy."
He should demonstrate conclusively that he was not interested in poli­
tics merely as the agency through which he could secure some lucrative 
political sinecure. He should go even further, advised Cable, and, while 
endeavoring to maintain his political rights, demonstrate that no single 
party could be certain of receiving his electoral support. "It means," 
he cautioned, "that without venality or servility, you must hold your
^Ibid., kh6. 448.
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vote up for the honorable competitive bid of political parties" because
"a vote is not a free-will offering to the past; it is a debt to the
0. .tl^ present.
Cable, a prolific witer, probably penned more words on the 
subject of the Negro than did any of his contemporaries. Incessantly he 
argued that the colored race could be elevated more quickly if the Negro 
was free to exercise the ballot, and he would have him protected in this 
right. In this attitude Cable was joined by some other Southerners who 
had attained some measure of prominence in their section and throughout 
the nation. For example, in the year that Cable left Louisiana for his 
self-imposed exile in Massachusetts, a former Confederate officer and now 
Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Kentucky, Thomas Dudley, wote that the 
Negro must be welcomed back to the polls and into the fellowship of the 
white churches. "The separation of the negro race from the white race," he 
\farned, "means for the negro continued and increasing degradation and de­
cay. His hope, his salvation, must come from association with that people 
among whom he dwells, but from whose natural guidance and care he has 
been separated largely by the machinations of unscrupulous demagogues.
^^George W. Cable, "VJhat Shall the Negro Do?" Forum, VI (August, 
l388), 63^ -38- In an article published in December of 1588, Cable in­
sisted that the Negro was being denied his legal right to vote at the 
South. He noted the claims advanced by Southerners that the colored vote 
had been "abundantly tried, and earned its o\m condemnation, in the cor­
ruption and disasters of the reconstruction period." Cable said that this 
would be a fair statement if the purpose of Reconstruction had been to 
secure the Negro in his right to vote. As Cable viewed the situation, 
however, the greater design of the period was "to put race rule of all 
sorts under foot, and set up the common rule of all . . . ." George W. 
Cable, "A Simpler Southern Question," Forum, VI (December, I888), 392-1+00.
^^ Thomas U. Dudley, "How Shall We Help the Negro?" Century 
Magazine, XXX (l/iarch, 1885), 2?8.
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The belief expressed by Dudley that the Negroes would have a 
better opportunity to improve their condition if freely permitted to exer­
cise the ballot was primarily the same idea advanced by another prominent 
Southern clergyman, the Reverend Atticus G. Haygood. In 1888 Haygood took 
up his pen to answer the contention, expressed in an article by Senator 
James B. Eustis of Louisiana, that the colored race posed a problem which 
should be settled exclusively by the South. Haygood, contending that the 
Negro must be educated and freely permitted to cast his ballot for the 
man or party of his choice, maintained that the Negro question i-ras not 
local in character but v/as of concern to the entire nation. "If there 
has ever been any fanaticism, intolerance, or spirit of intermeddling," 
he OTote, "mixed up in the efforts that have been made by Northern people 
to improve the negro's character as well as condition . . . such infirmi­
ties may deserve rebuke . . . It was the thought of this clergyman, 
however, that such was not the case, but he insisted that it \ras the duty 
of every American, Southern as well as Northern, to take an active inter­
est in educating the colored man and making him a fit citizen. Only by 
so doing would it be possible to advance the Negro to a position whereby 
they would be equally competent with the whites to understand the re­
sponsibilities attached to the privilege of citizenship.^^
Other liberals agreed that the colored citizenry had a right to 
the franchise and must be protected, by the Federal government if neces­
sary, in the unrestricted enjoyment of that riglit. For example, Lewis H. 
Blair, a wealthy Democratic businessman from Richmond, maintained in 1889
*^^ Rev. Atticus Haygood, A Reply to Senator Eustis's Late Paper on 
Race Antagonism (Nashville; Open Letter Club, 1BB9), p. 11. ”
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that the one legal right in which the Negro was not protected in the South
was that of the exercise of his franchise. Blair insisted that a situation
whereby a portion of the population was in any manner restricted in the
right to vote opened the door for the government to be conducted in the
interest of corrupt political rings ruled by venal bosses. He admonished
the Southern states to encourage the colored man to participate in
elections and to cease the utilization of force and fraud to deprive him 
17
of his ballot. Blair also took cognizance of the claim advanced by 
some prominent Southerners to the effect that it iras necessary to prevent 
the mass of Negroes from exercising the franchise in order to preserve a 
stable, civilized government and to prevent a return to the conditions 
which prevailed during Reconstruction. "To perceive all these changed 
conditionsy^nce Redemption^, " he said, "and to be afraid of a return 
to former evil days is to prove that we are cowards, not Anglo-Saxons, or 
if we are Anglo-Saxons, that we are unworthy of our ancestry . ..." To 
be airare of changed conditions, he continued, "and to be unwilling to 
restore the freedom of the ballot to the negro is to commit a crime against 
freedom . . . ." It was therefore requisite for the whites of the South, 
maintained Blair, to rise up in righteous indignation and insist that the 
ri^ ÿits of the colored man be observed. Only by so doing would peace and
1 O
prosperity return in full measure to that troubled section.
17Blair said that in Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, 
where the Negro iras led by able and strong white minorities, he exer­
cised the ballot freely and iras little subject to fraud. He went ahead 
to say that in the other Southern states the Negroes had been deprived 
of the ballot and the whites of their servile labor. Lewis H. Blair,
The Prosperity of the South Dependant upon the Elevation of the Negro 
(Richmond; Everett Waddley, 1889), pp. 66-70.
18
Ibid., p. 79.
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while the liberal element in the Southern states insisted that the 
Negro was legally entitled to a free ballot and a fair count, they con­
sistently couched their arguments as to why this right should in no wise 
be curtailed on the basis of moral considerations. Certainly, according 
to the liberal viewpoint, the colored man had a legal right to the 
franchise, and if this right was upheld and he was guided in the exercise 
of it, he would become better educated in the art of government. In the 
past the Negro had been merely a pawn in the political chess game, and 
consequently he had not been able to demonstrate his full potential. Not 
only was this the case, but the insistence on the part of some white 
leaders that the Negro posed a threat to Southern institutions had re­
sulted in the utilization of fraud and intimidati.on to cope with the 
imagined danger. This, in turn, had resulted in an undermining of the 
political morals of the mass of Southern whites and was evoking an in­
creased cynicism on the part of the general electorate. Thus, if the 
colored man was encouraged to cast his ballot upon issues rather than 
for or against a particular man or party it could only redound to the 
benefit of the South. It would have the effect of removing him as the 
overriding issue in the political life of the section, would contribute 
to his moral and educational advancement, and would open an avenue to 
material, economic, social, and political accomplishment in the Southern 
states.
Agreeing in essence with the white liberals that the colored man 
should freely be allowed to exercise the ballot but emphasizing it as a 
legal rather than a moral right were some of the politicians in the North 
and most of the Negro leaders of the South. As has been previously noted.
i8t
the national leaders of the Republican party early became disenchanted 
with their colored cohorts and abandoned them to the extent that the Re­
publican party organization in the Southern states iras encouraged to ally 
with any white Independent organization which mi^t rise to compete with 
the Bourbons. One Republican-oriented journal, the New York Tribune, 
rationalized the abandonment of the colored man shortly after Redemption 
by declaring that the Negroes had been given "ample opportunity to de­
velop their own latent capacities," and had only succeeded in demon­
strating that "as a race they are idle, ignorant, and vicious.Such 
a blatant declaration was, however, the exception rather than the rule. 
Instead, despite the fact that as the years rolled by the Republican party 
leaders determined that their purposes could best be served by making 
their organization in the South "lily-white," the party press and leaders 
generally found it politically expedient to give lip service to the 
principle of Negro suffrage. In almost every election, therefore. Re­
publican journals contended that the colored man had been and continued 
to be intimidated and disfranchised at the South. They continually 
charged that Southern Democrats were seeking to evolve a system whereby 
the Negro would be remanded to slavery in fact if not in name, and in­
sisted that this could be prevented only if the colored man was pro-
20tected in his legal right to the franchise.
^^New York Tribune, April 7, 1877*
20See, for example, the St. Louis Globe-Dispatch and the New York 
Tribune for the years from 1876 to I891. Setting the theme of the argu­
ments advanced for the benefit of Northerners was an article by William 
E. Chandler, patronage dispenser for President Arthur. In 1882 he had 
advised Southern Republicans to abandon the Negro and to cooperate with 
Independents in the area. In 1888, however, he charged that the Negro
188
At the same time that Republican journals and orators were ex­
pounding the thesis that the Southern Negro must by all that was right 
be guaranteed a free and unencumbered ballot, another group was also ex­
postulating upon the subject. Like their Republican mentors but unlike 
the liberal white Southerners, the literate Negroes emphasized that the 
colored man must be allowed to vote because it was a legal right accruing 
to every citizen. As was true of the statements made by the liberals, 
however, expressions by colored authors on this subject reached a peak in 
the late l830's. Undoubtedly one of the primary reasons for this -vras that 
by the latter half of that decade there was increased suspicion that the 
Bourbons had as their ultimate purpose the disfranchisement of the Negro. 
Consequently, Negro leaders reached the conclusion that Federal action 
must be taken to lessen the possibility that the Southern program could 
be brought to fruition.
One of the most able and certainly the most prolific of the Negro 
authors who gave consideration to the subject of suffrage and who, like 
most of his colored colleagues, viewed the situation with alarm was a North 
Carolinian, Albion W. Tourgee. This able individual early manifested an 
interest in political affairs and especially events which could possibly 
effect the members of his race. In I878 Tourgee took cognizance of the 
attitude of President Hayes toward the Negroes and their membership in 
the Republican party by proclaiming that this shortsighted policy meant 
that "the Republican party of North Carolina is dead--dead beyond all hope
had been intimidated and disfranchised in the South. He insisted, too, 
that the period of Reconstruction, during which the Negro voted freely, 
was one of material accomplishraent. William E. Chandler, "Our Southern 
Nhsters," Forum, VI (July, 1888), 508*
139
of resuscitation or resurrection."^^ Tourgee thought that Hayes' policy
toward the Negro would lessen the effectiveness of the Republican party
and would result in the colored man losing his political rights. This was
the theme which he carried out in subseq.uent books and articles.
As early as I88O Tourgee iras complaining that the Southern whites
22would never admit the Negroes to the rights accorded them by law. It 
iras in the latter half of the decade, however, that he really began causti­
cally to indict the whites for what he considered to be their attitude 
toward the colored race. The year I889, for example, found him declaring 
with some heat that the Negro question was the most momentous one which 
had ever faced the American civilization and that "the present phase of 
the question is a controversy touching the Negro's right to exercise 
freely, peacefully, and effectually the elective franchise, and to enjoy 
without hindrance its resulting incidents. Maintaining that the 
elective franchise iras a right and not a privilege as had been asserted 
by some Southern politicians, Tourgee went ahead to complain that it was
the purpose of many individuals in the South to deprive the colored race 
oh
of the ballot. Even if the claim advanced by some whites as to the
^^he "C" Letters as Published in "The North State." (Greensboro, 
1878), pp. 21-25, quoted in C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 
1877-1913, Vol. IX of A History of the South, eds. Wendell H. Stephenson 
and E. Merton Coulter (10 vols.; Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University 
Press, 19 7^ --), P* 100'
p p
Raleigh Mevs and Observer, October 3  ^I80O, said of Tourgee's 
statement that "we do not doubt there is much misrepresentation of facts 
in it."
23
Albion W. Tourgee, "Shall IVhite Minorities Rule?" Forum, VII 
(April, 1889), 1 4^.
^V'ourgee maintained that until duly conferred the franchise was 
a privilege which no individual or class had a right to demand, but once
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inherent superiority of the Anglo-Saxon was correct, he said, it did not 
logically follow that this constituted sufficient grounds to justify dis­
franchisement of the Negro. The whites, Tourgee vehemently insisted, did 
not have any divine authority to rule and as far as he was concerned past 
events had amply demonstrated that they were not fair or just guardians of 
the rights of their former slaves. Southern whites, he complained, "would 
not hesitate to destroy the Negro's opportunity for development in order 
to keep him weak, dependent, and manageable. Not because the Negro is 
ignorant or incapable," he continued, "do they object to his exercise of 
the right of suffrage, but because he is a Negro, and as such they will
25
spare no pains to keep him weak."
Tourgee's suspicions of the motives of the Southern whites and his 
insistence that the franchise was not merely a privilege but constituted a 
right which the colored race must be freely permitted to enjoy were but 
manifestations of the themes which were the predominant arguments of most 
of the leaders of the Southern Negroes during the Bourbon period. For 
example, W. S. Scarborough, a prominent colored educator, agreed with 
Tourgee, in an article which he wrote in l389, that the South was de­
termined tc .mke the Negro bend to its desires. Every effort of the 
colored man to raise his economic standards and his most peaceful efforts
granted it became a right which the soverign had to maintain and enforce. 
Ibid.
^^Ibid., 1^7-48. Tourgee insisted that the reason for Southern 
states not changing their constitutions to disfranchise the Negro was 
because it would result in a reduction of Southern representation in 
Congress and the Electoral College. However much "the southern man may 
object to the Negro as a political force," he said, "the southern poli­
tician is desperately fond of him as a political counter." Ibid., l48.
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"to exercise the privileges conferred upon him by the Constitution," said 
Scarborough, "are construedthe Soutiras a movement toward 'Negro 
supremacy.Such a fear was not and could not be justified. Actually, 
insisted the professor, "Negro supremacy has no part in the Negro's plans 
for his future, nor is it desired by him. He simply seeks to exercise 
undeterred the freedom to enjoy the rights guaranteed him by the Consti­
tution."^^
Scarborough and other colored leaders continued their campaign 
to see the colored man guaranteed a free ballot and a fair count well into 
the 1890's. Obviously their purpose in speaking and writing on the subject 
was not to convince the mass of illiterate Negroes that it was requisite 
for them to insist that their rights must be respected. Nor did they hope 
that they would be able to appeal successfully to the better instincts of 
the leadership class in the South. Instead, their arguments were so 
couched as to convince Northerners that it i-ras necessary to reinstitute 
restrictive legislation which would insure the colored man that his 
franchise would be protected by the Federal government. For example, in 
November of 189O the Reverend Amory D. Mayo suggested in an article pre­
pared for a Northern journal tliat the South vra.s too far immersed in
W. S. Scarborough, "The Future of the Negro," Forum, VII (March,
1889), 80.
27
Ibid., 82. Scarborough insisted that Southern fears of a return 
to the excesses of Reconstruction were groundless and did not constitute 
the true reason for the whites suggestion that the Negro vote should be 
curtailed. The key to the disturbance, as he saw it, was one of color 
and caste coupled with the Bourbon's fear that they would lose political 
power through the adherence of the colored man to the opposition party.
He said that the only hope of the Negro was to present a united political 
front and to appeal for Federal supervision if a fair vote was denied. 
Ibid., 83-88.
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constitutional nationalism to be really concerned with the welfare of her 
some eight million colored inhabitants. Since such iras the case, he pro­
claimed, the rights of the colored race, now subject to political wrenching
28in the South, could be guaranteed only by concrete Federal action.
The thesis advanced by Mayo at a time when Congress was giving con­
sideration to an election measure wzas seconded by Professor Scarborough in 
an article prepared for the first of the muckraking journals. The Arena, 
in 1891. Noting that there was a great deal of the sentimental and the 
sensational in the discussions then current on the so-called "Negro 
Problem," he suggested that only the passage of years could bring forth 
a satisfactory solution. Yet, like Ifâyo, he insisted that his Northern 
audience must not fall prey to a suggestion advanced by a United States 
Senator from Mississippi that the solution to the problem be left to "the 
sound judgment of the Southern people." Instead, said Scarborough, the 
colored man must be disengaged from politics and from political manipu­
lation and must be protected in the full enjoyment of his constitutional 
rights
The articles written by Tourgee, Scarborough, Ifeyo, and others of 
their type on the subject of the colored man and the ballot represents the 
thinlcing of only a small minority of the Negro race. That is not to say 
that the majority of the colored men did not believe that they were legally 
entitled to a free and full enjoyment of the ballot, but the race was 
mired so deeply in illiteracy that the average colored man was unable to
28
Amory D. Mayo, "The Progress of the Negro," Forum, X (November,
1890), 335-45.
S. Scarborough, "The Negro Question from the Negro's Point 
of View," Arena, IV (July, 1891), 291.
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comprehend the varions arguments advanced on the subject. As a whole 
the Negro electorate tended blindly to follow a course of political action 
charted for them by their colored leaders. While most of these individuals 
were of the Republican persuasion and led the black masses along those 
lines, if the leaders decided to cast their lot with a Democrat the chances 
were more than good that they could sway a large percentage of the colored 
voters to emulate their action.Such an event tended to bear out the 
contention of some Southerners that the Negroes had a propensity for 
casting their ballots for individuals rather than upon issues.
Although many, if not most, of the white Southerners also ignored 
issues when casting their vote, the leaders of the colored race recog­
nized that such a situation constituted a problem. The more literate 
members of that race continually exhorted the Negro voter to be less con­
cerned with party labels and with the advice of colored bosses. Instead, 
they cautioned, the Negroes should manifest an independence and cast their
The percentage of illiterate Negroes in the population of the 
individual states is given in the Census of l8gO. It shows that in Vir­
ginia the percentage of illiterates among both sexes was 57-2; in North 
Carolina 6o.l; in South Carolina 6h.l; in Georgia 67.3J da Florida 50*5j 
in Tennessee 5 -^2; in Alabama 69.1; in Mississippi 6O.8; in Arkansas 53*6j 
in Louisiana 72.1; in Texas 52.5- In each of the states the percentage 
of illiterates vrais higher among the females, but only in Florida and 
Arkansas was the percentage among males less than fifty per cent. U.S., 
Bureau of the Census, Negro Population in the United States, 1790-1919 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), chap. XVI, table 23, 
p. kl9.
In 1883 John Lynch informed his colored cohorts in the Republi­
can party of Mississippi that it mattered little whether the county 
machines decided "to fuse with the Independents instead of the Democrats, 
or with the Democrats instead of the Independents, or to make straight 
party nomination instead of fusing with either;" all good party men had 
a duty to follow the machine, "although they may honestly believe the 
decision to be unwise." Quoted in New York Globe, October 30, I883, as 
quoted in Woodward, Origins of the New South, pp. 217-18.
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ballots on the basis of the programs offered by the individual candidates. 
This, they thought, would serve to convince white Southerners that there 
was no danger of a revival of the Republican-Negro combination which had 
prevailed during Reconstruction. Yet, although this type of advice was 
freely given the major theme of the arguments advanced by literate colored 
men was that regardless of the Negroes, propensity for voting as a group 
and despite the fact that a majority of that electorate ifas illiterate, 
the Negro race had an inalienable right to the franchise and should in no 
wise be subject to restriction. That the protestations of the colored 
propagandists had little or no effect on the attitude of Northern and 
Southern white leaders, however, is easy to see from the vantage point of 
the nineteen-sixties. Certainly they were unable to entice concrete sup­
port for their suggestion that the Federal government should intervene to 
insure the colored man that his constitutional rights would be protected. 
Certainly, too, they suffered the same fate as did the white liberals in 
their efforts to convince the people of the South that the bugaboo of 
Negro supremacy was only an ephemeral thing and that measures should not 
be taken to effect the disfranchisement of a majority of the colored race.
In the debate which raged between 1876 and 189O over the right to 
exercise the ballot, the position occupied by the white liberals and by the 
■ literate Negroes was so far to the left of that occupied by the Bourbons 
that it might appear that they should be classified as archconservatives. 
Actually, the position of the Bourbons and those who adhered to their 
philosophy is in some elements the most difficult to grasp. Certainly 
they do not deserve to be grouped with that rather numerous segement of 
the Southern population which believed that the colored race should be
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remanded to a semi-legal position of political and economic slavery. 
Neither do they fit into the narrow category of liberals who seemingly 
believed that because the Negro was of a different race and had once been 
held in bondage he ras entitled to 'special consideration. Nor does the 
fact that the Bourbons were often found adjuring the whites of the South 
to accept the fact that the colored man was legally entitled to the 
franchise and that his right must be respected and almost in the same 
breath issuing dire \-7arnings that the ballot in the hands of the Negro 
was a weapon which posed a threat to cherished Southern institutions give 
any real clue as to the attitude of this class toward the colored vote. 
Obviously the Bourbons were pragmatists, but it is unfair to characterize 
them and their adherents as Machiavellis who were interested in the Negro 
only as an instrument through which they might assure their political 
dominance. At the outset of the Bourbon period, then. Redeemers such as 
Lamar, Hampton, and Vance were probably less guilty of hypocrisy than they 
have generally been charged with being. As was mentioned earlier, this 
class was the cultural heir of the ante-bellum aristocracy and their atti­
tude toward the colored man contained much of the paternalism romantically 
associated with the Old South. Undoubtedly the Bourbons recognized that 
the South liad a responsibility to assist the people they formerly held in 
bondage to make the transition to a society where their every thought iras 
not directed by an overlord. Yet, they believed that it had been a mis­
take to effect a rapid political change and place the colored man at the 
political helm, but because they were essentially a law-abiding class they 
recognized that the legal rights bestowed upon the Negro could not lightly 
be taken airay. They could accept and applaud the sentiments expressed by
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the Georgia editor of the Southern Watchman who wote in 1867 that "we 
hope there is no reason to "believe that the freedmen are going to array 
themselves against the whites in elections on account of race . . .
But, he said, "although the whites believe tliat the majority of colored 
people are not now qualified to vote understandingly, they nevertheless 
know that it is not their fault that they have been declared voters and 
hence harbor no unkind feelings tomrd them on that account. Let the 
colored man," admonished this editor in a phrase which anticipated the 
Bourbons, "see to it that they do not act in such a manner as to destroy 
present kind feelings between the races.
The statement by the editor of the Watchman as to the attitude 
current in the South on the subject of the Negro vote and his gratuitous 
advice to the members of that race presented a picture which could be ac­
cepted by many Southerners at the time it r^as written. Yet, events of the 
period known as "Black Reconstruction" foreshadowed a reversal of attitude. 
VJhether there was an "orgy of misrule" during this period or whether, as 
Professor Howard K. Beale s u g g e s t s , the entire subject must be restudied, 
it is evident that the Redeemers were able to make political capital out 
of the situation. Once native control was restored, however, the Redeemers 
began to tone down the often voiced demands that the Negro be deprived of
^^ The editor of the Southern Vfatclmnan on March 27, 1867, advised 
the colored men to "see to it that they vote for men they believe to be 
best qualified to fill the office; and let them, above all things, avoid 
saying or doing anything which can get up bad feelings between the two 
races." Quoted in Ralph Wardlaw, Negro Suffrage in Georgia, 1867-I93O 
(Athens, Ga.; University of Georgia Press, 1932), p. 2].
^^Howard K. Beale, "On Rewriting Reconstruction History," American 
Historical Review, XLY (July, 19 0^), 815.
197
the ballot. Actually, many of these individuals returned to the position 
they had assumed shortly after the Confederate defeat and became moderate 
in their attitude toward the colored vote. That is, they often ceased 
their propagandizing as to the necessity for disfranchising the Negro and 
emphasized their belief that he was and should be protected in his right 
to vote by the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the indi­
vidual states. They widely proclaimed that the traditional Southern re­
spect for law must not be subordinated in the desire to remove the Negro 
as a participant in the political arena. It \fas, of course, advantageous 
to the party leaders in their relation with the colored man to insist that 
his right to the ballot would be guaranteed. Not only did such an idea 
enable the Bourbons to appeal for colored support, but the fact that the 
Negro continued to vote lessened the possibility that the white vote of 
the South would divide upon issues. In line with the latter point is the 
fact that the party press continually raised the specter of potential Negro 
domination as a device to insure continued support for the party of white 
supremacy. Despite this, however, the utterances of the Bourbons on the 
subject and editorials which periodically appeared in journals in the North 
and South indicate that they were not as adamant against the exercise of 
the franchise by the colored man as has been thought.
At the outset of the Bourbon period most of the statements made 
by the moderates on the subject of the "black ballot" indicated that they 
were willing to accept the situation imposed on the South by Federal bayo­
nets. They were willing to admit that they would not have indiscriminately 
enfranchised the colored man had they had a free choice, but they insisted 
that the people of the North realize that they desired to effect no change.
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For example, in 1876 the New Orleans Daily Picayune complained that "the 
greatest political trouble under which our section now labors is the ap­
parent inability of other sections to understand that it has thoroughly 
recognized the fact that 'old things have passed av?ay.The editor of 
this journal insisted that the people of his state and of the entire South 
"recognize the emancipated and enfranchised African as a fellow-citizen in 
every sense of the word." Southerners, he continued, "mean to go to the 
polls with him, and to count his vote as we would count our oini; but we 
mean to control his vote, if we possibly can, by every fair means
Although the editorial in the Picayune appeared a few months be­
fore Louisiana vras redeemed to native white control, it is a classic ex­
ample of the attitude of the members of the higher economic and social 
class throughout the South. IVhile such Southerners might march in parades 
clad in cleaner versions of their Confederate uniforms and deliver homi­
lies glorifying the "Lost Cause, " they knew that the old vray of life in 
the South had been irretrievably lost and that it ifas necessary to make 
the best of the situation. Part and parcel of the changes with which 
their section was confronted was the new position of the colored men. 
Although the Bourbons might privately bemoan the situation they did strive 
to convince themselves and their white cohorts that Southern interests 
would be better served if the Negro \r&s accepted as an elector and con­
vinced that his future was interwoven with the whites of his section.
Thus, while the moderates would not accept the liberal viewpoint that 
colored men were equal to the whites, they were willing to experiment
34.New Orleans Daily Picayune, lyfey 12, 1876.
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with the Negroes having the franchise. Their moderate posture, however, 
had as its ultimate purpose the utilization of the colored vote for their 
OTO political purposes.
In 1873 Wade Hampton, prototype of the moderate Bourhon, informed 
an audience composed mainly of colored men that "you must stand on your 
own footing. You cannot be put upon any better one merely because you are 
colored men." The whites of the South, proclaimed the governor, "propose 
to protect you and give you all your rights; but while we do this you 
cannot expect that we should discriminate in your favor, and say simply 
because you are a colored man you have a right to rule the State. "35 As 
has been noted, while serving as governor Hampton fulfilled his promise to 
give the Negro his rights and in so doing elicited some colored political 
support. He ■^ras also interested, however, in convincing potential Northern 
antagonists, especially those dissatisfied with the Southern policy inaugu­
rated by Hayes, that the enactment of restrictive legislation was unneces­
sary. In 1879, for example, Hampton carried his campaign to convince 
Northern doubters as to the purity of Southern intentions toward the Negro 
onto the pages of a highly respected Northern journal. Proclaiming that
^^Yorkville Enquirer, September 26, 1878, quoted in George B. 
Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900 (Columbia; University of South 
Carolina Press, 1952), pp. 21-2 2. An anonymous correspondent of a promi­
nent South Carolina newspaper wrote a letter in 1878 in which he said there 
were at least three attitudes held by the whites on the Negro issue. The 
first group, smallest of the three, regarded the colored men as unworthy 
of any consideration. The second and most numerous group looked upon the 
Negroes "as human beings of an inferior order or grade." They would accept 
limited suffrage for the colored men based on qualifications of education 
or property. The third attitude, held by the Hampton party, was that the 
Negro was not responsible for the trouble visited upon South Carolina after 
the war and that the whites should accept their duty of educating the 
colored men to their responsibilities under freedom. "Cato" to the Editor, 
Columbia Daily Register, November 23, I878, quoted in ibid., pp. 36-37.
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the colored men should be educated to the duties and responsibilities of 
citizenship, Hampton said that "... it.would be almost impossible to 
disfranchise the negro and, if possible, it would not be carried into ef­
fect." The people of the South, he insisted, do "not desire to see this 
done . . . .  The negro contributes not only to the wealth of the South,
but to her political power, and she is indisposed to deprive herself of 
36
any advantage."
The pragmatic viewpoint expressed by Hampton vras seconded and ex­
panded by other moderates who composed a leadership class respected in 
both North and South. Lucius Q,. C. Lamar, for example, proclaimed that 
the people of Mississippi thought that the ballot had been an education
to the Negro, and he agreed with Hampton that there was no widespread de-
o '7
sire to see it taken away.-*' Hamilton H. Chalmers, chief justice of the 
Supreme Court of Mississippi, did not agree with Lamar that the people of 
that state would not welcome a curtailment of the colored vote, but he 
did agree that the enfranchised Negro did not pose a great threat to 
Southern institutions.^^ Chalmers would go even further and accept the
James G. Blaine, et al., "Ought the Negro to be Disfranchised? 
Ought He to have been enfranchised?" North American Review, CCLXVII 
(March, 1879), 2kO-kl.
‘ Ibid., pp. 231, 250. In 1876 Congressman Charles E. Hooker of 
Mississippi commented on a Senate investigation of affairs in his state.
He told his colleagues of the House that the investigation iras unnecessary 
and that the South did not oppose the granting of the franchise to the 
Negro. Leave the South alone, he said, and the natural relations between 
the races will adjust themselves. Charles H. Hooker, "On Relations Be­
tween the V/hite and Colored People of the South," Speech Delivered in 
tine United States House of Representatives, June l5~, IÜ76 (Washington;
R. Q. Polkenhorn, 1878), pp. 1-10. ,
oA
H. H. Chalmers, "The Effects of Negro Suffrage," North American 
Review, CXXXXI (March, 188I), 239* Chalmers maintained that the deeper
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legalistic dogma of Alexander H. Stephens which held that it would he
constitutionally impossible to prevent the colored man from enjoying this
privilege. "The men of the South/' said Chalmers, "must understand,once
and for all that the negroes, as negroes, . . . can never be disfranchised.
Their right to vote, as a race, is as fixed and irreversible as their
freedom, and the fifteenth amendment to the national Constitution is no
■20
more likely to be repealed than the thirteenth."
Advice by the moderates to the people of the South to recognize 
that the colored man was legally entitled to the franchise was often ac­
companied by suggestions to the Negro that he realize that this privilege 
entailed some obligations. For example, Zebulon B. Vance, former governor 
and then United States Senator from North Carolina informed the colored 
race that their political and social future was largely dependent upon 
their ability. According to this moderate, if the Negro continued "to 
array himself against the whites, following blindly the renegade element 
of white men, neither he nor his social status could be much improved."
As long, he warned, as the Negro "suffers himself to be made a pliant po­
litical tool, casting his vote as directed from the outside of his own 
community, and refusing to identify himself with the property and intelli-
and more lasting effect of their enfranchisement had been to demoralize 
Southern politics. He said that "when elections cease in his imagination 
to be fraught with his liberty . . . the enormous negro vote of the South 
will afford a field for the art of the demagogue and the bribes such as 
the world has never seen . . . ."
^^Ibid., 2 h j . Chalmers advised the Southern whites to realize 
that force and fraud was not the answer to their political woes, but that 
it could only be found in limiting the right of suffrage by imposing edu­
cational and property qualifications. I'jhile he was more radical than 
moderate, Chalmers did realize that the South must accept the fact that 
the Negro could not be disfranchised as a race.
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gence of the section where he lives ... he will be an element of danger 
to the welfare of society.
The idea of Vance on the future of the Negro was also that ex­
pressed by a true moderate and one of the best friends of the colored 
race, General Samuel C. Armstrong. Also writing in l884 this Northerner, 
largely responsible for the success of the educational experiment at 
Hampton Institute in Virginia, maintained that the Negro iras unfit, as a 
class, to use with ability the political power with which he had been en­
trusted. He noted realistically that the colored race would never be per­
mitted, even in those states where they constituted a numerical majority, 
to become politically dominant. Consequently, according to Armstrong, 
the Negro would be better off in a political sense if he would assume a 
middle ground and not cast his vote solidly for one party out of a mis­
guided sense of loyalty. It would be wise for the colored man, he advised, 
to "make the most of himself, but, if possible, forget grievances, and 
obey the dictates of common sen s e . T h a t  is exactly what the Southern 
moderates continually advised him to do.
The moderate viewpoint as to the future position of the Negro
^^Zebulon B. Vance, "The Future of the Negro," North American 
Review, CXXXIX (July, l884), 86. C. M. Clay of Kentucky later ■'.■/rote that 
the only solution to the race question was for the North to become solid, 
secure control of the government, and enforce all penalties. It %fas his 
opinion that such a situation would result in some Southerners ceasing 
their efforts to disfranchise the Negro. Cassius M. Clay, "Race and the 
Solid South," North American Review, CXLII (February, 1886), 13^ -36.
‘^^S. C. Armstrong, "The Future of the Negro," North American 
Review, CXXXIX (July, l884), $6. Armstrong was a friend of Booker T. 
Washington and like that Negro leader believed that the colored men should 
be less concerned with political and social rights, and should work to 
make himself economically indispensable. When that occurred those rights 
would come as a matter of course.
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race in the political structure of the South was promulgated not only in 
articles prepared for journals of national import, hut it also commanded 
much attention in the Southern press. While arguments on the subject were 
heard from almost every available forum, it was undoubtedly the newspaper 
which had the greatest effect in the molding of Southern opinion during
lip
the period. Percentagewise, the number of whites who had an opportunity 
to hear a Hampton, a Colquitt, or a Vance, or to read a journal of the 
type represented by the North American Review or the Nation was indeed 
small. But nearly every Southerner, regardless of whether he vas fortu­
nate enough to possess the ability to read, was generally made aivare of 
the comments of his leaders, and for that matter of their Northern antago­
nists, tlirough the medium of the local newspaper. Every county and 
sometimes it seemed that every crossroads hamlet could boast a journal of 
varying degree of merit--a paper which was easily accessible to" every 
farmer, laborer, and tovmsman, regardless of whether they paid for a sub­
scription. Citizens of a community would often assemble, especially in 
the slack season for agriculture, on some rickety porch, under some 
spreading tree, or perhaps in a back room of some favored business es­
tablishment and discuss the momentous events of the day. They mulled the 
news over, chewed tobacco on it, lauded it, or denounced it. They accepted
ho
As has been pointed out by a leading Southern historian the 
influence of the better daily newspaper was very great in the South. By 
a system of "exchanges" journals such as the Atlanta Constitution reached 
the desk of nearly every country editor, and many of the smaller peri­
odicals simply fed their readers the editorial opinion expressed by such 
prominent journalists as Henry Grady and Henry Watterson. Thus, publishers 
in the large cities directly influenced rural Southerners who never saw 
their paper. Thomas D. Clark, "The Country Newspaper; A Factor in 
Southern Opinion, 1865-193O," Journal of Southern History, XIV (February, 
1948), 8.
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the interpretation of the editor as to the deeper meaning of the news and 
how it effected their section, state, and locality, or they decided that 
he I'TEs not aware of the true situation. Thus, ■ either in the sanctity of 
private homes or in open forum •svas the primary medium of communication-- 
the newspaper— read and digested. It can be considered no wonder, then, 
that the local publisher, an individual not the least hesitant about 
publishing his o t o  views or pirating something expressed in one of his 
exchanges, was an important factor in the molding of Southern opinion 
during the period.
Undoubtedly the major issue attracting attention from the Southern 
press during the-Bourbon period ivas that involving relations between the 
races. For a few years after home rule \fas achieved the press as a whole 
■VTas moderate on the subject of the Negro vote. Naturally those newspapers 
published by colored men and those which were Republican-oriented advocated 
Negro suffrage as a right, but even Democratic journals often followed the 
example set by the Bourbon politicians and admonished Southern whites to 
accept the fact that the colored man \ms legally entitled to the ballot.
By doing so they hoped to convince colored leaders that their intransigent 
support of the Republican party iras an error. For example, the New Orleans 
Daily Picayune editorialized on July 1 $, 1876, that the Negroes were at 
last awakening to the utter hopelessness of their situation under Radical 
leadership. They see, said the editor, "that they have been alienated 
from their best friends, that they have been assisting an unscrupujLous 
horde of political adventurers to rob themselves, as well as the whites,
^^ 3ibid., 27.
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. . . and that ten years of allegiance to the Republican party has profited 
IlIl
them nothing." Two years later another Louisiana newspaper, noting that 
election day had come and gone with little discord, announced to the 
colored men that "for ten long years, have we, born together and linked 
in one common tie of interest, been estranged, but today we are united 
forever. Colored men, we salute you as citizens, friends and brothers I
From Texas to Virginia the Southern newspaper proclaimed to all 
who would heed that "the black man vreints peace and he will have it as soon 
as the sectional agitators are overthrown.The same newspapers agreed 
that the Negro, as long as he acted like a "good old Southern darky," was 
entitled to all rights accorded him by law.^^ They lauded the "gallant 
colored men" who cast their ballots for Democratic candidates, and boasted 
that "we believe in treating the negroes with exact justice, with kindness 
and in every way seeking to advance their material and personal welfare.
’^^New Orleans Daily Picayune, July 19, 1876.
^^Natichitoches Vindicator, n.d., quoted in New Orleans Weekly 
Democrat, November 28, Ibyb, quoted in Philip D. Uzee, "Republican Poli­
tics in Louisiana, I877-19OO" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation. Dept, of 
History, Louisiana State University), p. 1]^ .
^^Galveston Daily News, September 2k, 188O.
h i'The "uppity nigger" \jas bitterly castigated, but the colored 
man who remained loyal to his master was lauded. As late as 190k Thomas 
Nelson Page commented on the new generation of Negroes as being unworthy 
and a threat to the South. He said that "the disfranchisement of the main 
body of the Negro race in the Southern states \fas a measure of high ne­
cessity." Thomas Nelson Page, "The Negro; The Southerner's Problem," 
McClure's, XXIII (May, 190k), 129. For his view on how the old-time Negro 
vras loved and respected in the South see Thomas Nelson Page, "The Old-Time 
Negro," Scribner's Magazine, XXXVI (November, 190k), 522-32. .
^^Aberdeen (Miss.) Examiner, October 25, I883, quoted in Albert D. 
Kinran, Revolt of the Rednecks; Mississippi Politics, I876-1925 (Lexington; 
University of Kentucky Press, 1951), p. 15. See also Raleigh News and 
Observer, March 2k, 1881.
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Nevertheless, in the midst of these homilies there was always an admixture 
of threat. Editors were not at all reluctant to warn that the South had 
no intention of permitting a continued alliance between the colored men 
and the Republicans to endanger native control. The reason for such an 
attitude was explained in l838 by the editor of the bellwether of the 
Southern press, the Atlanta Constitution. Republican misrule and its 
attendant corruption, said the editor, had been tasted by the South and 
had proved to be a bitter physic. "This is the real problem and this is 
the fear," he v/rote. "The negro is not now and never has been a menace. 
There is no danger of social equality and nobody fears it." But, he con­
tinued, the dangers inherent in Republican rule was something else to be 
considered. All Southerners, he proclaimed, remembered vividly the excess 
of the period of Reconstruction and consequently they could not and would
not countenance anything which might contribute to a revival of alien
hq
control.
Expressions on the part of the Southern press as to the willing­
ness of the South to accord the Negro the privileges which were legally 
his lessened in frequency as the years of Bourbon domination slowly 
passed. At almost the same time the tenor of articles and speeches 
authored by the political leaders also began to change. Near the end of 
Reconstruction and at the outset of the Bourbon period the press and the 
party bosses were lavish in their praise of those colored men who risked 
ostracism by members of their own race to support candidates of the Demo­
cratic party. Their efforts to attract additional support from this group
^^Atlanta Constitution, May 2, l338.
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resulted in their expressions on the subject of the Negro vote to be 
moderate in tone. Although they early stated that it was their feeling 
that it had been unwise to enfranchise the freedman indiscriminately, the 
Bourbons and the party press continually asserted that they would be un- , 
willing to see a change effected. Nevertheless, it ivas not many years 
before this posture of moderation began to crumble under the realization 
that a majority of the Negroes, however agreeable and amenable they might 
be on other subjects, were adamant in their refusal to abandon their tra­
ditional loyalty to the Republican party. As long as the Bourbons were 
able to attract colored support in state politics through fusion ar­
rangements there was alvrays the possibility that this allegiance would 
erode and a phalanx of Negro voters would troop to the polls to cast a 
solid vote for Bourbon Democracy. But, while fusion was successful in 
some areas, the Negro remained a potential Republican, and in contests of 
national import it was sometimes found necessary to use fraud and intimi­
dation to preserve a Democratic victory. This, coupled with the fact that 
as the years passed the Bourbon position was increasingly under attack 
from disenchanted elements within the party, convinced the moderates that 
some means of curtailing the Negro vote might be necessary. Such an event 
would serve two purposes. In the first place the gullible and easily led 
Republican Negroes, who might be guaranteed their voting privileges through 
national legislation, would be removed as a potential dominating force in 
the politics of the Southern states. Secondly, the Bourbons would be en­
titled to assert more emphatically their claim that they were striving to 
maintain white supremacy and thus combat the increasing dissatisfaction 
which \js.s becoming more manifest within the party.
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It I'/as largely for political reasons, then, that the vaunted 
moderation of the Southern leadership class began to split asunder as the 
decade of the eighteen-eighties reeled to a close. Although the Bourbons, 
who largely loved the Negro in the abstract, continued to extoll the 
virtues of the "good old Southern darky," and did not advocate the out­
right disfranchisement of the Negro as a race, they did increase their 
output of articles, speeches, and editorials on the subject of the ne­
cessity of imposing limitations upon the colored vote. Thus, at a time 
when the liberals of the class represented by Cable, Haygood, and Blair 
were increasing their attacks upon Southern policy toward the Negro, the 
moderation of the Bourbons was being replaced by an attitude which was 
nearer the radicalism of the poor whites. It was indeed unfortunate for 
the political future of the colored man that his status as a voter had to 
become entwined in the maze of party discord which ivas visited upon the 
South in the decade of the nineties.
CHAPTER VII
SOUTHERN ATTITUDE TOWARD NEGRO
VOTING-OPPONENTS
During the entire period from I876 to l8$0, as demonstrated 
earlier, colored men exercised the franchise in varying degrees of in­
tensity in all of the former Confederate states, i/hile no legislation 
nor changes in the fundamental lav of any state contemplated the dis­
franchisement of the Negro as a race, the amount of actual colored par­
ticipation in politics vas often governed hy the vhims of those vhites 
exercising political control. Although the Bourbons vere often moderate 
in their personal attitude tovard the Negro vote— undoubtedly because 
they sometimes found it useful for their ovn purposes— the intensity of 
colored voting vas dependent upon the intervorking of many different 
factors. Included among those elements upon vhich the unfettered exer­
cise of the ballot by the Negroes rested vas the ratio of vhites to blacks 
in the population of the individual states, the ability of those indi­
viduals vho had directed the campaign for Redemption to prevent dissatis­
fied vhites from bolting the party, the potential threat of a reneval of 
Federal control over election procedure, and a myriad of other factors of 
greater or lesser importance depending upon the time, locality, and 
situation.
Although many general factors entered in to the development of
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attitudes touard the Negro vote there are so many ramifications to the 
problem that it is a patent impossibility to say that one specific thing 
or another motivated the whites of the South at one particular place or 
one especial time. Always present, however, among the preponderance of 
Southern whites— those who were not colored or did not fall into the 
classification heretofore termed liberal— was a firm intention not to 
permit a revival of alien control based on the Negro vote. \'Jhile the 
evils of the Reconstruction period may very well have been overdrawn, 
the belief that such a situation had prevailed was of utmost importance.
In fact, the dangers inherent in a revival of Republican-Negro rule were 
so continuously impressed upon the Southern mind that they might almost 
be considered a result rather than a cause of the predominant attitude.
At any rate. Southern whites of every economic station became adamant 
in their intention not to countenance a return to a situation where the 
"bottom rail was on top."
It would obviously be a fallacy to maintain that there ever ex­
isted a single, unified Southern attitude toward participation by the 
Negro in the political affairs of that section. Certainly the Bourbons, 
even with their expressions of and belief in the philosophy of noblesse 
oblige, were not possessive of a single attitude tow.rd the exercise of 
the franchise by the colored men. As a class and for political reasons 
they mi^t counsel moderation, but there were always individuals who would 
raise their voices in dissent. Nevertheless, as a whole, the members of 
this class were more liberal in their attitude tov/ard the Negro and his 
vote than were those who occupied the lower rung of the Southern economic 
ladder. It would require a psychologist possessing the rare ability to
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delve with some degree of accuracy Into the innerworkings of an indi­
vidual’s mental processes to even approximate some of the reasons why 
those Southern whites occupying the lower economic strata had such a deep 
and abiding hatred of their colored neighbor.^
Generally accepted as one motivating factor in the attitude of 
this class of Southerners toward the Negro was that it vras a heritage of 
the ante-bellum period when the poor white was often in a worse condition 
from an economic standpoint than \ras the slave on the neighboring plan­
tation. About the only manner in which the poor white could salve his 
ego was to rationalize that since he vra.s a free man of the Caucasian race 
his station in life ■ijas consequently above that of any colored man— free 
or slave. Events of the Reconstruction period, when the Negro was in­
vested with social and political rights to which he could never aspire 
while mired deep in the stultifying system of slavery, resulted in an 
intensification of the bitter antagonism of many of the Southern whites 
toward the colored race. Reconstruction broadened this group of whites. 
Not because the Negro was advanced to any great extent in an economic 
sense, but because hundreds if not thousands of the small farmer class, 
those who in the ante-bellum period had aspired to the status of planter,
1
For a consideration of some of the psychological overtones of 
the race problem see Guion G. Johnson, "The Ideology of White Supremacy, 
1876-1910," Essays in Southern History, ed. Fletcher M. Green ("James 
Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science," Vol. XXXI; Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 19 9^ )• Also deserving of examination 
are the following: W. 0 . Bro\m, "Role of the Poor V/hite in Race Contacts
of the South," Social Forces, XIX (December, 19^0), 200-l6; E. Franklin 
Frazier, "Role of the Negro in Race Relations of the South," Social 
Forces, XIX (December, 19 0^), 217-35; Edgar T. Thompson, "The Planter 
in the Pattern of Race Relations in the South," Social Forces, XIX 
(December, 19 0^), 236-48.
212
found themselves economically leveled with the colored man. Thus, the 
Negro was not only legally equated with the whites in a social and poli­
tical sense during Reconstruction, but he vms also the primary economic 
competitor of an increased number of whites. This situation did not die 
out when Redemption was accomplished, but it intensified as the South 
began to diversify its economy. Frustrations piled upon hatred as the 
years rolled on. Consequently, more and more of the whites of the lower 
economic stratum began, largely through the agency of its more literate 
members, to vent their spleen by demanding that the colored man be rele-
p
gated to a secondary position— politically as well as socially.^
Undoubtedly the political and social advancement of the Negro by 
Federal decree during Reconstruction was a causal factor in the cooperation 
of whites of all economic station in their efforts to overthrow the alien 
rule based primarily on the Negro vote. When the revolution which ac­
complished this was complete the leaders of the Redemption movement, as 
previously noted, sought to maintain their hegemony by keeping alive the
•3
worst memories of the period. Despite their efforts, however, the 
2
It was the mass of lower class whites who were the primary ex­
ponents of "Jim Crow" legislation, and as long as the Bourbons were in 
control the racial code v^ as not as severe as it later became. In 1875 
the Tennessee legislature authorized common carriers and public servants 
to refuse service to anyone they did not wish to serve, but in I88O this 
law vjas declared unconstitutional by a Federal judge. In I881 it was re­
placed by a law requiring separate accommodations for Negroes in first- 
class cars, but leaving the races unsegregated in second-class coaches. 
Stanley J. Folmsbee, "The Origin of the First 'Jim Crow' Law," Journal 
of Southern History, XV (August, 19 9^)> 23^- k j . Even after the civil 
rights legislation of the Reconstruction period was declared unconsti­
tutional in 1883 it v/as a few years before the most typical "Jim Crow" 
law, that requiring separate accommodations for the races on trains, 
became common. Beginning in I887, however, one Southern state after 
another adopted this type of legislation.
3
■^ Southern leaders made political capital from this just as did the
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vaunted white solidarity was an ephemeral thing, and as the years passed 
there was increasing dissatisfaction with the racial and other policies 
pursued by the Redeemers. This cleavage over racial policies, more im­
portant in some of the Southern states than in others, was a contributing 
factor in the rise of Independent parties. Bourbon utilization of the 
Negro vote through fusion agreements made it feasible and politically 
advantageous for the agrarian leaders of Greenback and other political 
and economic persuasion to attack Bourbon claims that it was necessary 
to maintain white solidarity to prevent a recurrence of Republican-Negro 
domination.^ Despite such attacks, however, a majority of the whites 
accepted the Bourbon warning and continued to give electoral support to 
those leaders during most of the period.
Not only did the upland white manifest a distinct distaste for 
the Bourbon truckling to the colored vote, but the efforts of these poli­
ticians to salve Northern suspicions by assuming a posture of moderation 
•^Tas also viewed with some suspicion. Bourbon protests that there was a 
free ballot and a fair count in the South did not always jibe with the 
experiences of some c£ the whites. They found that any revolt against 
the political domination of the entrenched Redeemers would often result
Republicans from the "bloody-shirt" technique. See, for example, Hilary 
A. Herbert, et al., IVhy the Solid South? or Reconstruction and its Results 
(Baltimore: R. H. Woodward and Co., 189O).
^General Martin Gary, leader of the whites in upland Edgefield 
County in South Carolina, proclaimed that "it was the Straightout ag­
gressive policy which saved the State ZJn 1876^in spite of Grant's 
bayonets, as every one knows, not 17,000 negro votes as Hampton says." 
Charleston News and Courier, May 1+, 1877, quoted in C. Vann Woodward, 
Origins of the New South, 1877-1913, Vol. IX of A History of the South, 
eds. Wendall Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (10 vols., Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 19^7--), P* 80.
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in steps being taken to deprive potential white supporters of Independent 
candidates of the ballot. At the same time colored men would be herded 
to the polls to exercise their franchise for candidates supported by the 
higher economic echelon of Southern whites. Thus, while the Bourbons were 
utilizing the Negro vote in the Black Belt to assure their supremacy in 
the various states, they were insisting that the colored man was free to 
choose his own party and that his manifest propensity was to remain solid 
for the party associated in his mind as being responsible for his freedom. 
It is not surprising, then, that the majority of the agrarian-oriented 
whites were confused as to the true situation. Thus, even though there 
early iras evidence of dissatisfaction with the racial, economic, and other 
policies of the Bourbons, the majority of whites of the lower economic 
station preferred to "go down the line" with the leaders of the party of 
white supremacy during most of the period. Any other course of action, 
they were convinced, would be risking a renewal of Negro-Republican domi­
nation.
Although the poorer white element of the South despised the colored 
man and would have been more than pleased to see him relegated to a second­
ary economic, social, and political order, the lack of education of this 
group largely prevented them from effectively vocalizing their opinion.
That is not to say that individuals representative of and appealing to the 
prejudices of this class did not utilize every opportunity to castigate 
the colored race. Nor does it mean that some of the leaders of this group 
were not literate and literary. It does mean, however, that most of the 
pronouncements on race relations and especially on the subject of the Negro 
vote came from the pens and lips of adherents to the Bourbon cause. As
215
has baen noted, much of what was said on the subject was literature for 
a purpose or, to employ a word which is bandied about with increasing 
frequency in the contemporary world, propaganda. One aspect of this 
literature was designed to convince recalcitrant Southern whites that 
any split in the party of white supremacy, any fissure in the dike of 
white solidarity, would unleash a flood of colored votes and a return 
to the conditions paramount during Reconstruction. Thus, at the same 
time that adherents to the Bourbon cause were counseling moderation 
toward the Negro, some members of that group were voicing suspicion of 
the colored vote. As the years of the Bourbon period rolled inexorably 
on there was increasingly heard the radical arguments as to why some 
limitation should be placed on the exercise of the franchise by the 
colored man. Eventually the seeds of such protests were to fall on 
fertile soil and were to blossom into disfranchising legislation in all 
of the Southern states.
Expressions of a radical attitude toward the Negro and his right 
to vote were common even before the Bourbon period had really dawned. In 
November of 1876, for example, a prominent South- Carolinian opened a new 
journal of record amidst what he characterized as a time "of great politi­
cal excitement, attendant on the effort of our people to throw off the 
incubus of corrupt negro government which has been weighing upon our un­
fortunate State for the past eight years . . . . The private musings of 
this individual, however, were not written with the intent or for the pur­
pose of winning support for his particular point of view. Neither was the
^Arney R. Childs (ed.), The Private Journal of Henry William 
Ravenel, 1859-I88T (Columbia; University of South Carolina Press, l$kl), 
p. 3B5. Ravenel rarely mentioned the Negro after I876.
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statement made about the same time by a Virginia jurist, ruined financially 
by emancipation, to a Scottish visitor to his court. "God," said the 
judge, "made niggers different from white men, and nobody can make them 
the same. Nor was the Georgia planter who told the same touring member 
of Parliament that the Negro was "first rate to 'shovel dirt,' a function
7
for which he was made, but no good for much else,” seeking to convince 
anyone that it was necessary to the welfare of the South that the colored 
man be relegated to a secondary political position. Each of these indi­
viduals, none of whom belonged to the poor white class, whether confiding 
his thoughts to a private journal or casually commenting to a visitor from 
afar was merely stating what to him was a matter of fact. Each of these 
individuals, however, would probably have agreed that the colored man was 
legally entitled to the ballot and that the South must accept the situ­
ation. Nevertheless, in making statements of this type they were re­
flecting the attitude of many if not me it of the people at the South 
toward the Negro as the Bourbon period began.
V/hile the majority of the Southern whites had a firm view on the 
subject of the colored vote and what it meant to their section, the pri­
mary arguments as to why the members of that race were not capable of 
understanding the responsibilities attached to the exercise of the
^George Campbell, #ite and Black; the Outcome of a Visit to the 
United States (New York, R. Worthington, 1879), p. 27b.
n
Ibid., p. 358. The Georgia planter told Campbell that the young 
Negroes who had reached maturity after the Civil War were the bad ones.
The older colored men, maintained the Georgian, had some virtues, but 
since emancipation it was impossible to discipline them. He also com­
plained that the older Negroes could not or would not discipline the 
younger ones. Ibid., 358-59*
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elective franchise were those advanced by newspapers, pamphleteers, and 
professional politicians. None of these groups were at all hesitant in 
making their viewpoint known. Generally, the theme of the speeches and 
editorials coming from facile Southern pens during this period contained 
one or more of three main ideas. As previously noted, there iras the 
idea, usually expressed for the benefit of people in the South who dis­
liked the Negro, that the colored man was worthy of trust if he behaved 
like a "good old Southern dahky." That is, if the colored men were 
amenable to the freely given advice that their best interests would 
be served by trusting and supporting politically the representatives 
of the class which iras the true heir of their former masters they would 
be freely allowed to exercise the ballot. This theme, for the benefit 
of those who hated the Negro, always contained the thought that the en­
franchisement of the colored men had added to the political power of the 
South and that they really posed no threat as long as they were directed 
by the Bourbons.
Although the idea that the Bourbons could control the Negro for 
the benefit of the South continued to be expressed as the years of the 
period passed, its effectiveness eroded under the realization that in po­
litical affairs the colored men were not always receptive to the advice 
given by this group and that when they were their vote vras not being used 
for the benefit of the South but for the Bourbons. IVhile the Bourbons, 
largely in an effort to convince Northerners, continued to expound the 
thesis that the people of their section had an innate understanding of 
the Negro, the "good old Southern darky" theme of their speeches and 
articles was largely replaced before the end of the period with the one
218
O
which viewed him as a "higoty nigger." This was the theme which viewed
the Hegro with suspicion; it was the one which insisted that the colored
race v/as morally and educationally unqualified to understand the high
responsibilities of the elective franchise. VJhile most Southerners
prefaced their statements on the subject with the view that the South had
no ulterior motives toward the members of that race, underlying a majority
of the pronouncements a few years after the advent of the Bourbon period
9
was the thought that the Negro should not have been enfranchised. Gonse- 
cuently, the predominant theme by the end of the period--sometimes hinted 
at; often expressed--was that which expounded the radical vieivpoint that 
the Negro vote should be curtailed.
Before turning to an examination of some cf the reasons cited by 
the radicals as to why the colored men should not have been enfranchised 
and as to why it might be necessary to limit their political participation, 
it might be noted that other issues involving relations between white and 
black assumed political overtones in the Southern press. One of the con­
tinuing threads of editorial opinion expressed in newspapers from the Gulf 
to Chesapeake Bay was that while the South might have been forced to ac­
cord political equality to the colored men the whites of that area would 
never be willing to accept him on an even social plane. For example, the
T^homas D. Clark, "The Country Newspaper: A Factor in Southern 
Oninion, 1865-I93O," Journal of Southern History, XIV (February, 19^0),
27.
^According to one historian, Southern editors "generally believed 
that the Negro should be denied the right to vote until by education and 
extensive experience he could do so intelligently and show that he was 
free of outside exploitative influences. The Negro, in a significant 
segment of editorial opinion, \ras believed to have natural and primitive 
tendencies which only labor would subdue." Ibid.
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Atlanta Express said in 188O that "as for the freedmen, they are protected 
the same as white men hy the laws, hut as for associating with them . . . 
the suggestion is spurned with contempt.Or, consider the reply made 
hy an accredited organ of the Democratic party in Virginia, the Richmond 
State, to the claim advanced hy Joseph Pulitzer's New York World that the 
Negro I'/as hated in the South. Such, said the editor of the Virginia 
newspaper, \ras simply not the case. "Socially and politically," he said,
"we do not admit his equality, hut insist upon his inferiority and the 
superiority of the white race." Nevertheless, he proclaimed, "as to 
'hating the negro' or heing prejudiced against him in the South, Mr.
Pulitzer is altogether mistaken. We do not hate him, nor do we have any 
prejudice against him. We only demand that he keep his place . . . .
Demands that the Negro "keep his place" occupied a prominent place
in Southern journals during most of the years encompassed within the
Bourbon period. The inference that the colored man was seeking social as
well as political equality ifas continuously utilized as a political device
to keep potential bolters among the whites in line for the party of white
supremacy. Southern newspapers incessantly pointed out that the Negro iras
legally entitled to the ballot and that he generally cast it for candidates
12representing that Southern bugaboo, the Republican., party. Because the
"^^ Atlanta Express, n.d., quoted in Galveston Daily News, December 1, 
1880. The editor of the Texas newspaper commented that his Georgia 
counterpart should not express himself with so much irarmth, but should 
content himself with asking Northern exponents of social equality to 
practice what they preached.
^^Richmond State, n.d., quoted in U.S., Senate, "Alleged Outrages 
in Virginia," Senate Reports, i+8th Cong. 1st Sess. 1883-84, VII, p. v.
1 p
While Southern journals usually maintained a majority of the
220
colored man expressed a propensity for remaining Republican the Southern 
whites were cautioned that if they chose to split over unimportant issues 
they were running the risk of incurring further social leveling--a prospect 
that was anathema to most of the whites of that region.
An example of this type of argument is an article which appeared, 
shortly before the Reconstruction ended in the last of the former Con­
federate states, in the Charlotte Democrat. The editor raised the cry 
that it was necessary to maintain white solidarity in order to protect 
the traditional way of life in the South. "%ite men of North Carolina,” 
questioned the editor, "are you ready for mixed schools, for Negro judges, 
for Negro representatives, for Negro Senators? Are you ready to forget 
that this is a white man's government, framed by the wisdom of the white 
men, and secured by the blood of the white race?" If the whites of his 
state were prepared for such momentous events, advised the editor, they 
should absent themselves from the polls on election day. If, however, 
they were not ready to accept such a situation they should "come up, 
every man of you, and vote for the man of your race. "^3
Negroes were adherents of the Republican party, they always carried ac­
counts after an election which proclaimed that large and increasing 
numbers of colored men were voting Democratic. This may have been for 
the purpose of counterbalancing Republican claims that Democratic totals 
in those areas where Negroes outnumbered whites were obtained only through 
fraud and intimidation.
■^ Charlotte Democrat, August 2, l875; quoted in William A. Nfebry, 
The Negro in North Carolina Politics Since Reconstruction (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 1$A0), pp. 15-16. The Lynchburg (Va.) News warned 
in l88l that the election of that year would determine whether Negroes 
controlled "the schools to which your little children go ... . Remember 
it, white people," cautioned the editor, "when you coma to vote."
Lynchburg News, n.d., quoted in U. S. Senate, "Alleged Outrages in Vir­
ginia," Senate Reports, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., 1883-84, VII, p. v. ’ One 
subscriber of the Nation wrote the editor that one of his friends had
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Newspapers throughout the South continually echoed the warning 
of the Charlotte Democrat that the presence of a mass'^ of ignorant colored 
voters in the hody politic posed a threat to Southern institutions and to 
white supremacy. For example, the principal organ of the Democratic party 
in Alabama informed its readers in 1882 that "the downfall of Democracy 
means the restoration of Negro rule."^^ The editor of the Raleigh News 
and Observer was not so blatant for he told his readers in 1887 that no 
true Southerner desired to have the suffrage limited or the Negro remanded 
to slavery. He qualified his statement on the suffrage, however, by pro­
claiming that "it would be decidedly more wholesome if the negro were 
rendered less prominent in affairs of State than he remains after the 
boost into citizenship given him by the republican party." The colored 
man, \Trote the editor, "has disappeared from the halls of Congress. He 
should disappear as a prominent feature in the political landscape of the 
country as a whole." Southerners, he pontificated, would simply "have him 
assume his normal position and be kept within the degree of his actual 
importance.
The attitude that the Negro should be relegated to the position 
of his actual importance -v/as a theme advanced by many Southern newspapers 
during the period, but probably no other journal advanced so many facets
informed a prominent Negro that the Democrats "... don't intend to 
allow those who have neither property nor intelligence nor character to 
get into power again; they'll die first 1" A South Carolina Subscriber 
to the Editor, Nation, XXVII (December $, I878),
^^Montgomery Advertiser, August 2, 1882, quoted in Allen J. Going, 
Bourbon Democracy in Alabama, 187^-1890 (University, Ala.; University of 
Alabama Press, 19$1), p. 3I.
^^Raleigh News and Observer, December 21, 1887.
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of this idea as did the one edited by the able Henry W. Grady, the Atlanta 
Constitution. Grady had been one of the first to applaud the decision of 
President Hayes to remove Federal troops from the South and he conducted a 
running feud with George W. Cable, characterizing his attitude toward the 
Negro as being "sentimental more than practical.Grady did not, how­
ever, assume the mantle of a crusader and spokesman for the South until 
l336. In December of that year he was invited to deliver an oration on 
"the New South" at the annual banquet of the New England Society in New 
York. In a speech which has become famous Grady ranged far and wide. He 
spoke of the desire of the South to let the issues which had resulted in 
war be regarded as permanently settled; he lauded the New South which had 
"challenged your spinners in Massachusetts and your iron-makers in Pennsyl­
vania"; he spoke, too, of the Negro problem and its solution. "The re­
lations of the southern people with the negro," he said, "are close and
cordial . . . .  To liberty and enfranchisement is as far as the law can 
carry the negro. The rest must be left to conscience and common sense." 
The rights of the colored man, he urged, must be left "to those among 
whom his lot is cast, with whom he is indissolubly connected and whose 
prosperity depends upon their possessing his intelligent sympathy and 
confidence . . . .  Faith will be kept with him in the future," Grady 
promised, "if the South holds her reason and integrity." '
^^Henry W. Grady, "In Plain Black and VJliite--A Reply to Mr.
Cable," Century Magazine, XXIX (April, 1885), 9O9. In this article
Grady insisted that the liberal Cable did not truly represent the South. 
Grady professed to believe that the civil rights and enfranchising 
legislation of the Federal government was unwise, but he thought the 
latter was irrevocable.
^^Joel Chandler. Harris (ed.). Life of Henry W. Grady Including
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Some newspapers in the North attacked Grady's "New South" speech,
1 Q
but, as a whole, it was favorably received in both North and South. The 
same reception \ras accorded to a speech delivered by Grady in November of 
the following year at the Augusta Exposition. Here, on his home ground 
and addressing an audience largely favorable to his views, Grady bitterly 
assailed the victorious North for imposing a mass of ignorant, corrupt 
Negro voters upon the South. To him, it was a part of the Northern plan 
to punish the Southern people for daring to secede. He went ahead to 
caution his receptive audience'to realize that it 17as necessary for the 
South to maintain white solidarity in order to prevent an alien, ignorant, 
purchasable, and impulsive Negro electorate from assuming control. The 
Negro vote, he insisted, "can never be merged through logical or orderly 
currents into either of two parties, if two should present themselves. We 
cannot be rid of it. There it is; a vast mass of impulsive, ignorant, and
19purchasable votes." If there \fas any solution to this problem, according 
to the young journalist, it could only be arrived at by maintaining the 
political and social integrity of the white race. If a course of white 
solidarity was pursued all efforts of the Republicans to ensuare Negro su­
premacy through the medium of Federal election laws would be to no avail. 
"The Negro," said Grady, "can never be established in dominion over the
His Writings and Speeches, A Memorial Volume Compiled by I^ir. Henry W. 
Grady's Co-Workers on ''The Constitution" (New York; Cassel Publishing 
Co., IB9Ù), pp. 89-90..
^^or an account of the reception accorded the speech see Rayford 
W. Logan, The Negro in American Life and Thought, the Nadir, 187T-I9OI 
(New York: The Dial Press, 195 )^; pp. 172-82. Logan is extremely criti- 
cal of Grady.
^%arris (ed.). Life of Henry W. Grady, pp. 12h-26.
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white race of the South. The sword of Grant and the bayonets of his army 
could not maintain them in the supremacy they had won from the helpless­
ness of our people." The situation must not, would not, and could not be 
reversed. "Wo sword," proclaimed Grady, "dravm by mortal men . . . can 
replace them in the supremacy from which they were cast down by our 
people, for the Lord God Almighty decreed otherwise when he created these 
races, and the flaming sword of His archangel will enforce His decree and 
work out His plan of unchangeable wisdom."
Grady's idea that it was the intention of the Republican party to 
attempt to dominate the South through the medium of the Negro vote and his 
view as to the necessity of the whites of his section to prevent this by 
remaining solid vras expressed again and again. In a speech delivered at 
the Texas State Fair in Dallas on October 27, l838, for example, he warned 
that "the supremacy of the white race of the South must be maintained for­
ever, and the domination of the negro race, resisted at all points, and 
at all hazards--because the white race is the superior race . . . .  No
race," he insisted, "has ever risen, or will ever rise above its ordained 
21
place." The colored race, he informed his audience, must be kept in 
its assigned position. The whites of the South must at all costs maintain 
their solidarity and prevent any possible recurrence of Negro domination.
or)
Ibid., pp. 130-36.
^^or the full text of the .speech see the Atlanta Constitution, 
October 28, 1888. , Qn the same day the Constitution carried opinions 
voiced by prominent Georgians to Grady's speech. Senator Colq.uitt said 
it -vras an able and eloquent speech which would be attacked by sectional 
demagogues in the North. Senator Brown said it was full of important 
facts and wholesome advice to the people of the entire nation.
22ibid.
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Grady's interpretation of the dangers inherent for the South in 
the Negro vote did not result in this influential Southerner advocating 
the outright and complete disfranchisement of the colored race. His be­
lief, hovrever, in the innate superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race and of 
the absolute necessity for maintaining white supremacy at any cost as­
sociate him with that large group of Southerners who were radical in their 
attitude toward Negro suffrage.Certainly he \ras never as moderate in 
his opinion as were some of those Bourbon leaders who in the halcyon days 
of Redemption had reveled in their new found power to the extent that they 
welcomed the colored man as an elector. It might be noted, however, that 
in the face of increased opposition from dissatisfied agrarian groups in 
the South and the increasing possibility of Federal legislation to ensure 
the Negro a free ballot and a fair count the vaunted moderation of these 
political directors began to erode and they moved nearer to the attitude 
expressed by the influential Georgia editor.
It is impossible to state with any accuracy that the Bourbon swing
to radicalism began at any specific time for they generally continued to
seek political support from the colored electorate during the entire
period. Some of these individuals obviously became disenchanted with
PIlNegro suffrage earlier than did others. For example, Joseph E. Brovm,
^3|jenry Watterson, a prominent Kentucky editor, had much the same 
view of the race question as did Grady. In 1885 he ivrote that "the 
stronger race will govern; the weaker cannot. The trial was made and we 
saw what came of it." Henry Watterson, "The Reunited Union," North 
American Review, CXL (January, 1885), 23. In I692 he wrote that to give 
the Negro "his freedom all at once was a doubtful experiment ; to give him 
the franchise all at once was a dangerous adventure." Henry watterson, 
"The Negro in America," Ghautauquan, XV (April, l8$2 ), 20-23.
^^In 1877 Charles Gayarre, Congressman from Louisiana, complained
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a member of the Georgia Triumvirate, informed his colleagues in the United 
States Senate in 188I that, while there was a free ballot and a fair count 
in his state, it would have been better for the country as a whole had the 
South been permitted to establish a q.ualified suffrage. The dangers in­
herent for the South and for the entire nation in the fact that the colored 
man \/as indiscriminately enfranchised was apparent because, he said, the 
Negroes "have no wisdom, knowledge, and some no virtue . . .
The attitude expressed by Brown in 188I became more common as 
the years of the decade passed into history. Uhen the Bourbon leadership 
took up their pens in these years to defend the Southern position they 
were cautious to emphasize that there was a free ballot and a fair count 
in the South and that the rights of the colored population were fully pro­
tected.^ '^  Yet, more and more they began to protest that the Negro vote 
was a corrupt and corrupting influence in the politics of their region and 
tlmt enfranchisement had been an error because the colored masses were not
that it had been the purpose of the Radicals to place the colored man in 
a position where he could most harm the South-ras an elector. Gayarre 
said that in those states where the Negro had been politically dominant 
"the excesses perpetrated under this reign of insane power are such that 
they will liave to be softened by the historian, because truth would appear 
too much like exaggeration to be believed by posterity . . . ." Charles 
Gayarre, "The Southern Question," North American Review, CXXV (December,
1877), 483-96.
a full account of this speech see Herbert Fielder, A Sketch 
of the Life and Times and Speeches of Joseph R. Brown (Springfield, Mass ; 
Press of the Springfield Printing Co., I883), pp. 642-49.
^^Alfred H. Colquitt, another member of the Georgia Triumvirate, 
vehemently denied that the Negro vote 1-ra.s suppressed in the South. Never­
theless, he said that "as for the white vote of the South, there is every 
reason why it should be 'solid;' the very instinct of self-preservation de­
manded that it be so." Alfred H. Colquitt, "Is the Negro Vote Suppressed?" 
Forum, IV (November, 1887), 268-75*
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mentally equipped correctly to utilize this all-important privilege. For 
example, Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama wrote in l884 that "all that 
has been done by Congress to elevate the negro race . . . has been to wage 
a conflict with the white race upon the question of caste, and to stimu­
late individual negroes to demand a social equality which they are not 
prepared to enjoy . . . As far as Morgan was concerned the "legis­
lative remedies have failed to remove the negro race from the plane which 
they appear to have selected for their pursuit of happiness, in accordance 
with natural laws." To the Alabama Senator "this failure is definite, and 
it is folly to repeat the attempt. "^7
A colleague of Morgan's in the United States Senate, James B. 
Bustis of Louisiana, was even more blatant in his indictment of the Negro 
race. Four years after Morgan had penned his article for the North Ameri­
can Review, Eustis proclaimed to all the world in an article prepared for 
the Forum that "the negro question remains a running sore in our body 
politic." Like Morgan he believed the Negro to be an inferior creature. 
"The Gulf Stream," he wrote, "that river in the ocean with its own current 
and higher temperature, is no more distinctly separated from the ocean 
than is the negro race from the human family, although a branch of it 
. . . .” It \ras his belief, he said, that the "condition of inequality 
between the negro and the white race, which has alirays existed and will 
always exist . . . springs from a consciousness of superiority in the 
white man and from a consciousness of inferiority in the negro . . . ." 
Bustis then concluded his philippic that "the negro today has every
^7john T. Morgan, "The Future of the Negro," North American 
Review, CXXXIX (July, l838), l44-$$.
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reason to know that under no circumstance will the white people submit
28to his government and his domination."
Although the bitter indictment of the Negro by Eustis elicited an 
answer from the liberals, no prominent Southern politican found it neces­
sary to deny that he was not essentially correct in his interpretation of 
29the situation. In fact, Southern political leaders who had formerly 
been moderate in their attitude toward Negro suffrage were almost as radi­
cal as was Eustis at the time he vnrote his article. Indicative of this 
fact is the change in attitude of the foremost Bourbon, Wade Hampton, in 
the period between 1879 and 1888. In the first year Hampton was saying 
that "when the negro was made a citizen it followed, as a logical conse­
quence, under the theory of our institutions, that he must become a voter. 
My objection to his enfranchisement," he said, "therefore, is confined to 
the time when, and the mode in which, this privilege was conferred upon
3Q
him." A short nine years later the South Carolina Senator was writing 
that anyone who had lived under the baleful supremacy of the Negro real­
ized a recurrence of such domination would "involve total and absolute 
ruin to the South, and infinite and irreparable loss to the whole country." 
Hampton continued his lecture by noting that a large number of men at the
28
James B. Eustis, "Hace Antagonism in the South," Forum, VI 
(October, l833), 1U1+-55*
2qT^he most cogent rebuttal of Eustis' argument was contained in 
a pamphlet written by a prominent clergyman and liberal. See Atticus G. 
Haygood, A Reply to Senator Eustis's Late Paper on Race Antagonisms 
(Nashville; Open Letter Club, IÜÜ9).
^^Quoted in William E. Chandler, "Our Southern Masters," Forum,
IV (July, 1888), 515* Chandler insisted the Negro must have the ballot 
to protect his rights.
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North who were ignorant of conditions in the South and of the character­
istics of the colored race believed that the Negro, hy right, should rule 
wherever he was in the majority. "How erroneous are their opinions," 
moaned Hampton, "and how sound are those of the southern people who have 
had the direful experience of negro supremacy." Enfranchisement of that 
race, he concluded, was a "crime against humanity, civilization, and
Christianity."3^
Although Hampton had obviously dropped his facade of moderation 
by 1888 he still deemed it necessary to qualify his statements against 
the Negro vote by insisting that the South would willingly accept an en­
franchisement policy which would permit the better class of Negroes to 
exercise the ballot.Two years later, however, when there was an in­
creased possibility that the colored people of his state would cooperate 
with the leaders of the agrarian movement in an effort to overthrow the 
Bourbons, he dropped all pretense of moderation. In 189O, a year when 
Congress was discussing the necessity of legislation to ensure the Negro 
of his right to vote Hampton penned an article for a Northern journal in 
which he stated that the colored man had changed little since he vras first 
depicted on the monuments of Egypt. "A pregnant fact, . . ."he i/rote,
"is the white and black races are essentially different, not only in 
physical organization but in mental characteristics." He then cited the 
experiences of the Negro race in Liberia, the Dominican Republic, and 
Haiti to prove that the colored man \m.s incapable of self-government.
^^ Wade Hampton, "IVhat Negro Supremacy Means," Forum, V 
(June, 1888), 383-8^ . ,
3 I^bid., 385.
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Surely^  said Hampton, the Negro was "not fitted to take a part and a con­
trolling one in shaping the destiny of that other race which has ruled 
and dominated the world since creation." Yet, according to Hampton, this 
vas the position in which the Negro ws placed by what he termed the ill- 
advised and unconstitutional laws which conferred the right of citizenship 
upon him. Nevertheless, Hampton accepted the fact that it would be diffi­
cult or impossible to deprive the members of tlaat race of their right to 
vote. Consequently, his solution to the growing problem was to deport 
the Negroes— by their o;m consent— to a place where they "could work out 
their political destiny free from contact with the white race." If such 
a solution -v/as impossible of attainment, however, Hampton said that he 
would "wish to see them scattered over the whole country, so that each 
State of our Union could have the benefit of their presence, or learn by 
actual experience how baleful an influence they exercise . . .
The Senator from South Carolina was not the only Bourbon leader 
who became more radical in attitude toward the colored man and his right 
to vote, but because of his prominence and prestige his attitude com­
manded much attention.It was not, however, only politicians of the 
type represented by Hampton who expounded the radical viewpoint toward 
the subject of the Negro vote and what it signified for the South. Long
33vjade Hampton, "The Race Problem," Arena, XI (July, I89O), 132-38. 
34For example, a Congressman from Kentucky irrote an article in 
which he used the Bible to prove that there always had been and would be 
discord between the races, but that there would be no problem if the Negro 
was scattered throughout the states. He warned that the whites were 
going to control public affairs in spite of laws which sought to give 
the colored man a greater voice. This was because Negroes were incapable 
of governing themselves and others. William C. P. Breckenridge, "The 
Race Question," Arena, XI (June, 1890), 39.
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before Hampton, Colquitt, Vance, Morgan, and others of their ilk abandoned 
their moderate position other Southerners, some prominent; some not, set 
forth arguments against the right or reason for allowing the colored man 
to participate actively and freely in the Southern electoral process.
Almost at the outset of the Bourbon period individuals repre­
senting the radical attitude began to be heard on the subject of the Hegro 
vote. In general they represented the thinlcing of the poor white class, 
the category of Southerners traditionally the most antagonistic toward 
the colored race. Representatives of this class early sought to prove 
tliat the most educated Negro ■^7as in no way equal to the lowest member of 
the Anglo-Saxon race. At the outset of the period, however, they were in 
a distinct minority among the literate group of Southern whites and conse­
quently their f^ailings of despair fell on infertile political ground. Yet, 
as the years passed their forces were augmented by demagogues who sought 
to make political capital out of their traditional antagonism to'VTard the 
Negro, and, thus, toTOrd the end of the decade of the eighties the mouth- 
ings of the radicals against the colored man became more pronounced. 
Eventually, representatives of the philosophy they advanced were to domi­
nate Southern politics— an event which foreboded eventual disfranchisement 
for a majority of the colored race.
As would be expected, the arguments advanced by the early radicals 
were largely based upon the thesis that there was an innate difference be­
tween white and black--a difference which precluded any possibility that . 
the colored man would or could be accepted as an equal in any sense, social 
or political. R. L. Dabney, a prominent Virginia educator, expressed his 
sentiment in 13T9 when he wrote that differences of color, alien blood.
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savage morals, and a total absence of property-stake in the common weal, 
coupled with the propensity of the colored man for accepting "poisonous 
and malignant outside influences" demonstrated the perils attendant upon 
negro suffrage.35 Agreeing with this idea, but expressing it a little 
differently, was a South Carolina clergyman who informed the editor of 
the Nation in 188O that "it was a great mistake to confer the franchise 
upon the negroes indiscriminately" because most of them were unworthy of 
such trust and their presence in the body politic was degrading since 
they could never blend with the whites as one people.3& This attitude 
was seconded by another minister, the Reverend J. L. Tucker of Jackson, 
Mississippi, who informed an Episcopal Church conference at Richmond, 
Virginia in l882 that the Negro lacked honesty, morality, and modesty.
He would, according to Tucker, lie, cheat, and steal, and was a hypocrite 
who desired more than one wife. Thus, he insisted, "no one can do very 
much for the negro."3?
Other radicals who wrote in the eighties had little desire to 
see anything done for the colored man. Beginning about the middle of 
the decade these individuals increased the tempo of their attacks upon 
the colored race. Always they emphasized the differences between the 
races and proclaimed the superiority of the whites. This racist complex
35r. l. Dabney, "Free Schools," Southern Planter and Farmer 
(January, I879), p. 6.
^^ J. H. T. Z j . H. Tillinghas_t7 to the Editor, Nation, XXXI 
(September 2, 188O), 17O.
3ÎQuoted in the Lancet (Petersburg, Va.), November 11, 1882.
This was a Negro newspaper and the editor, naturally prejudiced, said 
that Tucker's tirade was disgusting to every man of sense in the 
audience.
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is well illustrated by a pamphlet \rritten in l866 by the Superintendent 
of Public Instruction of North Carolina, Sidney M. Finger. This indi­
vidual, Southern born but New England educated, maintained that claims 
of the Negro to equality of intellect or force of character with the 
Indo-European rested upon a hair-thin foundation. Finger stated that 
he did not know whether it was the size of the Negro's brain which 
marked him as inferior, but insisted that "... history is against the 
claims of the negro to equality with the white nations."3® Finger also 
believed that the colored race tos not morally or educationally worthy 
of the franchise, and in this attitude he was joined by a Virginian, Noah 
K. Davis, who in the same year complained that, in general, the Negro had 
no conception of the ballot except to use it as directed. This, Davis 
maintained, posed a distinct danger to Southern institutions because the 
colored man was an easy prey for the demagogue. "The silly negro," he 
wrote, "has been a blind and passive tool of his political master, used 
and abused as a mere instrument, degraded from a busy producer to an idle 
nuisance, allowed only to hold the stirrup for vaulting ambition.
That the colored man had been and was merely a political tool 
totally unaware of the responsibilities attached to the franchise privi­
lege and consequently unworthy of its use came to be the keystone of the 
radical argument. A concomitant, however, was that members of the white
2®Sidney M. Finger, Educational and Religious Interests of the 
Colored People of the South (Washington: National Educational Association, 
1ÜÜ6), p. 1. A copy of this pamphlet may be found at the University of 
Virginia Library.
3%oah K. Davis, "The Negro in the South," Forum, I (April,
1886), 129.
234
race, regardless of their social and economic position or of educational 
qualifications, were fully and freely entitled to the franchise simply be­
cause they belonged to the superior race. For example, Horace S. Fulkerson 
of Mississippi wrote in I887 that "color has much if not everything to do 
with the relation of races to civilization . . . .  In so far as the races 
. . . are concerned race characteristics, determined by color, are as im­
mutable as any of the laws of nature . . Fulkerson, insisting that
"the benign influence of American slavery . . . was to that race a benefi­
cence, " proclaimed to all that enfranchisement of the colored men loosed 
"a flood tide originating on the benighted shores of Africa to mingle with 
a stream purified by the learning, the wisdom, the valor, and the patri­
otism of countless ages."^^ This action, he complained with vehemence,
was a sacrilege and a "degradation of the highest privilege belonging to 
iiOa civilized manl" Enfranchising the colored men, he insisted, had 
tainted and degraded the ballot for all time because no one could possibly 
respect its exercise by the ignorant mass of corrupt Negroes. "It is no 
palliation of the offense," he maintained, "to be told that some white men 
are no better. \9hy increase an evil— make it fourfold when it is only
S. Fulkerson, The Negro; As He vra.s; As He is; As He Will Be 
(Vicksburg: Commercial Herald Printers, 1ÜÜ7), p. 4. Fulkerson was born 
in Kentucky in 1818, but removed to Mississippi in I836. In I861 he was 
sent to Europe as a special agent to purchase arms for the Confederacy. 
After his return he served the Confederacy in various capacities until, 
in the last stages of the war, he became a corporal in the army. In 1867 
he moved his family to Vicksburg where he engaged in the merchantile 
business until his death in 188I. For a more complete account of his 
life see H. S. Fulkerson, Random Recollections of Early Days in Missis­
sippi (Baton Rouge: Otto Claitor, 1937)*
^^ulkerson. The Negro; As He Was; As He Will Be, p. 4l.
^^Ibid., p. 43.
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single? And it should not be forgotten," Fulkerson advised, "that the 
ballot is the birthright of the native born white man . . .
To say that the rantings of Fulkerson were based upon emotionalism 
and upon an obvious hatred of the colored race and should be regarded in 
that light would be to ignore the fact that he was expressing the opinion 
of many of the less literate and less vocal members of the radical group. 
Individuals associated with this shadowy, ill-defined mass disliked their 
colored neighbors so intensely that they were anxious to see the Negro— a 
race they regarded as something less than human— relegated to a position 
where he could not compete in any manner. It is not surprising, then, to 
find other Southerners giving voice to the opinion that colored men were 
entitled to little consideration. Raising their voices in lamentation on 
the subject of the Negro and the elective franchise, for example, were 
such other individuals as Frank G. Ruffin of Virginia and a prominent 
educator from Kentucky, Nathaniel S. Shaler.^^
In the year I888 and again in I89O Ruffin published articles which 
constituted nothing less than tirades against the Negro race. The first 
was submitted to the editors of the Forum and the Century, but when they
^^Ibid., p. yo. 
khOthers who took a dim view of Negro suffrage included Joel 
Chandler Harris, Walter B. Hill, and John C. Wicliffe. Hill wrote that 
the South "is not to be ruled by the blacks, nor by white men at home or 
from abroad who owe their election exclusively to the blacks." Walter B. 
Hill, "Uncle Tom Without a Cabin," Century Magazine, V (April, 188U), 882. 
Wicliffe wrote in 1893, after the .Bour'bori period, that the Negro "stands 
just where he did twenty-five years ago— a cipher on the political black­
board, valuable only when controlled by other figures, and in nowise af­
fecting the result by reasons of his own worth." John C. Wicliffe, "Negro 
Suffrage a Failure; Shall We Abolish It?" Forum, XIV (February, I893), 
801. Wicliffe TOS of the opinion that it was not only feasible but 
necessary to abolish Negro suffrage.
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refused to accept it Ruffin published his philippic at his own expense.
In the pamphlet, innocently entitled The Negro as a Social and Political 
Factor, the Virginian reiterated the often-expressed view that Negro 
suffrage was imposed upon the South as a punishment for secession and as 
a means of advancing the cause of the Republican party. At the outset, 
according to Ruffin, the colored men had little conception of the re­
sponsibilities attached to the exercise of the ballot, but, guided by 
their Republican mentors, they used and were using it in an effort to 
achieve social equality in the South. To Ruffin such a prospect 'iras 
anathema. The colored men, he said, were "not descendants of Republican 
barbarians or pagans, as we are, but of savages the "beginning of
history a race of slaves and despots, lechers, polygamists, cannibals 
. . . poisoners, thieves, having no record of independent progress 
. . . What possible good could it do, he asked, to give high po­
litical rights to such a people? Certainly enfranchisement could not 
cause any advancement of that race and those who supported a continuation 
of such an affair could only be regarded as enemies of the South.
Ruffin's first pamphlet iras published during the course of a 
bitter political campaign in his home state, but in 189O he purposefully
^^ F^rank G. Ruffin, The Negro as a Political and Social Factor 
(Richmond: J. W. Randolph and English, Publishers, lbb3)," p. 3. A copy 
of this pamphlet is located in the University of Virginia Library.
^^ To those who believed the suffrage was a civilizing force Ruffin 
had a word: "Fools and blind1 As if there was a vivida vis, a living
force in citizenship, to make men fit for freedom. As if the varnish of 
suffrage could cure inherent defects of the Ethopian's inner nature any 
more than whitewash could change his inherent skin I" Ibid. Ruffin warned 
the people of his state that political solidarity was essential to the 
maintenance of white supremacy. Ibid., p. 6^.
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waited until after the canvass of that year to publish his solution to 
the race issue. It was his contention that Northern idealists and the 
leaders among Southern Negroes considered miscegenation to be the ideal 
solution to the problem confronting the races. The aspirations of the 
colored man, he informed the eighty per cent of the Southern whites that 
he considered to reside in the rural areas, "lead them to demand not only 
civil, but social equality; and the greatest stimulus to their aspirations
k 7
is that the time may come when they can all have white wives." ' Ruffin 
continued his race baiting by insisting that if the Negro was permitted 
to remain as a permanent resident of the South and continued to be allowed 
to exercise the franchise there was a possibility that he would eventually 
dominate the whites. It is, he said, "a portentous evil to have this race 
as a permanent factor in . . . politics . . . ." It was intolerable to 
consider the prospect of that race living in Virginia upon the same social 
plane as the white citizens because "that insures degradation of the latter 
into mongrels.Consequently, Ruffin concluded that because the Negro 
was a savage race the only sane solution to the problem was to bodily de­
port them to Africa. This could easily be brought about, he believed, be­
cause the colored people would desire to emigrate if educational and po­
litical advantages were withdrawn, by all of the states— an event which he
"^^ Frahk. G. Ruffin, iVhite or Mongrel? A Pamphlet on the Deportation 
of Negroes from Virginia to Africa (Richmond; Everett Waddey Co., 1590), 
pp. preface, $. Ruffin said that the twenty per cent of the population 
residing in the cities and making money wanted to leave the race question 
alone for fear of agitating the North. Eighty per cent of the population, 
however, were rural and since there was a coming conflict with industri­
alists, especially the railroad interests, must gain political strength 
by getting rid of the Negroes.
^Ibid., p. 7.
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thought should be immediately accomplished.
Ruffin's opinions of the Negro, expressed through the medium of 
pamphlets because reputable periodicals would not accept his articles for 
publication, were symptomatic of the attitude of many people in the South 
toward the members of the colored race. Professor N. S. Shaler, for ex­
ample, agreed that the Negro was little more than a savage. In fact, he 
OTote in 1890, the colored race was nearer the anthropoid or pre-human 
ancestry of man than other variety such as the Aryan, Tartar, or Semitic 
folk.50 mo where else was this more evident than in the field of poli­
tics. Not only did the colored men make an ignominious failure in govern­
ment when they were in control of the Southern states, but they became 
the tool of the basest type of whites during and after that time. To give 
the ballot any meaning, wrote Shaler, the man who casts it must have a 
keen and intelligent interest in public affairs and the Negro did not pos­
sess this particular attribute. Since the colored man had risen little 
above the savage state, he said, while siting upon the subject of proposed 
Federal election laws, "it is more than absurd to devise legislative plans 
for making him free to use his vote. The enfranchisement can come only
51by education . . . To Shaler, then, as to most radicals it was
necessary to effect a cessation or at the minimum a limitation upon Negro 
participation in politics until he could be lifted from his state of 
savagery. Only by so doing could the white civilization be preserved.
^^ Ibid.
^^ N. 8 . Shaler, "The Nature of the Negro," Arena, II (December,
1890), 23. ----
51lbid., 23-35.
239
The radical attitude toward the Negro and his right to the 
franchise was expressed in various ways and with ever-increasing frequency 
during the decade of the eighteen-eighties— a fact which demonstrates the 
fallacy of the oft-expressed idea that the colored race was illegally but 
effectively disfranchised when the Southern whites assumed political con­
trol with the end of Reconstruction. Had not large numbers of Negroes 
still exercised the ballot during this decade there would have been no 
reason for the increase in arguments as to why the colored vote posed a 
distinct threat to the South and to Southern institutions; there would 
have been no reason for a change in the predominant theme of "the good 
old Southern darky" to one which emphasized the "bigoty nigger." Never­
theless, these changes did occur and before the turn of the decade the 
emphasis was on the fact that it was necessary for the future of the South 
that some restriction be placed upon the exercise of the franchise by the 
colored race.
That the radicals could agree that the Northern conqueror had im­
posed Negro suffrage upon the South as a method of punishment is obvious.
By the end of the decade an urbane journalist such as Henry Grady, a poli­
tician like Wade Hampton, or a rabble-rouser of the type represented by 
Frank Ruffin could agree that the Negro should be removed as a factor in 
the political life of the South. There was, however, a lack of balance 
among the radicals. They were not always in unison as to the methods which 
should be utilized to accomplish the desired end or, for that matter, on 
the actual extent to which the Negro did pose a threat. Grady, for ex­
ample, emphasized white solidarity as the means whereby the colored man 
could be controlled. On the other hand, the more radical Ruffin went to
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the extreme and suggested that deportation to Africa vas the only solution.
The middle of the radical position came to be occupied by the 
Bourbon leadership. These individuals had based much of their program 
upon the fact that they were best able,to guide and direct the colored 
race because of past experience and that the rights of the Negro were 
safe as long as they were in control. As consumate politicians, however, 
they had been successful in their efforts to convince the mass of Southern 
whites— a group which was by nature radical in its attitude toward the 
Negro vote— that it was requisite for the whites to remain solid if they 
did not desire the colored man to regain his Reconstruction-era importance. 
Thus, during most of the period they emphasized that the whites of the 
South must accept Bourbon decisions in all areas of thought in order to 
maintain the vaunted white superiority. Nevertheless, some of the 
Southerners who were radical in their attitude toward the colored man and 
who were disenchanted with Bourbon economic policies early rebelled and 
launched Independent political parties. Generally, such movements at­
tracted little real support because the Democratic party was associated 
with the idea of white supremacy . By the end of the decade of the 
eighties, however, representatives of the rural Southerners were en­
deavoring to gain control of the Democratic party. Not only were they 
advocates of white supremacy, but they were the exponents of a program of 
economic reform which would supposedly be of benefit to the rural white.
In an effort to counter their attack the Bourbons changed the complexion 
of their attitude toward the Negro vote, but the die was cast and their 
reversal in attitude provided only a brief respite from the inevitable. 
Thus, in the decade of the nineties the domination of the Democratic party
2k 1
went to the representatives of the rural white Southerner, and the days 
of the Negro as an elector were numbered.
CHAPTER VIII 
CLOSING THE DOOR
The years encompassed within the decade of the eighteen-nineties
i -
constitute a pivotal period in the history of the Negro for it was during 
this time that the colored elector in the Southern states was relegated 
to the political limbo from which he had emerged after the Civil War.
For a very brief period after that conflict the Negro, protected by 
Federal law and bayonets, had freely enjoyed the political privilege 
which gave substance to the fact that he was truly emancipated. Un­
fortunately for the political future of the colored men, however, the 
elective franchise had been granted less because the Radical Republicans 
had a real desire to promote the welfare of the freedraen than because 
they hoped to use the Negro votes as an instrument through which their 
personal power and prestige and that of their party might be enhanced. 
Through the utilization of the colored vote the Carpetbagger and Scalawag 
were, for varying periods of time, successful in their efforts to dominate 
and exploit the governments of all those states which had experimented in 
rebellion. Their employment of the Negro vote, coupled with the satur­
nalia of corruption with which their administrations were charged, had, 
however, an effect upon the mass of Southern whites which the Radicals 
had not anticipated. Faced with tne dire prospect of continued control 
by the Republican-Negro combination and its attendant social, economic,
2k2
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and political leveling, the whites of the South largely subordinated the 
differences which had divided them in the ante-bellum period and achieved 
virtual political solidarity. Led by the "Confederate Brigadiers," the 
nominal heirs of the old aristocracy, the whites in state after state 
employed legal, semi-legal, and extra-legal methods to drive from power 
the Republicans and their colored allies. In state after state their 
efforts were marked with success until home rule was a fact instead of 
a dream in all of the former Confederate states.
Restoration of home rule in the last of the Southern states 
came in 1877 as the result of a bargain between Northern Republicans and 
Southern-Democrats--an alliance not at all rare in contemporary politics. 
When the election of I876 was complete there was a dispute over whether 
the electoral votes of Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina belonged to 
Tilden or to Hayes. Although a Republican-controlled electoral commission 
determined that the votes of each of these states should be counted for 
Hayes, there was the threat that a Democratic filibuster in the House of 
Representatives would prevent his inauguration. With the assistance of 
Southern Democrats, however, the filibuster was broken and Hayes was 
chosen as the successor of Grant. In exchange for this assistance 
Hayes, shortly after his inauguration, withdrew support from the Radi­
cal claimants to the governorship in South Carolina and Louisiana and - 
also recalled the last of the Federal occupation forces from the South.^
^An important part of the political bargain which was concluded 
contained the promise of the Republicans that they would assist in the 
securing of a Federal subsidy for the construction of the Texas and Pa­
cific railroad and other internal improvements. Promises of the with­
drawal of the troops from South Carolina and Louisiana were made re­
peatedly between December, 1876, and March, 187?. VThen a Republican
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The beginning of Hayes' conciliatory policy toward the South was 
full of portent for the Negro. On the day after the election, when he be­
lieved Tilden to be the victor, Hayes wrote that "I don't care for myself; 
and the party, yes, and the country, too, can stand it; but I do care for 
the poor colored men of the South . . . .  The result will be that the 
Southern people will practically treat the constitutional amendments as
nullities, and then the colored man's fate will be worse than when he was 
2
in slavery." After Southern Congressmen assisted in his election, how­
ever, the tenor of Hayes' statements on the subject underwent a change.
In September of 1 ÔTJ, while on a "good-will" tour of the South, he con­
tinually reiterated the idea that reconciliation had truly been effected 
and that harmony between the sections would continue to prevail. Even 
more important to the Negroes, however, was his assertion in Atlanta that 
their "... rights and interests would be safer if this great mass of 
intelligent white men were left alone by the general government."3
Although Hayes had reached the conclusion before the end of his 
administration that the political rights of the colored men were not being 
respected in the South little effort was made by him or his Republican
newspaper appeared to repudiate these promises, the famous Wormley Hotel 
conference was held on February 26 and 27, 1877. Apparently the promise 
of withdrawal of troops was reaffirmed for Southerners respected their 
agreement. For a complete account of the economic and political bargain 
which was concluded see C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction; The 
Compromise of I877 and the End of Reconstruction (Boston; Little, Brown 
and Co., I951], especially pp. 8, 25, 195-98, 201-02,
C^harles Richard Williams (ed.). Diary and Letters of Rutherford 
Birchard Hayes, Nineteenth President of the United States (Columbus, Ohio; 
Ohio State Archaelogical and Historical Society, 1922-26), I, 488-8$.
^Quoted in Atlanta Constitution, September 22, 1877.
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successors to overturn the agreement of I877. Investigating commissions 
were organized in several instances by the Republican-controlled Congress, 
but no concrete action was taken upon their findings prior to the intro­
duction of the Lodge bill in 189O. Undoubtedly one reason for this was 
that the conservative Bourbons were closely akin to the Republicans in 
their political philosophy and their support in Congress often was valu­
able in the implementation of the Republican program. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the Republican party maintained its organization in the South 
and often endorsed anti-Bourbon candidates such as Nfehone in Virginia 
made the colored man remain an important factor in the political life of 
that section. V/hile some members of that race willingly associated them­
selves with the Democratic party, the general course of events in national 
elections saw them maintaining their allegiance to the party responsible 
for emancipation. This fact enabled the Bourbons, whenever revolt against 
their program was threatened, to demand that the Southern whites give un- 
deviating loyalty to the party of white supremacy. Otherwise, they in­
sisted, a revival of the Republican-Negro combination and a return to the 
excesses of Reconstruction was more than a distinct possibility.
Although during the period of the eighteen-eighties many Southern 
whites expounded upon the desirability of effecting the disfranchisement 
of the colored race, as long as the Bourbons were in control they pre­
vented this radical suggestion from being brought to fruition. Un­
doubtedly a major reason for their posture of moderation was their con­
viction that Northern liberals must be convinced that Hayes' early as­
sertion that the political future of the Negro was safe in the hands of 
the Southern whites was correct. Otherwise, their conservative allies
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among the Republicans in Congress might be pressured into enacting legis­
lation guaranteeing a free ballot and a fair count. Such an event would 
result in a revival of the Republican party in the South and would threaten 
Bourbon hegemony. . Another, and probably more basic reason, that these 
leaders did not succumb to the radical argument that disfranchisement was 
necessary was that they often found the colored vote usefuJ to their own 
purposes. lÆiile the Negro vote was primarily available to the Republican 
party in campaigns with national overtones that party, as previously noted, 
made no real effort to contest for control of the Southern state govern­
ments after 1876. Consequently, such real opposition as was manifested 
to the Bourbon program came from dissatisfied elements within the Demo­
cratic party. IVhen revolt occurred, and as the eighties progressed it 
happened with increasing frequency, the Bourbons found that through the 
medium of fusion arrangements they could win the support of the Negro 
leaders and through them the vote of the colored electorate. Such an 
event not only enabled the Bourbons correctly to inform Northern doubters 
that the Negro was permitted to vote at the South, but it also contributed 
to the maintenance in power of the group which had led the successful 
battle for home rule.
To the Bourbons the continuation of their class in political con­
trol was basic to the economic advancement of the South. Traditionally 
that region was one in which the primary economic orientation was agri­
cultural. Prior to the Civil War it had been not only the basis of the 
wealth but of the entire social structure. Just as a society based upon 
slavery had crumpled under the assault of Union arms so, the Bourbons 
were convinced, had that conflict amply demonstrated that there was an
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inherent weakness in an economy based almost exclusively upon agriculture. 
Consequently, after Redemption had freed the South from the political con­
trol of the victorious North they began to insist that if their section 
was to rise phoenix-like from the ashes it must subordinate the agrarian 
tradition and take advantage of the wealth which was latent in its abundant 
natural resources and cheap labor. The South, they preached with an 
almost religious fervor, must emulate the North by fully developing the 
industrial and commercial potential with which it was endowed.
Diversification of the economy of the South, the Bourbons early 
realized, would not be possible on the desired scale with the relatively 
small amount of native capital which was available for investment. Thus, 
it was requisite for that section to attract funds from the purses of 
Northern investors. Such would be possible, however, only if there was 
a more favorable "climate for business endeavor in the South than in the 
North.^ It therefore became the purpose of the Bourbons to convince po­
tential investors that the economic weather in their section ^ ras as balmy 
as the climate of Florida. Southern journals launched a continuous propa­
ganda campaign in which the natural resources awaiting exploration and the 
plentiful supply of cheap and docile labor v/as emphasized. Real oppor­
tunities for investment, they insisted, could no where be better founa 
than in the South.^  More important to the actual and potential investor.
It might be noted that the first real effort at industrialization 
came in the effort to bring the textile mills to the cotton fields. In 
the eighties this endeavor assumed the proportions of a religious crusade, 
and it irns accomplished primarily with capital raised in the South. For 
a discussion of this campaign see Brodaus Mitchell, The Rise of the Cotton 
Mills in the South (Johns Hopkins University Studies," Vol. ÎOCXIX, No. 20; 
Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1921).
A^mong the newspapers which evidence this are the Atlanta Journal,
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however, was the fact that during the eighties the Bourbon-controlled 
legislatures in state after state enacted legislation which vras friendly 
to the business community. Liberal franchises, subsidies, and tax ad­
vantages were freely bestowed upon receptive railroads and manufacturing 
concerns— a fact which brought dividends as the decade rolled to its con­
clusion. For example, the railroad mileage in the South in 1890 i^ as more 
than double that which had been in existence only ten years before.
Textile plants had blossomed amidst the cotton fields, the tobacco indus­
try \fas greatly expanded, and blast furnaces were belching smoke in cities 
which had not even existed prior to the Civil War.^ Truly, the Bourbon's 
polities were changing the economic complexion of the South.
Progress is seldom possible without sacrifice and in the South it 
was the agrarian element that made it possible. Undoubtedly the farmers 
of this region believed that a restoration of home rule would free them 
from onerous taxation and similar economic policies which had prevailed 
during Reconstruction. To the disgust of the farmer, however. Redemption 
did not result in any marked improvement in his position. In essence the 
agrarian element had merely replaced one group which was oriented toward 
the business community with another, and upon them had fallen, as one 
Mississippi newspaper complained, "the burden of taxation, out of all 
proportion to the value of their property or their ability to pay."^
Raleigh News and Observer, New Orleans Picayune, and, especially, the 
Atlanta Constitution.
^or a succinct summary of the success attendant upon the efforts 
of the South to diversify the economy see Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Rise 
of the Cities, 1878-98, Vol. X of A History of American Life, eds. Arthur 
M. Schlesinger and Dixon R. Fox (13 vols.; New York: Macmillan Co., I927- 
U8), pp. 1-22.
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Bourbon efforts to encourage industrialization through favorable
franchises and tax benefits were not, however, the only causal factor in
8the depressed condition of Southern agriculture during the eighties. On 
the national scene the policies pursued by the Republican party worked to 
the disadvantage of the Southern farmer as well as to that of his counter­
part in other sections. One of the primary complaints of the rural element 
in the South was that the business-oriented Republican party insisted upon 
maintaining a high protective tariff. This not only resulted in the farmer 
having to pay a higher price for his manufactured products, but, since 
other nations usually retaliated by imposing a high tax on the commodities 
they imported from the United States, usually agricultural products, the 
farmer also lost a portion of his market.
While the tariff course of the national government was unsatis­
factory to the agrarian element another aspect of the Republican's policy 
was even more bitterly disliked. Farmers throughout the nation, faced 
with a continual decline in the price received for their products,5
7Jackson Clarion, December 15, l886, quoted in C. Vann Woodward, 
Origins of the New South, 1877-1913, Vol. IX of A History of the South, 
eds. Wendell H. Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (10 vols.; Baton Rouge ; 
Louisiana State University Press, 1947--), p. 187.
^In the former Confederate states where cotton continued to be 
uhe primary crop, all but Florida and Virginia, the number of farms in­
creased from 449,936 in i860 to 1,110,294 in 188O. During the same period 
the average size of a farm declined from 347 to 156 acres. In 188O the 
census counted as a farm any land worked by a family. Thus, if a plan­
tation owned by one individual was tilled by several tenants each of the 
smaller tracts would be counted as a single farm. By I88O some-301,738 of 
the farms in the cotton states were worked by tenants. U.S., Bureau of the 
Census, Tenth Census of the United States, 188O. Agriculture, III, 25.
%he average price of a bushel of corn in the years between 1874 
and 1877 was 40.9 cents. The price declined until the average between 
1894 and 1897 was 29*7 * Prices received for cotton declined even more
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increasingly voiced their dissatisfaction with the government's acceptance
of the idea of the necessity for currency contraction. In all sections
of the nation farmers complained that at the same time the price they
received for their crops was declining the amount of their debts when
10measured in the terms of production was increasing. This, coupled 
with the apparent favoritism of the government toward business, convinced 
the farmer in every section that he was the unloved in the American eco­
nomic system.
While the downward trend in the prices received was a common
grievance of farmers throughout the nation in the ei^teen-eighties, the
Southern farmer was convinced that his position was worse than that of
his Northern counterpart. Not only was he saddled with an outmoded tax
structure with land bearing a disproportionate share of the tax burden,
but he often found that it was difficult for him to borrow money. In the
North and West the farmer could usually secure a loan by mortgaging his
land to the local banlc, but the Southern farmer ^ vas not so fortunate. Not
only was the banking system of the South still dislocated as a result of
the war, but the value of land in that section was too small to make it
11attractive for loans. Also, many of the Southern farmers did not own
from a percentage standpoint. While the price of corn fell 32.8^ in 
these years that of cotton declined lu monetary terms the price
of cotton fell from an average of 11.1 cents a pound in the period of ■ 
187^-77 to 5.8 cents between 1894-97» John D» Hicks, The Populist Revolt ; 
A History of the Farmer's Alliance and the People's Party (Minneapolis; 
University of Minnesota Press, 1931), P» 5 ^-
l^In other words, due to currency contraction there was less 
money in circulation and it was consequently more difficult to obtain. 
Thus, a farmer who had borrowed money when his wheat was bringing one 
dollar per bushel would often find it required twice as many bushels 
a few years later to meet his fixed obligations.
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their land, hut instead tilled the acres belonging to someone else for a
share of the crop. Consequently, the funds they so desperately needed for
seed, tools, fertilizer, draft animals, and supplies had to be secured
from some agency other than a bank. In the South this agency came to be
a local supply merchant. This individual, also a Bourbon, would advance
credit to the farmer, at a usurious rate of interest, in the form of sup- 
12plies. Once a farmer had concluded an agreement with a merchant he \fas 
required to restrict his business to that individual until the original 
obligation had been paid. Often the crop which he produced in a single 
year was not sufficient to meet his debt, and he was forced to place an­
other lien on his next crop.^ ^ The ultimate effect of this situation,
^^he situation in regard to banking in the South thirty years
after the can be seen from the fact that in 1895 there was in the
whole country one bank for every l6,600 people. At the same time there
ira.s in all of the cotton states but Texas one bank for every 58,130 
people. In Georgia there were I23 counties in 189^ ./Lich had no in­
corporated banlï of any kind. Figures cited in Woodward, Origins of the 
New South, p. 183.
12Not only was the interest rate extremely high, but the farmer 
also was faced with a two-price system, the cash price and the credit 
price.
13The farmer not only bought in the highest market, but he usually 
was forced to sell in the lowest. As soon as his crop was harvested his 
obligation to the merchant \ms due and he \/as forced to sell his crop in­
stead of holding it for a higher price. Usually, too, the merchant in­
sisted upon the production of a crop with which he x/as familiar, which 
al\/ays would command some sort of a cash price, and which could not be 
consumed by the farmer and his family. Thus, despite Bourbon efforts to 
secure crop diversification, the Southern farmer generally produced cotton 
and tobacco during this period. Many authors have examined the effect of 
the crop-lien system upon the South. See Matthew B. Hammond, The Cotton 
Industry; An Essay in American Economic History (New York; American 
Economic Association, 1877.), George K. Holmes, "The Peons of the South, " 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and.Social Science, IV 
(Philadelphia ; The Academy, 1893), 265-74; Benjamin B. Kendrick,
"Agrarian Discontent in the South, 188O-19OO," Annual Report of the 
American Historical Association, 1920 (Washington; Government Printing 
Office, 1925), PP* 265-72. '
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given legal sanction by the Bourbon-controlled and business-oriented 
legislatures, was the development of a system of debt peonage in the 
South.
The economic ills of the Southern farmer, aggravated and com­
pounded by the policies of the Bourbons, made that class ripe for politi­
cal revolt as the decade of the eighties rolled to a conclusion. Earlier 
farmer-oriented movements had not had any lasting effect upon the South 
because the agrarian element of that section was convinced that any di­
vision in the party of white supremacy would result in a revival of Negro- 
Republican rule and further social and economic leveling. Consequently, 
the first real attack upon Bourbon political hegemony came late in the 
decade of the eighties from the agrarian element organized within the 
Southern Farmers' Alliance. The genesis of this movement came in 1875 
when a group of small farmers in Lampasas County, Texas, organized for 
the purpose of protecting themselves against land syndicates and cattle 
kings. The movement spread to a few other Texas counties, but in the 
Greenback campaign of 1878 it was beset with internal political dis­
sension and was disbanded. During the early eighties, however, the 
Texas Alliance, largely due to the efforts of Dr. C. VJ. Macune, was re­
vived and expanded. In January of 1887 a meeting was held at Waco, and, 
despite the efforts of some divisive groups to creat dissension, the 
delegates voted to consolidate with the Louisiana Farmers' Union in a
new organization— the National Farmers' Alliance and Cooperative Union
ihof America, commonly termed the Farmers' Alliance.
^^^cune was elected president of the new organization.
Woodward, Origins of the New South, pp. 188-91-
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Shortly after the new organization ifas completed recruiting teams 
were sent into all of the cotton states with the evangelistic message 
that effective cooperation would result in a mitigation of the economic 
ills suffered by the agrarian class. The verbal attack upon the policies 
of the Bourbons and of the national government was a clarion call to the 
benighted farmer. In almost every state individual farmers and inde­
pendent agrarian organizations, convinced that the program offered by the 
Alliance would improve their financial situation, rushed to cast their lot 
with the new movem e n t .^5 Share-croppers and cash tenants, small land 
oraers and large, thus demonstrated their belief that the new economic 
order of the Bourbon benefited only a few.
The organizational success achieved by the Alliance in the South 
did not end the efforts of agrarian leaders in that section to effect a 
combination of class-conscious farmers which could successfully challenge 
the entrenched political parties. In 1889 an attempt iras 'made to merge 
with a similar agricultural group, the Northern Alliance, which had 
blossomed among the dissatisfied farmers of the Midwest. An effort was 
made at consolidation of the two organizations in a joint convention 
which was held at Saint Louis in that year, but, ^ Largely because the 
Southern leaders insisted that "secrecy" must be maintained, the attempt 
came to naught.Nevertheless, the two Alliances did recognize that the
T^he largest of these was the Agricultural VJheel which was organ­
ized in Arkansas in l882 and quickly spread into surrounding states. By 
l884 it claimed over a half million members. Consolidation of the Wlieel 
and the Alliance was completed in 1889. Also swelling the ranks of the 
Alliance were the over one million members of the Colored Farmers' National 
Alliance and Cooperative Union. This group was organized at Houston in 
1886 and soon spread into all of the Southern states. Ibid., pp. 191-92.
^^ It should be noted that the leaders of the Southern Alliance,
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problems of the farmers were everyv^ here alike. They salvaged something 
from the meeting by issuing a joint statement in which it was proposed 
that the Federal government should own and operate the railroads, national 
banks should be abolished, a monetary program which would place more 
currency in circulation should be adopted, and legislation regulating 
the activities of the trusts should be enacted. Obviously, the class- 
conscious rural element was in the mood for revolt in I889.
The socialistic program advocated by the Alliance was anathema 
to the Bourbons of the South as well as to the business-oriented Republi­
cans at the North. Establishment of cooperative marketing and purchasing 
agencies by the Alliance in some states, agitation for the "subtreasury 
plan," boycotts against those newspapers and their advertisers which at­
tacked the farmers' movement, and sundry other programs which were alien 
to the philosophy of the New South early convinced the Bourbons that the 
Southern Alliance posed a distinct threat to the continuation of their 
program.
representing an organization superior from a numerical standpoint, did 
make some concessions. They accepted, for instance, the name of the new 
organization suggested by Northern leaders and also agreed to admit 
Negroes into the Superior Council. Although no new organization was 
created, the Southern Alliance gained ground due to the fact that some 
state organizations seceded from the Northern Alliance to follow the 
Southerners. Ibid., pp. 200-01. See also Leonidas L. Polk, "The 
Farmers' Discontent," North American Review, CLIII (July, I89I), 5-12.
'^^ one aspect of the Alliance program which \fas bitterly disliked 
by the Bourbons was the "sub-treasury plan," the brain-child of y&cune. 
This called for the establishment of storage facilities and a subtreasury 
office in every county that offered for sale at least one-half million 
dollars worth of farm products in a year. The farmer would be allowed to 
store his nonperishable crops in the warehouses and to receive certifi­
cates of deposit which would entitle him to a loan of legal tender notes 
equal to eighty per cent of the market value of the crops he had stored. 
For this loan he would pay one per cent plus a small charge for storage
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Equally alarming to the Bourbons as the socialistic ideas advo­
cated by the farmers was the possibility that the Alliance might turn to 
political action in an effort to implement its program. In the early 
years of its existence the leaders of the Southern Alliance, conscious 
of the fact that earlier farmer-oriented movements had been wrecked be­
cause of their revolt from the proscriptive one-party system, had shunned 
political action. Nevertheless, there was the possibility that this 
situation would not continue to prevail. Consequently, the Bourbons in­
creasingly made radical pronouncements upon the subject of the colored 
vote, warning that any split in the party of white supremacy would result 
in a revival of the Republican-Negro combination.
That the radical arguments advanced by the Bourbons in regard to 
the colored vote made an impression upon the leaders of the Southern Al­
liance is evident from the situation which developed in the elections 
which were held in the South during 189O. Early in that year the Al­
liance, now led by the able North Carolinian, Leonidas L. Polk,^® began 
its first successful revolt against the political and economic domination 
of the entrenched Bourbons. Unlike the Greenbacker and some of the Inde­
pendent parties, however, the Alliance sought to accomplish its ends by 
dominating the state nominating conventions of the Democratic p a r t y .
and handling. For a more detailed account see John D. Hicks, "The Sub- 
Treasury; A Forgotten Plan for the Relief of Agriculture," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, XV (December, 1928), 355-73*
^^ For an evaluation of Polk's contributions see Clarence Poe,
"L. L. Polk, A Great Agrarian Leader in a Fifty-Year Perspective,"
South Atlantic Quarterly, XLI (October, 19 2^), 405-15.
^^ Potential candidates were informed that they must measure up 
to the "Alliance Yardstick." Generally, this meant they must sign a 
pledge to support the Alliance program.
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By so doing they lessened the possibility that the Bourbons would be able
to defeat their purposes by raising the cry that solidarity in that party
was necessary if white supremacy was to be maintained. This political
strategy of the class-conscious Alliance leaders paid dividends because
signal victories were won in almost every Southern state. In Georgia, for
example, the Alliance chose the governor, three-fourths of the senators,
four-fifths of the state representatives, and elected six Congressmen, one
20of whom was Thomas E. Watson. The Alliance of Tennessee secured the
election of the governor and dominated the legislature to such an extent
that one historian has said that it was "distinctly agrarian in charac- 
PIter.' In South Carolina, where the Alliance had been unsuccessful in 
previous elections, the Bourbon dynasty fell under the onslaught of the 
aroused farmers. Benjamin Tillman was elected governor and the state
PP
legislature was filled with his agrarian supporters. Texas voters 
POFor details on the Georgia election see Alex M. Arnett, The 
Populist Movement in Georgia, Vol. 104: Studies in History, Economics 
and Public Law of Columbia University (New York; Columbia University,
1922), pp. 114-26.
^^aniel M. Robison, Bob Taylor and the Agrarian Revolt in Tennes­
see (Cliapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 1935); P* l^ W.
PPTillman launched his campaign for the gubernatorial nomination 
in January of I89O when there appeared the Shell Manifesto— written by 
Tillman but published over the name of G. W. Shell, President of the 
South Carolina Farmers' Association. In this address it was stated that 
the farmers had sought to secure economic and governmental reforms for 
five years, but that all their efforts had been th^ rarted by the entrenched 
politicians. Tillman said the whites of the state had accepted the 
Bourbon program only because they feared division would result in a re­
newal of Negro rule. He promised that he and his supporters would rectify 
the ills suffered by the masses, but would do it through the agency of 
the Democratic party. For the text of the Shell Manifesto see Henry S. 
Comraager (ed.). Documents of American History (Two volumes in one, 4th 
ed.; New York; Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948), II, 138-42. After 
Tillman's nomination a North Carolina newspaper said he was to be con-
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elected James Hogg, not truly an Alliance man but giving lip service to 
its principles, and in nearly every other Southern state the farmers 
elected Congressmen or numerous members of the state legislature. 
Throughout the South the elation of the agrarian element knew no bounds. 
One jubilant member of that class, when the results of the election be­
came known, was moved to write that "being Democrats and in the majority
2k
we took possession of the Democratic party.
Although the Alliance had won a resounding victory some of its 
more important members, among them Leonidas Polk, were already convinced 
that it would not be politically wise to continue within the Democratic 
party.They believed that the program of the farmers would have a
demned for basing his campaign on the points he had made prominent and 
for his disreputable and demagogical method of securing office. He was 
to be commended, however, for making his fight within the Democratic 
party. Raleigh Hews and Observer, September 13, 189O. For the best 
account of Tillman's life see Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, 
South Carolinian (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 19^^ ).
go
In Alabama between 75 and 80 of the 133 Assemblymen were 
supporters of the Alliance, but Reuben F. Kolb, the state leader, was 
defeated in his bid for the governor's nomination. Florida saw 52 of 
the 100 seats in the state legislature filled by members of the Alliance, 
and also a member of that organization was chosen to serve in the United 
States Senate. Mississippi elected two Alliance members to Congress. 
Woodward, Origins of the Hew South, p. 203.
2k 1Quoted in ibid., p. 20U.
25^At the annual Alliance convention, which met at Ocala, Florida, 
in December, 189O, Western delegates attempted to secure Southern approval 
of the Populist party. The conservative element, led by Macune, preferred 
to continue working through the Democratic party, and was able to secure 
the passage of a resolution postponing consideration of a third party un­
til February, 1892. Ifecune warned Congress that if they did not meet the 
farmers' demands a third party was inevitable. New York Herald, De­
cember 9; 1890, quoted in ibid., p. 236. At this meeting the Alliance 
demands were revised to emphasize the "sub-treasury plan" and other 
Southern ideas. The so-called "Ocala Platform" later became the primary 
guide of the Populists. For the text of this platform see Commager (ed.).
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chance of "being brought to fruition if an agreement could be concluded 
with organized labor and a third party formed to drive the traditional 
parties from power. Also interested, in fact pushing the idea of a third 
political force, were the farmer organizations of the Midwest who, unable 
to gain concessions from the two major parties, had campaigned as Popu­
lists or as other third party groups in 189O.
Despite the fact that some of the prominent agrarian leaders in 
the South were interested in the idea of a third party, an event of the 
year 189O prevented the immediate conclusion of such an arrangement. Tra­
ditionally, the small farmer class of the South was antagonistic toward 
their colored neighbor and they had long heeded the warnings voiced by 
the Bourbons that a split in the party of white supremacy would result 
in the Negro again becoming politically powerful. This ifarning was given 
a semblance of validity even before the electorate went to the polls in 
1890 when Congressman Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts introduced a bill 
in the House of Representatives calling for Federal control of elections.
Documents of American History, II, p. 142. A resolution was also adopted 
at Ocala in which the white Alliance protested against the Lodge bill.
U. S., Congressional Record, 51st Cong., 2nd Sess., XXII, Part 1, 256.
The Colored Alliance, meeting separately at Ocala, endorsed the Lodge 
bill.
^^ The main difference between this bill and the one of 187O which 
was still on the books was in the increased power it gave to supervisors 
of elections. The Lodge bill provided that supervision would occur in any 
city on the petition of one hundred voters and in any Congressional 
District on the petition of fifty. The supervisor ivas empowered to pass 
on the qualification of any challenged voter, accept any ballot the state 
election officers refused to receive, and inform illiterates in which box 
to place their ballot. Idien the person declared by the Federal official 
to be elected was not the same as the one certified by the state canvass­
ers, the Clerk of the House was required to place the one designated by 
the Federal supervisor on the rolls. For the arguments by Lodge as to 
the necessity for the measure see U.S., Congressional Record, 51st Cong.,
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This measure, immediately termed the "force bill" in the South, aroused 
extreme excitement in that region. Southern newspapers attacked the pro­
posal as a diabolical plan to impose another Reconstruction upon the South. 
The Atlanta Journal, for example, maintained that those who were advo­
cating the. measure were not really interested in promoting the welfare of 
the colored men but were, like Republicans of old, engaged in an effort to 
enhance the power of their party and to improve their own position. If 
the bill, said the editor, "accidently stirs up strife and bloodshed at 
the south, so much the better for their purposes. That will strengthen 
their vravering lines in the northeast and help them in a desperate effort 
to get one more president out of the 'bloody s h i r t . T h e  Raleigh Mews 
and Observer stated that the people of the South had just cause for com­
plaint against the Republicans because they "treat Southern folks without 
any consideration . . ., disregard the interests of the South, abuse our 
section, villify our people . . . and otherwise hold the South as conquered
provinces rather than as states in the Union or on an equality with their 
28
sister States." In complete agreement with these views was another 
Bourbon journal— the Atlanta Constitution. This newspaper called at­
tention to the fact that the South had once before been faced with the 
situation which would prevail if the Lodge bill v?as enacted into law. 
Realizing this, said the editor, there should be a revival of "that
1st Sess., XXII, Appendix, 6538-^ 5. A Northern journal said the effect 
of the measure would be to take "the election of members of the House out 
of the hands of State officials." Nation, LI (July 17, 189O), p. 44.
^^Atlanta Journal, July 22, 189O.
^®Raleigh News and Observer, August 26, 189O.
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glorious era when the indomitable spirit of the freemen of Georgia ira.s 
equal to the emergency . . . .  What we did tw'enty years ago, " he pro­
claimed, "we can do again.
Southern manifestations of displeasure with the "force bill" were 
not confined to the columns of newspapers nor to the members of the Demo­
cratic party. Jonathan Norcross, often a Republican candidate for office 
in Georgia, announced that he \j3.s bitterly opposed to the measure and pre-
SOdieted that even if it was passed it would never be enforced in the South.
S. A. Darnell, United States Attorney in Georgia, protested that not only 
was such a measure not needed to insure fair elections in the South but 
that it \rs.s unfair to all of the states.3  ^ in Florife a Republican con­
vention in the Second Congressional District adopted a platform which in­
cluded a plank attacking the measure, and;in North Carolina a former Re­
publican candidate for Congress complained that passage of the bill would 
result in the Africanization of the South.Most white Southerners, 33
^Atlanta Constitution, July l8, 189O. One Republican journal, 
the Washington Post, agreed that the Lodge bill was not introduced for 
the purpose of securing fair elections. "In fact," said the editor, "it 
is an instrument bubbling over with mischief of a most dangerous nature, 
and its passage would bring about a. state of chaos in all parts of the 
country that no party could carry and succeed." Quoted in Atlanta 
Journal, July 11, I89O. The New York Tribune, on the other hand, v/as 
loud in its acclaim of the measure. It advised all Republican Congress­
men that it "is the only Republican caucus measure of the session except 
the Silver bill . . . and Republicans certainly ou^t to be as earnest 
and attentive in support of it ... as the Democrats are earnest and 
active in opposing the bill and upholding fraud and theft in elections."
New York Tribune, June 28, 189O.
-'^ Atlanta Journal, July 29, I89O.
3 S^ee the Raleigh News and Observer, August I5 and 30, 189O.
33In Tennessee a colored convention heard a resolution opposing 
the Lodge bill, but after considerable discussion it narrowly adopted one
26i
then, agreed with the editor of the Atlanta Constitution who had written 
in 1889, when the question of the necessity of a more stringent Federal 
election law was being discussed, that "the American people have never 
been confronted with an issue like this. It involves the surrender of 
their liberties, and it gives the government perpetually into the hands 
of the dominant party." Such a measure, he continued, would put "the 
south back to the days of 1868— under even worse conditions than then 
prevailed. It again inspires the negro with the federal drumbeat and 
fortifies him vith federal bayonets.
The emotionalism which was paramount in newspaper articles and in 
statements by individuals j^as seconded in debates on the Lodge bill which 
ensued in Congress— debates which Southerners of every political per­
suasion followed with deep and abiding interest. In the House of Repre­
sentatives the Republicans were in a slight majority and, since the bill 
was made a party measure, it was almost a foregone conclusion that it 
would be passed by that body'. Nevertheless, Congressmen from the South 
deemed it necessary to go on record as being opposed to any measure which 
had as its purpose the regulation of elect i o n s . I n  general, their main
favoring the measure. Atlanta Journal, August 1, I89O. In North Carolina 
a convention of colored Republicans also adopted a resolution affirming 
support of the measure, and the same Tfras true of a comparable convention 
in South Carolina. Raleigh News and Observer, August 27 and September 20,
1890.
ok
Atlanta Constitution, November 3; I889.
35^^With rare exception, not including Negro Congressmen, the Re­
publicans from the South were generally opposed to the Lodge bill. For 
example, Hamilton G. Ewart of North Carolina informed Congress that al­
though he realized that he would have to pay a penalty, a sense of duty 
required him to go against his party. He insisted that in his state all 
men were free to cast a ballot and have it counted. U.S., Congressional
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arguments consisted of protestations against Republican assertions that 
the legislation was necessary to protect the Negro in his right to vote, 
that the bill as proposed was unconstitutional because it violated the 
right of the states to regulate their elections, and that it had been 
introduced primarily for the purpose of bolstering the chances of the 
Republican party in future elections.
As various Southern Congressmen spoke against the measure they 
usually emphasized one or more of these arguments. Thomas Stockdale of 
Mississippi, for example, argued that there was no need for such a law 
and characterized the proposed legislation as un-American, unexpedient, 
and unnecessary.3  ^ Congressmen Benjamin Bunn and Thomas Skinner of North 
Carolina couched their arguments on the basis that the Negro voted freely 
and had his ballot counted. Skinner, in a bitter indictment of the Re­
publicans, said that the leaders of that party were little interested in 
the colored men as long as it was possible to maintain political control 
without them. Now, he said, the Republican tariff and silver policy had 
antagonized the adherents of that party in the West, and consequently the 
party bosses were attempting to insure their continued dominance through 
the medium of the colored vote and an election law. ?^ That this was the
Record, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., I89O, XXI, Part 7, 6688. See also Raleigh 
News and Observer, August 22, 189O.
3 U^.S., Congressional Record, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., I89O, XXI, 
Part 2, 562-72. Stockdale insisted that the Negro needed no protection 
in the South. He maintained that "the old masters and old slaves are 
friends today, defying all the viscious schemes put in motion to alienate 
them." Congressman Joseph \'Jheeler of Alabama couched his main argument 
in the terms that the bill was unconstitutional. Ibid., 681-82.
3Tlbid., 453-55.
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real purpose of the Republicans was also the thought of Congressman Henry
H. Carlton of Georgia. Like most of his colleagues, however, his primary 
purpose iras to impress upon the supporters of the Lodge bill that their 
efforts would be for naught. Passage of the measure, he warned, would 
solidify the whites of the South in support of the Democratic party as 
never before— a fact which would make the revival of Republican-Negro 
rule an impossibility.^^
Despite the protests of Democratic Congressmen from all sections 
of the nation, the Lodge bill was passed by the Republican-controlled 
House of Representatives in the fall of 1890.^^ Consequently, when 
Congress convened for its second session after the November elections 
the interest of people tliroughout the nation turned to the debate which 
began in the Senate.Beginning early in December and continuing well
^^ Ibid., Part 7, 6888-91. With a few exceptions most Southern 
Congressmen were in agreement with Samuel W. Peel of Arkansas who said 
that the bill should be entitled "an act to stir up strife and cause 
bloodshed in the South and to rob the States and the people of the whole 
country of their right to elect their own officers." Ibid., Part 2, 401.
3%he membership of the Fifty-first Congress consisted of 166 Re­
publicans and 159 Democrats in the House and 39 Republicans and 37 Demo­
crats in the Senate. U.S., Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics 
of the United States, 1789-19 9^: A Supplement to the Statistical Abstract 
of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), 
p. 293. In the House the Lodge bill passed by the slim margin of 155 to 
IÀ9, with 2 k not voting. All of the affirmitive votes but one cast by an 
Independent Union Laborite were by Republicans. Two Republicans voted 
with the Democrats against the measure. Of those voting against the Lodge 
bill, 82 were Southerners and 67 were Northerners. U.S., Congressional 
Record, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., I89O, XXI, Part 6700-735/ 6843-900,
6923-941.
^^New York Daily Tribune, on December 4, 189O, noted that the 
Republican Senators had courageously entered on their duties— the 
foremost of which was to secure the passage of the Lodge bill. The 
Tribune berated the New York Times for opposing the measure, and said 
that it and other journals pursuing the same editorial policy were
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into the new year Republican orators, \mdoubtedly alarmed at the result 
of the Congressional elections,castigated the South for depriving the 
colored men of their legal right to the ballot through force and fraud.
They insisted that it was the moral duty of the Senate to give its assent 
to legislation which would effectively protect all persons, regardless of
42
color, in the free and full enjoyment of their right to vote.
Republican arguments as to the need for an election bill to pro­
tect the Negro elicited nothing but condemnation from the Bourbon Sena­
tors. As was the case with their colleagues in the House of Représenta- . 
tives, they generally characterized the Lodge bill as unnecessary, uncon­
stitutional, and a partisan measure designed to perpetuate the domination
4sof the Republican party. A few of the Bourbons admitted that the legal
committed to ". . . maintaining fraudulent elections as a permanent feature 
of the political system . . . ."
^^As a result of the election of 189O the Republicans lost con­
trol of the House of Representatives. In the new Congress which would 
convene in March of I89I there would be 88 Republicans, 235 Democrats and 
9 others— mostly Populists. Bureau of the Censiis, Historical Statistics 
of the United States, p. 293. Many of the new Democrats were repre­
sentatives of the agrarian class.
lipAs a part of his argument, for example. Senator George F. Hoar 
of Massachusetts had read into the Record an article which appeared in the 
Anglo-Saxon Churchman, published at Little Rock in January, I89I. In this 
article the editor said that "the white people of Arkansas have irrevo­
cably made up their minds that the negroes of the State shall not rule; 
that is no longer a debated question. The only question open to dis­
cussion is the method that shall finally be adopted to nullify the Afri­
can vote." U.S., Congressional Record, 51st Cong., 2nd Sess., I89O, XXII, 
Part 2, Appendix, 1399* Senators James K. Jones and James Berry of Arkan­
sas both vehemently denied that Hoar ivas correct in his impression that 
the Ohio-born editor of the Churchman was aware of the true conditions in 
the state. Both Senators assured their colleagues that the Negro was free 
to vote in Arkansas. Ibid., l400-01.
'^ T^he partisan purpose of the Lodge bill \ja.s emphasized by all 
Senators, but see especially the arguments of John Morgan of Alabama,
2Ô5
rights of the Negro had sometimes been restricted at the South, but they 
insisted that this had been necessary in order that the whites could pro­
tect themselves from the corrupt political control of an ignorant race not 
far removed from savagery. Senator E. C. Walthall of Mississippi, for ex­
ample, said that he had never disputed the fact that in the past illegal 
actions in connection with elections had sometimes occurred in his state. 
He argued, however, that "palliation for these wrongs is found in the 
struggle of a spirited and domtrodden people to save themselves from 
greater wrongs than any they committed for their ovm' protection.
Although Bourbon Senators attempted to couch their arguments in 
temperate terms, the radical attitude toward the Negro vote may be found 
in their statements on the measure. Alexander H.-Colquitt of Georgia in­
formed the Senate that the Negro had not advanced in civilization since • 
emancipation and that enfranchisement of that race had been a grievious 
error. In spite of this, he hastened to add. Southerners realized that
vote was a permanent fixture and they had no intention of attempting to
ij-Sdeprive the colored men of the ballot. Senator Samuel Pasco of Florida 
promised that "the Anglo-Saxon will be true to this history. In every 
quarter of the world where he has been placed side by side with people of . 
other races he has ruled.James Z. George of Mississippi warned that
Zebulon Vance of North Carolina, John Regan of Texas, and Randall Gibson 
of Louisiana. Ibid., Part 1, 319 ff. Some Southern Senators argued that 
the political condition of the "wage slaves" in the North was no better 
than that of the Negro.
^Ibid., 367-7^ . ^^ Ibid., 451-68.
^Pasco tempered his statement by saying that course the Negro 
would be protected in his rights as a citizen and property holder. Ibid.,
403-18.
266
if the Republicans secured the passage of the bill then "... remembering 
the history and traditions of our race, we give you notice of your certain 
and assured failure; it will never come to pass in Mississippi, in Flori­
da, in South Carolina, or in any other State in the South, that the neck 
of the white race shall be under the foot of the negro, or the Mongolian, 
or of any created b e i n g . Wade Hampton of South Carolina, who had con­
vinced President Hayes in I877 that the future of the Negro was safe in the 
hands of the Southern whites, summed up the arguments of his colleagues.
"In my opinion," he said, "the voters who in any State represent the best 
elements, the capital, the intelligence, and the virtue should govern, de­
spite all finespun theories of fraternity and equality, the sacred brother-
L O'
hood of mankind, and the divine right of universal suffrage."
Although the Lodge bill failed of passage in the Senate in Janu­
ary of 1891,^9 it had already served to increase Southern antagonism 
against the colored man as a voter. The electoral success of the farmers 
in the elections of I89O had brought into office representatives of the 
class which vras traditionally the most antagonistic toward the Negro «
While some of the agrarian leaders, especially during the next few years 
when the Populists were contesting for control in the South, sought to 
reach an understanding with the colored voter, there was early a movement
^^Ibid., Part 2, 3 2 k ff. ^^Ibid., Part 1, 4.98 ff.
^%he Democrats filibustered the Lodge bill, and, with the aid of 
several Republican Senators, defeated a move by Senator Nelson Aldrich of 
Rhode Island to invoke cloture. Qn January 22 the bill was laid aside so 
that another measure could be considered and was not taken up again. 
Undoubtedly Southern support of the silver bill earlier in the session 
won them the support of some Republicans from the silver states.
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under way to render the Negro politically impotent. This movement began 
in Mississippi shortly after the Lodge bill was introduced into the House 
of Representatives. In this state, where the Negro outnumbered the white, 
a convention was assembled for the purpose of preparing a new instrument 
of government. The farmer-controlled assembly encountered little diffi­
culty in adopting a clause which legally circumvented the Fifteenth 
Amendment. It imposed a poll tax, excluded electors who had been con- ■ 
victed of certain crimes, and prohibited the voting of all individuals'
who could not read a section of the state constitution, understand it
50when read, or give a reasonable interpretation of its meaning.^
While Mississippi was the only state to effect disfranchisement
through the medium of a change in the organic law before the advent of
the Populist revolt, the attitude toward Negro voting was more radical in-
51most states after Bourbon control was restricted. In South Carolina,
%^"or the story of the convention and the literacy test which it 
evolved'see Vlnarton, The Negro in Mississippi, pp. IggrSlS.
^^Although the Alliance had achieved considerable success the con­
servatives were still an influential element. They were able, in most 
states, to prevent the adoption of the more socialistic parts of the 
agrarian program. They were reluctant to call conventions that might 
write the provisions of the "Ocala Platform" into the organic law. Later 
the conservatives used the Negro vote to defeat the Populists. When this 
vreis accomplished the Southern states began to follow the lead of Missis­
sippi and changed their constitutions to effect the disfranchisement of 
the colored race by adopting a literacy test. Tennessee, Florida, Arkan­
sas, and Texas accomplished disfranchisement by adopting a poll tax and 
by other devices. Woodward, Origins of the New South, pp. 235-63, 321. 
Most Southern states did not maintain registration records which differ­
entiated between white and colored electors. Louisiana did, however, 
and the figures can probably be taken as an indication of the state of 
affairs in most Southern states. In l397, just before the Constitution 
of the state was changed to include a literacy test, there were l6h,088 
whites and 130,3^ -^  colored men registered in Louisiana, The figures for 
1898 showed 7 ,^133 whites and 12,902 Negroes, and those for I9OO were 
125,^ 37 whites and 5,320 colored men. The increase in white registration
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for example, Benjamin Tillman proclaimed in his inangnral address on De­
cember 4, 1890, that "Democracy has yon a great victory unparalleled. The 
triumph of Democracy over mongrelism and anarchy is most complete." He 
went ahead to boast that the whites had absolute control of the govern­
ment and intended at all costs to retain it because the Negroes had little 
capacity to exercise the franchise intelligently.^^ This demagogic at­
titude amply expressed that voiced by the most rabid radical during the 
Bourbon period and was a portent of the animosity which was to be directed 
toward the colored race during most of the decade of the nineties.
It was during the years of the eighteen-nineties— a time in which 
the United States annexed territory populated by other colored peoples 
and assumed the responsibility for their elevation— that the Southern 
Negro was largely deprived of the privilege of exercising the ballot.
While it is true that large numbers of coJ.ored men did troop to the polls 
when Populists and Democrats were contesting for control of the state 
governments,' when the representatives of the "boys at the forks of the 
creek" became dominant in the Democratic party in the South the days of 
the Negro as an elector were numbered. Such an event had occurred by the 
middle years of the decade and after that time there was little proba­
bility that the liberal attitude expressed by Cable and a few other 
Southerners would be taken seriously. By that time the colored men had
v/as undoubtedly due to the effect of the "grandfather clause." Figures 
cited in Philip Uzee, "Republican Politics in Louisiana," (unpublished 
ph. D. dissertation, Louisiana State University), p. 196.
^^Tillman said that it was not true that all men were created 
equal. He insisted that the white men were superior. Simkins, Pitchfork 
Ben Tillman, pp. 171-75, 295*
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been abandoned by their Republican mentors, and the Bourbon policy of 
moderation which had been a noteworthy event of the eighties was an at­
titude of the seemingly distant past. Thus by 1895 the liberal attitude 
was a thing of scorn; moderation was dead and the traditional antagonists 
of the Negro were In political control. By the utilization of the poll 
tax, strict residence requirements, the literacy test, and eventually by 
closing the Democratic primary to Negro'es, the white supremlsts embarked 
the South upon-a.policy leading to almost complete disfranchisement— a 
policy of'Which the’echoes are still rolling. ■ ' . •
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